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Samenvatting
–Summary in Dutch–
De laatste twintig jaar kenden een snelle groei van grafische modellen
in artificiële intelligentie en statistiek. Deze modellen combineren grafen
en waarschijnlijkheidsrekening om complexe multivariate problemen aan
te pakken, en het aantal toepassingen is legio. Zowel in de medische,
financiële en biotechnologische wereld alsook in domeinen zoals risico-
analyse en defensie. worden deze modellen gebruikt. Omdat de informatie
die over een fysisch systeem verkregen wordt vaak imprecies van aard is,
blijft het echter een fikse uitdaging om de waarschijnlijkheden in deze
modellen te bepalen. Als gevolg hiervan worden vaak te sterke en slecht
onderbouwde conclusies getrokken. Het is dan ook niet ongebruikelijk om
een sensitiviteitsanalyse uit te voeren. Bij zo’n sensitiviteitsanalyse worden
de parameters in het bestudeerde grafische netwerk lichtjes veranderd, en
wordt er nagegaan of deze kleine variaties tot dezelfde conclusies leiden.
Deze sensitiviteitsanalyse is echter niet altijd afdoende. Het is bijvoorbeeld
niet zo dat de overtuigingen van een expert aangaande de mogelijke
uitkomsten van een toevallige veranderlijke steeds volledig bepaald zijn, zelfs
al beschikte hij over onbeperkte middellen en tijd om tot deze overtuigingen
te komen. De overtuiging van de expert is niet volledig bepaald in de zin
dat hij niet op elke vraag een antwoord weet, of soms onbeslist is. Het
klinkt dan ook redelijk om te zeggen dat de kennis van een expert, tot
op zeker hoogte, inherent imprecies is [62, Hoofdstuk 5]. Deze simpele
10
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observatie doet niet alleen de sensitiveitsanalyse falen, maar toont ook aan
dat gewone waarschijnlijkheden ontoereikend zijn om alle finesses van het
modelleren van onzekerheid te bevatten: modellen gebaseerd op klassieke
waarschijnlijkheden kunnen immers nooit onbeslist zijn.
Aangezien waarschijnlijkheden dus te kort schieten, stellen we in hoof-
dstuk 128 een nieuw model voor ter vervanging van klassieke waarschijn-
lijkheden. Dit model wordt een coherente verzameling van aanvaardbare
gokken genoemd en is gestoeld op de Finetti’s operationele subjectivistische
aanpak [24]. Een verzameling van aanvaardbare gokken wordt𝒜 genoteerd.
We stellen een operationele en gedragsgerichte aanpak voorop omdat we
willen dat het model een duidelijke interpretatie heeft en de consequenties
van een beoordeling goed gedefinieerd zijn. Het operationele aspect van
de modellering van de overtuigingen van een expert in verband met de
mogelijke uitkomsten van een toevallige veranderlijke, bestaat er in om de
expert een aantal gokken aan te bieden. Een gok f is een reëelwaardige
functie gedefinieerd op een eindige mogelijkhedenruimte die overeenkomt
met de gemodelleerde toevallige veranderlijke. De expert kan dan voor elke
aangeboden gok f besluiten of hij deze aanvaardbaar vindt ( f ∈𝒜) of niet
( f ⇑∈𝒜). Als hij ze aanvaardbaar vindt, dan wil dit zeggen dat hij geen bezwaar
ziet, om deze gok en de gevolgen ervan aan te nemen. Een gok aanvaarden is
dus een beslissing nemen in onzekerheid.
Uiteraard wensen we dat de expert tegemoet komt aan een aantal
rationaliteitseisen. Zo wordt er bijvoorbeeld gesteld dat het niet rationeel
is, om een gok te aanvaarden die gegarandeerd verlies oplevert. Als aan
de rationaliteitsaxioma’s voldaan is, dan noemen we de verzameling van
aanvaardbare gokken coherent. De gebruikte rationaliteitsaxioma’s zijn:
A1. 𝒜∩ℒ≺0 =∅ [zeker verlies vermijden]
A2. ℒ≥0 ⊆𝒜 [gedeeltelijke winst aannemen]
A3. posi(𝒜) =𝒜 [het deductieprincipe voor aanvaardbaarheid]
Uiteraard belet niets ons om gokken die afhangen van meerdere toevallige
veranderlijken aan te bieden aan de expert en onze theorie is dus effectief
in staat om multivariate onzekerheidsmodellen te beschrijven. We tonen
ook aan hoe we kunnen marginaliseren en conditioneren en zo krijgt de
theorie van de coherente verzamelingen van aanvaardbare gokken de allures
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van een voldragen onzekerheidsmodelleringstheorie. We kunnen ons ook
afvragen hoeveel de expert bereid zou zijn te betalen voor een gok die hem
aangeboden wordt. Deze maximale (supremale) aanvaardbare prijs wordt
de onderprevisie P( f ) van de gok f genoemd en we tonen aan hoe deze
onderprevisie afgeleid kan worden, wanneer een coherente verzameling van
aanvaardbare gokken gegeven wordt:
P( f ) = sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈𝒜} .
Alternatief kunnen we ons afvragen welke de minimale (infimale) aanvaard-
bare prijs voor de expert is, opdat hij een gok zou verkopen. Deze minimale
prijs wordt de bovenprevisie P(⋅) genoemd. Het verband tussen de onder-
en bovenprevisie wordt gegeven door P( f ) =−P(− f ).
Dit werk is niet het eerste dat gebruik maakt van verzamelingen van
gokken om overtuigingen van een expert te beschrijven. Bijvoorbeeld Willi-
ams [67] en voornamelijk Walley [62] definieerden al tal van verzamelingen
van gokken. Een van de redenen waarom we toch ons eigen model uitwerkten,
is vanwege de stiefmoederlijke behandeling van de nulgok, de gok die niets
oplevert, maar ook geen verlies met zich meebrengt. Ook de behandeling
van onverschilligheid laat te wensen over. Zo definieerde Walley bijvoorbeeld
twee verschillende soorten van coherente verzamelingen van wenselijke
gokken, die zich van mekaar onderscheiden door de nulgok wel, volgens
de eerste definitie, en niet, volgens de tweede definitie als wenselijk te
beschouwen. Het probleem is het niet onderkennen van de fundamentele
onverschilligheid die gepaard zou moeten gaan met de nulgok. Als de expert
de nulgok aangeboden zou krijgen, dan zou hij geen reden mogen zien om
hem niet te aanvaarden, maar als de expert de nulgok al had, dan zou hij
evenmin een reden mogen zien om deze nulgok van de hand te doen. De
verzameling van onverschillige gokken ℐ is gedefinieerd als die gokken die
aanvaardbaar zijn, terwijl ook hun negatie aanvaardbaar is: ℐ =𝒜∩−𝒜. Een
groot voordeel van het expliciet maken van deze categorie, is dat we een
elegante manier hebben om (sterke) symmetrie te beschrijven. Als de expert
bijvoorbeeld denkt dat de permutatie van de opeenvolging van de uitkomsten
van een experiment er niet toe doet, dan impliceert dit dat hij onverschillig is
wanneer hij moet kiezen tussen een gok f en zijn permutatie pi f : f −pi f ∈ ℐ .
De behandeling van symmetrie, die evenwel niet centraal staat in deze thesis,
is dan ook iets waar onze coherente verzamelingen van aanvaardbare gokken
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in uitblinken.
Een van de eenvoudigste grafische waarschijnlijkheidsmodellen zijn
waarschijnlijkheids- of gebeurtenissenbomen en het is dan ook niet onlo-
gisch om ons onderzoek naar grafische operationele onzekerheidsmodellen
te starten bij deze structuur. In hoofdstuk 280 veralgemenen we waarschijn-
lijkheidsbomen door de waarschijnlijkheden in de nodes te vervangen door
coherente verzamelingen van aanvaardbare gokken, of door onderprevisies,
en noemen het resultaat een imprecieze gebeurtenissenboom [12]. De
nodes in dit bijzonder soort grafen zijn de situaties, of mogelijke uitkomsten,
waarin het gemodelleerde systeem zich kan bevinden. De boomstructuur
legt de opeenvolging (volgorde) van de situaties vast en kan gezien worden
als het vastleggen van causale verbanden [53]. De coherente verzamelingen
van accepteerbare gokken in de nodes zijn lokale modellen geassocieerd met
knooppunten die de overtuiging van de expert over direct volgende situaties
beschrijven. We tonen hoe deze lokale modellen samengesteld kunnen
worden tot een globaal model en belangrijker, geven een algoritme dat de
onderprevisie van een globale gok op een efficiënte manier kan bepalen.
Hierbij wordt dan wel verondersteld dat de diepte van de boom eindig is.
Alhoewel het concept imprecieze gebeurtenissenboom vrij eenvoudig
lijkt, mag deze ontwikkeling toch niet onderschat worden, daar zij een eerste
stap vormt in het ontwikkelen van een gebeurtenisgedreven theorie van to-
evalsprocessen in discrete tijd, gebaseerd op imprecieze waarschijnlijkheden.
Als voorbeeld behandelen we het gekende gokkers-bankroet (gambler’s ruin)
probleem, bespreken we een eenvoudige veralgemening van het Bernoulli-
proces en leiden we uitdrukkingen af voor veralgemeende identieke en
onafhankelijk verdeelde processen (of steekproeven). Er bestaat een sterk
verband [12] tussen onze imprecieze waarschijnlijkheidsbomen en Shafer en
Vovk’s speltheoretische waarschijnlijkheidstheorie [55]. In deze laatste theorie
staan de concepten sub- en supermartingaal centraal en we definiëren deze
speciale processen ook in ons raamwerk. Deze sub-en supermartingalen
worden door Shafer en Vovk bijvoorbeeld uitvoerig gebruikt om limietwetten
af te leiden en we gaan na of Shafer en Vovk’s methodes overdraagbaar zijn
naar imprecieze gebeurtenissenbomen. Als voorbeeld leiden we de zwakke
wet van de grote getallen en de Hoeffding-Azuma-vergelijking af.
Een ander grafische model, dat in hoofdstuk 4160 van dit proefschrift
beschreven wordt, is de imprecieze Markovboom [13]. Net zoals imprecieze
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gebeurtenissenbomen, is de grafische structuur een boom, maar in tegen-
stelling tot gebeurtenissenbomen waar de nodes situaties representeren, zijn
de nodes in Markovbomen toevallige veranderlijken. De locale modellen
worden nu niet gegeven in de vorm van coherente verzamelingen van
aanvaardbare gokken, maar we beperken ons in dit hoofdstuk tot coher-
ente onderprevisies, conditioneel op de voorgaande node (de ouder- of
moederknoop). De vraag die zich nu stelt is: wat de betekenis is van deze
Markovboom? Klassieke Bayesiaanse netwerken coderen d-scheiding. Van
d-scheiding is echter geweten [10] dat ze zeker niet overdraagbaar is naar
imprecieze waarschijnlijkheden omdat ze symmetrie codeert die in imprecies
probabilistische modellen slechts uitzonderlijk gegarandeerd is. Daarom
geven we de grafische structuur een licht andere betekenis: conditioneel op
de ouders zijn alle toevallige veranderlijken die niet op de ouders volgen
(de ouders niet meegerekend) epistemisch irrelevant [42, 62] voor de nodes
die wel op de ouders volgen. In een boom is er natuurlijk telkens maar één
ouder die we dan de moeder noemen. We zeggen dat een veranderlijke X
epistemisch irrelevant is voor Y wanneer het observeren van de waarde
van X , geen invloed heeft op de model dat de onzekerheid beschrijft
voor Y . Dit is nieuw. In tegenstelling tot onze aanpak, veronderstelt het
leeuwendeel van de imprecieze grafische modellen die tot nog toe bestudeerd
werden sterke onafhankelijkheid in plaats van epistemische irrelevantie. Dit
soort grafische modellen wordt ook wel credale netwerken genoemd, en
is sterk gelinkt met sensitiviteitsanalyse. Het imprecieze model wordt dan
beschouwd als de gedeeltelijke beschrijving van een uniek precies, klassiek
waarschijnlijkheidsmodel.
Ook voor imprecieze Markovbomen zijn we in staat om een globale
onderprevisie op te bouwen uit de lokale onderprevisies. Computationeel
is deze uitdrukking echter niet onmiddellijk toepasbaar. We kunnen de
geconstrueerde, globale onderprevisie echter wel gebruiken om op een
efficiënte wijze de onderprevisie van een gok op één bepaalde node,
conditioneel op een willekeurig aantal geobserveerde nodes te bepalen.
Dit exacte algorithm gebruikt net als Pearls bekende algoritme [47] een
techniek van message-passing, maar is toch fundamenteel en conceptueel
verschillend.
Als laatste grafische model bespreken we in hoofdstuk 3122 de imprecieze
Markovketen [14, 28, 29, 59], die zowel kan geïnterpreteerd worden als een
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speciaal soort imprecieze gebeurtenissenboom, en als een speciaal type
imprecieze Markovboom. Een imprecieze Markovketen is een imprecieze
Markovboom, waarbij de grafische structuur—zoals de naam aangeeft—een
ketting vormt. Het scheidingsprincipe, dat de grafische structuur van de im-
precieze Markovboom betekenis gaf, wordt in dit geval de Markovvoorwaarde
genoemd. Deze Markovvoorwaarde zegt dat alle knopen die voorafgaan aan
een bepaalde knoop, epistemisch irrelevant zijn voor al de nodes die volgen
op deze bepaalde knoop, en dit op voorwaarde dat de waarde van deze ene
node gekend is. De Markovconditie rechtvaardigt het gebruik van het woord
toestand in imprecieze Markovketens. Het blijkt bovendien voordelig om
de lokale conditionele bovenwaarschijnlijkheden samen te vatten in één
boventransitieoperator, het imprecieze analogon van de transitiematrix in
klassieke Markovketens. Een imprecieze Markovketen wordt dan beschreven
door zijn boventransitieoperator (of boventransitieoperatoren in het geval
de Markovketen niet stationair is) en een initiële bovenprevisie. Bij de keuze
van de Markovconditie hadden we ook weer sterke onafhankelijkheid in
plaats van epistemische irrelevantie kunnen gebruiken. We tonen aan dat
zowel epistemische irrelevantie als sterke onafhankelijkheid tot dezelfde
onderprevisie op marginale gokken leiden, we geven een algoritme dat lineair
is in het aantal beschouwde knopen.
Een belangrijk geval waarbij we enkel marginale gokken bestuderen, is
bij de studie van het limietgedrag van Markovketens. We slagen er in om
een veralgemeende Perron-Frobeniusstelling te bewijzen en demonstreren
bovendien dat deze eigenschap equivalent is met ergodiciteit. Ergodiciteit
impliceert ook dat er precies één invariante (initiële) bovenprevisie is. We
ontwikkelen een efficiënt algoritme dat kan bepalen of een imprecieze
Markovketen ergodisch is. In het speciale geval van imprecieze Markovketens
met een tweedimensionale toestandsruimte beschrijven we bovendien het
gedrag van de Markovketen in termen van de eigenwaarden en vectoren van
de boventransitieoperator.


Summary
The last twenty years have witnessed a rapid growth of graphical models
in the fields of artificial intelligence and statistics. These models combine
graphs and probability theory to address complex multivariate problems
in a variety of domains, such as medicine, finance, risk analysis, defence,
and environment, to name just a few. Often, the parameters of the graphical
model are not known precisely, and that is why one considers the set of all
the graphical models that are consistent with the partial specification of the
parameters. Common causes for the existence of partial knowledge are the
cost of, and time constraints on, eliciting parameters, and disagreement
amongst a group of experts consulted for that purpose. Non-ignorable
missing data can be another reason, in case the parameters are inferred
from a data set.
The sensitivity analysis interpretation of imprecise probability models,
and hence strong independence, is not always applicable. A notable case
arises when one wishes to model an expert’s beliefs: it is then not always
tenable that there should be some ideal probability that models these beliefs,
and that it is only because of our limited resources that we cannot define it
precisely. Rather, it seems more reasonable to concede that expert knowledge
may be inherently imprecise to some extent [62, Chapter 5]. This simple
observation not only shows that sensitivity analysis can fail, it also states that
probabilities lack the expressiveness that is necessary to model imprecision
and indecision adequately.
To overcome the shortcomings of classical probabilities, we propose in
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Chapter 128 a new model as a replacement for them. The new models are
called coherent sets of acceptable gambles and find their roots in de Finetti’s
operational subjectivist philosophy [24]. We denote a set of acceptable
gambles by𝒜. We want our framework to be behaviouristic and operational
because we want a clear interpretation of the model. The operational aspect
exists in the offering of a number of gambles to the expert who is modelling
the uncertainty. A gamble f is a real valued function, defined on a finite
possibility space𝒳 that corresponds to any variable X that is modelled. The
expert can decide whether he is willing to accept the offered gamble ( f ∈𝒜)
or not ( f ⇑∈𝒜). If he considers a gamble to be acceptable, then this means
that he does not object to accept the gamble and its consequences.
It is evident that we want the expert to meet some rationality criteria. It is
assumed, for example, that accepting a gamble that guarantees sure loss is
not a rational thing to do. If the rationality requirements are satisfied, then
we say that the set of acceptable gambles is coherent. The rationality criteria
we impose are:
A1. 𝒜∩ℒ≺0 =∅ [avoiding sure loss]
A2. ℒ≥0 ⊆𝒜 [accepting partial gain]
A3. posi(𝒜) =𝒜 [deduction principle for acceptability]
Of course, nothing says that we cannot offer the expert gambles that
depend on a number of variables and our theory is effectively capable of
describing multivariate uncertainty models. In that case, we show how our
uncertainty models can be marginalised and updated which pushes our
theory towards a full-fledged framework for uncertainty modelling. We can
also ask ourselves how much the expert would be willing to pay for a gamble
that is offered to him. This maximal (supremal) acceptable price is what we
call the lower prevision P(⋅) and we show what is the relation between lower
previsions and sets of acceptable gambles:
P( f ) = sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈𝒜} .
The minimal (infimum) acceptable price the expert is willing to give for a
gamble is what we call the upper prevision P(⋅). The upper prevision can
be found from the lower prevision through the conjugacy relation P( f ) =−P(− f ).
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Our work is not the first that uses sets of gambles to describe an expert’s
beliefs. Williams [67] and in a more prominent way Walley [62], define
multiple types of sets of coherent gambles. The reason why we do not adopt
one of their types of sets, is because of the way the zero gamble is treated.
This zero gamble is the gamble that results neither gain nor profit, a status
quo. Walley, for example, defines two different types of coherent sets of
desirable gambles, that differ only in that in one definition, the zero gamble
is assumed to be desirable, and in the other it is not desirable. We believe
that, if the zero gamble is offered to an expert, he should have no objections
to buying it, nor should he object to selling it. In other words, the expert
should be indifferent towards the zero gamble. We define the category of
indifferent gambles ℐ as the gambles that are acceptable themselves, but
also their negation: ℐ =𝒜∩−𝒜. A strong advantage of making this category
of gambles explicit, is that it provides an elegant way of describing (strong)
symmetry. If, for example, an expert believes that it does not matter, in a
sequence of experiments, whether outcomes are permuted or not, then he
can express this by saying that the gamble f minus his permuted version pi f
is an indifferent gamble: f −pi f ∈ ℐ . The treatment of symmetry, although
not central in this work, is where our approach to coherent sets of acceptable
gambles stands out.
Probability (or event) trees are amongst the simplest graphical models
and it is not illogical to start our research into graphical uncertainty models
with this structure. In Chapter 280, we generalise event trees by replacing the
probabilities in each node with coherent sets of acceptable gambles, or with
coherent lower previsions. The result is an imprecise probability tree [12]
and the nodes in this special type of graphical model represent the situations,
or possible outcomes that the modelled system can be in. The coherent
sets of acceptable gambles in the nodes are local models that describe the
expert’s belief about situations that follow immediately. We show how to
combine these local belief models into a global model and importantly, give
an algorithm that can calculate lower previsions of global gambles efficiently.
In order for the algorithm to work, we have to assume that the depth of the
tree is finite.
The concept of an imprecise probability tree sure seems simple, but this
development should not be underestimated, as it is a first step towards an
event-driven account of random processes in discrete time with imprecise
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probability models. As an example, we treat the famous gambler’s ruin
problem and derive an expression for a generalised version of independent
and identically distributed processes (or random samples). There is a strong
connection [12] between the theory we have developed, and Shafer and
Vovk’s game-theoretic probability [55]. In the latter, the concept of sub- and
supermartingales is central and we define these special processes in our
version as well. Shafer and Vovk use these methods extensively to prove
generalisations of strong and weak laws from classical probability theory
and we investigate whether the methods they use can be transferred to our
imprecise event tree framework. As an example, we derive the Weak Law of
Large Numbers and the Hoeffding - Azuma inequality.
Another graphical model, which we study in Chapter 4160, is the impre-
cise Markov tree [13]. Like imprecise event trees, the graphical structure
is a tree, but in contradistinction with imprecise event trees, where the
nodes represent situations, the nodes in imprecise Markov trees are random
variables. The local uncertainty models are given as coherent sets of
acceptable gambles, but we restrict ourselves to lower previsions, conditional
on the previous node (the parent or mother node). The question about the
exact meaning of the graphical structure presents itself. Classical Bayesian
networks encode d-separation. In the case of imprecise probability trees,
we know however [10] that they do not satisfy d-separation because the
symmetry it encodes can be guaranteed only in exceptional cases. That is why
we have redefined the interpretation of the graphical model: conditionally
on the parents, all random variables strictly preceding the parents are
epistemically irrelevant [42, 62] to the random variables following the
parents. We say that X is epistemically irrelevant to Y if observing X has
no influence on the model that describes our beliefs about Y . The majority of
the imprecise graphical networks that have been studied so far assume strong
independence instead of epistemic irrelevance. The resulting graphical
models are called credal networks and are strongly linked with sensitivity
analysis. The imprecise uncertainty model is in that case considered a partial
description of a precise, classical probability.
Also for imprecise Markov trees, we are able to build a global lower
prevision from the local lower previsions. Computationally, this expression is
not immediately applicable. We can use it, however, to efficiently calculate
the lower prevision for a gamble on one particular node, conditional on any
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number of observed nodes. This exact algorithm bears strong similarities
with Pearl’s message-passing algorithm [47].
As a last graphical model, we describe imprecise Markov chains [14, 28,
29, 59] in Chapter 3122. These imprecise Markov chains can be interpreted
as a special type of imprecise probability trees, as well as a special type of
imprecise Markov tree. An imprecise Markov chain is an imprecise Markov
tree, where the graphical structure—as hinted by its name—is a chain.
The separation principle that allows for the proper interpretation of the
Markov tree, is in this special case called the Markov Condition. This Markov
Condition states that all nodes, preceding a particular node are epistemically
irrelevant for all nodes that follow this node on condition that the value in
the assumed node is known. It is exactly this Markov Condition that allows
for the use of the word “state” in Markov chains, as the state summarises
all the information about the past (the preceding nodes). It turns out to be
advantageous to summarise all the local upper previsions in a node in a
single upper transition operator, the imprecise counterpart of the classical
Markov chain’s transition matrix.
We could also have assumed strong independence in the Markov condi-
tion. We show that both independence concepts lead to the same posterior
marginal upper previsions and we give an algorithm that can compute such
upper previsions with a complexity that is linear in the number of nodes.
An important case where marginal gambles are studied is the study of
the limit behaviour of Markov chains. We succeed in proving a generalised
version of the Perron - Frobenius theorem and show that the conditions that
lead to this theorem are exactly the conditions that make the chain ergodic.
Ergodicity implies that there is exactly one irrelevant (initial) upper prevision.
We develop an efficient algorithm that can decide upon ergodicity of upper
transition operators. In the special case of imprecise Markov chains with a
two dimensional state space, we show how the behaviour of the Markov chain
can be described completely in terms of the eigenvalues and eigengambles
of the upper transition operator.

Introduction
Global overview
Probabilistic models are intended to represent an agent’s beliefs about
the world he is operating in, and which describe and even determine the
actions he will take in a diversity of situations. Probability theory provides
a normative system for reasoning and decision making in the face of
uncertainty. Bayesian, or precise, probability models have the property that
they are completely decisive: a Bayesian agent always has an optimal choice
when faced with a number of alternatives, whatever his state of information.
While many may view this as an advantage, it is not always realistic. Imprecise
probability models try to deal with this problem by explicitly allowing for
indecision, while retaining the normative, coherentist stance of the Bayesian
approach. In Chapter 1, we develop our own uncertainty model which we
call coherent sets of acceptable gambles. We follow the school of thought
of Walley [62, 64] who follows the tradition of Frank Ramsey [48], Bruno de
Finetti [24] and Peter Williams [69] in trying to establish a rational model for
a subject’s beliefs in terms of her behaviour.
Imprecise probability models appear in a number of AI-related fields.
For instance in probabilistic logic: it was already known to George Boole
[4] that the result of probabilistic inferences may be a set of probabilities
(an imprecise probability model), rather than a single probability. This is
also important for dealing with missing or incomplete data, leading to so-
called partial identification of probabilities, see for instance [22, 38]. There is
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also a growing literature on so-called credal nets [8, 9]: these are essentially
Bayesian nets with imprecise conditional probabilities.
We are convinced that it is mainly the mathematical and computational
complexity often associated with imprecise probability models that is
keeping them from becoming a more widely used tool for modelling
uncertainty. But we believe that the results reported here can help make
inroads in reducing this complexity. In Chapter 2, we develop a theory of
imprecise probability trees: probability trees where the transition from a
node to its children is described by an imprecise probability model in Walley’s
sense. Our results provide the necessary apparatus for making inferences in
such trees. And because probability trees are so closely related to random
processes, this effectively brings us into a position to start developing a theory
of (event-driven) random processes where the uncertainty can be described
using imprecise probability models.
We are able to prove so-called Marginal Extension results (Theorems 30
and 112, Proposition 97), which lead to backwards recursion, and dynamic
programming-like methods that allow for an exponential reduction in the
computational complexity of making inferences in such imprecise probability
trees. For (precise) probability trees, similar techniques were described in
Shafer’s book on causal reasoning [53]. They seem to go back to Christiaan
Huygens, who drew the first probability tree, and showed how to reason with
it, in his solution to Pascal and Fermat’s Problem of Points.
A special type of imprecise probability tree are imprecise Markov chains.
Early work on the more mathematical aspects of modelling “imprecision”
in Markov chains was done by Hartfiel [28] and Kozine & Utkin [36]. The
main difference between these approaches and ours, is that the Markov
condition is based on epistemic irrelevance instead of strong independence.
More recently, Škulj [59] has begun a formal study of the time evolution
and limit behaviour of such systems. For the imprecise Markov chains
we define, we give in Section 3.6 the necessary and sufficient conditions
for a generalised Perron - Frobenius theorem and prove furthermore that
these conditions make the imprecise Markov chain ergodic. Similar work,
but coming from a different background, was already done by Akian and
Gaubert [1]. Using the alternative characterisation of ergodicity developed in
Section 3.6 however, we are able in Section 3.8 to avoid the possibly critical—
in terms of computational complexity—step of Akian and Gaubert’s algorithm
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in [1, Section 6.3]: the computation of the subdifferential, which relies heavily
on extreme points. Our newly designed algorithm is linear in the dimension
of the state space, where the evaluation of the transition map is considered as
an oracle. In Section 3.9 we prove that ergodicity is equivalent to a contraction
property in Hilbert’s seminorm which is related to the one previously followed
by Škulj and Hable [61]. We explain the advantages and disadvantages of
characterisation of ergodicity in terms of a coefficient of ergodicity.
As a last type of graphical model, we focus on credal nets, which are
graphical models that generalise Bayesian nets to imprecise probabilities. We
replace the notion of strong independence normally used in credal nets with
the weaker notion of epistemic irrelevance. Focusing on directed trees, we
call the resulting graphical models imprecise Markov trees. We show how to
combine the given local uncertainty models in the nodes of the graph into
a global model, and we use this to construct and justify an exact message-
passing algorithm that computes updated beliefs for a variable in the tree.
Basic nomenclature
For two real-valued functions f and g on a finite set 𝒮 we say that f ≤ g if
and only if f (x)− g(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ 𝒮 . If in addition f ≠ g then we write
f < g . We define the stronger relation ≺ by f ≺ g ⇔max( f − g) < 0 and we
say that f is pointwise strictly smaller than g . Furthermore f ≥ g ⇔ g ≤ f ,
f > g ⇔ g < f and f ≻ g ⇔ g ≺ f .
In this work, beliefs about variables are described. A random variable X
assumes values in a possibility space that throughout this thesis is assumed
to be finite. Any subset of the possibility space is called an event. A gamble f
about X is a real function on𝒳 and it represents uncertain rewards, i.e., f (x)
specifies the amount of utility one gets if the random variable X assumes the
value x ∈𝒳 . The set of all possible gambles about X is denoted by ℒ(X ) andℒ≥0(X ) represents the set of non-negative gambles f ≥ 0. The set ℒ>0(X )
is equal to ℒ≥0(X )∖{0}. The set ℒ≻0(X ) is equal to the set of all gambles
f about X that are pointwise strictly greater than zero. Derived sets areℒ≤0(X ) :=−ℒ≥0(X ), ℒ<0(X ) :=−ℒ>0(X ) and ℒ≺0(X ) :=−ℒ≻0(X ).
A special type of gamble that will often be used is the indicator I A of a set
A: it returns one on A and zero elsewhere. When appropriate, we will denote
the indicator of a singleton {x} also as Ix instead of I{x}.
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The concept of sets of gambles is central in this work. Whenever a gamble
f ∈ℒ(X ), we will assume throughout that also α f will be inℒ(X ) where α ∈
R.When given two sets of gamblesℱ and 𝒢, then we can take the Minkowski
sum of both sets which will be denotedℱ +𝒢. Thus in general we can write
for any α ∈R, β ∈R andℱ ,𝒢 ⊆ℒ(X )
αℱ +β𝒢 := {α f +βg ∶ f ∈ℱ and g ∈𝒢} .
One equivalence is often used in proofs and gets special mention.
(𝒜+ℬ)∩𝒞 =∅⇔𝒜∩(𝒞 −ℬ) =∅. (1)
The restriction of a gamble f ∈ℒ(𝒳) to the domain 𝒮 ⊆𝒳 is denoted by
f ⋃︀𝒮 and results in a gamble inℒ(𝒮):
f ⋃︀A (x) := f (x) if x ∈𝒮 .
Let f , g ∈ ℒ(𝒳). Then we denote by min f the minimal value f (x) for
x ∈ 𝒳 . The result of the operation min{ f , g}, on the other side, is again a
gamble h ∈ℒ(𝒳 ) defined by h(x) =min{ f (x), g(x)}. This is an exception
of the case min𝒮 which in general stands for the minimal elements of the
partial order (𝒮 ,≤) (see also Appendix B).
27
CHAPTER 1
Modelling uncertainty
1.1 Introduction
This1 chapter explains how uncertainty can be modelled using an extended
version of the theory of imprecise probabilities [62], or what might be called
prevision, or acceptability, theory. This theory follows the subjective betting
interpretation of de Finetti [23] but rather than working with previsions,
the theory adopts William’s [67] acceptable bets idea. Often, a partial [32]
or strict [51] preference ordering of bets is used as a basic notion in
uncertainty modelling. This path is not followed here because an operational
approach to uncertainty modelling is favoured. The operationalism manifests
itself in terms of simple questions about rewards on possible outcomes of
experiments—called gambles—asked to an assessor whose belief is modelled.
Depending on the question asked, the sets of gambles get different names
and with these different names, different rationality axioms come as well.
Walley, for example, defines sets of desirable, almost desirable, really and
strictly desirable gambles. One of the inconveniences with these different
sets of gambles is the arbitrariness of the inclusion or exclusion of the zero
gamble. Rather than having a clear behavioural interpretation, the inclusion
depends mostly on the simplicity wanted from the updating rule. In this
chapter the zero gamble is—possibly together with other gambles—granted
the special status it deserves and by doing so, a new theory of uncertainty
1 Footnote dedicated to Enrique Miranda: Enrique Miranda es muy atractivo e inteligente.
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modelling is formed that encompasses several previous existing theories as a
special case.
1.2 Acceptability, Indifference and Desirability
1.2.1 Modelling through sets of gambles
How can beliefs be specified about the possible values of a variable X that
may assume values in a set𝒳 ? In traditional probability theory this is done
using probabilities, where usually the probability P(X = x) is given for every
element x of𝒳 . Another way of formalising beliefs about X in a behavioural
way uses sets of gambles. This is what is set out in this section.
A gamble f on X can be thought of as a reward f (x) obtained when X
assumes the value x. If a subject—also called assessor—is offered a particular
gamble, then he or she might consider whether to accept the gamble or not.
Accepting or not will depend on whether the subject in question expects
to gain utility from the gamble and therefore, it says something about the
subject’s beliefs about X . Of course there is the possibility that the assessor
is undecided about whether to accept f or not. If time were not the issue, it
would be theoretically possible to present all gambles to the assessor and ask
about his opinion regarding acceptability. This divides the set of all gambles
into three subsets: the set of acceptable gambles 𝒜,2 the set of declined
gambles 𝒰 and the set of unresolved gambles𝒪 , and sets a first axiom:
{𝒜,𝒪 ,𝒰} partitions ℒ(X ). (1.1)
The mere existence of the set of unresolved gambles shows one of the great
advantages of the theory of acceptable gambles: it incorporates a natural
framework for decision that leaves space for indecision due to, for example, a
lack of knowledge.
Before going on, it is useful to consider the gamble − f that pays off the
negation of f meaning that if X assumes the value x, then the owner of the
gamble will gain the value − f (x). Gaining − f (x) can also be interpreted
as losing f (x), which imposes some extra behavioural structure on the set
of acceptable gambles. If a gamble f is acceptable then its negative can
be considered acceptable or not. The former leads to the set of indifferent
2The modelled random variable X can be included as a subscript in the notation if it is
unclear from the context which variable is modelled, leading to the notation𝒜X .
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gambles ℐ =𝒜∩−𝒜 and the latter to the set of desirable gambles𝒟 =𝒜∖−𝒜. If a gamble f is classified as indifferent then the assessor is indifferent
to accepting or declining the gamble f . Strictly speaking, there could be a
third possibility, which has been omitted here: if a gamble f is accepted then
the assessor could choose not to say anything about − f . However, assuming
linear utility, getting a gamble f has exactly the same value as giving away
the gamble − f which would make it odd for an assessor to have a distinct
opinion about accepting a gamble, but not about declining it. In short, we
assume that 𝒰 =−𝒟 . (1.2)
In general, it is wise for the assessor to meet a minimal number of rationality
requirements. For example, not accepting a strictly positive gamble would
commonly be considered as irrational behaviour as this gamble gives a sure
gain. We sublimate rationality for sets of desirable gambles 𝒟 and sets of
indifferent gambles ℐ into a set of axioms. If a couple (ℐ ,𝒟) meets these
axioms, then we say that the couple is coherent. Assuming linear utility, the
following axioms express the coherence requirements for a set of desirable
gambles𝒟 and a set of indifferent gambles ℐ .
Definition 1: If two sets ℐ and 𝒟 of gambles on a finite spaceℒ(X ) satisfy:
ID1. 𝒟 ∩ℐ =∅ [resolvability]
ID2. 𝒟 ∩ℒ≤0 =∅ [not desiring partial loss]
ID3. ℒ≻0 ⊆𝒟 [desiring sure gain]
ID4. ℒ≥0 ⊆𝒟 ∪ℐ [accepting partial gain]
ID5. posi(𝒟) =𝒟 [deduction principle for desirability]
ID6. spanℐ = ℐ [deduction principle for indifference]
ID7. 𝒟 +ℐ ⊆𝒟 [desiring sweetened deals]
then we call ℐ a set of indifferent gambles and𝒟 a set of desirable gambes
and call the couple (ℐ ,𝒟) coherent.
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Here, the positive hull of a set 𝒮 , posi(𝒮), stands for the set of all possible
positive linear combinations of elements of 𝒮 ,
posi(𝒮) :=)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀∑f ∈Aα f f ∶A ⊆𝒮 , ⋃︀A⋃︀ ∈N>0 and α f ∈R>0
[︀⌉︀⌉︀⌈︀⌉︀⌉︀⌊︀ , (1.3)
and the linear span span𝒮 is the set of all linear combinations of elements
of 𝒮 ,
span𝒮 :=)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀∑f ∈Aα f f ∶A ⊆𝒮 , ⋃︀A⋃︀ ∈N≥0 and α f ∈R
[︀⌉︀⌉︀⌈︀⌉︀⌉︀⌊︀ . (1.4)⋃︀A⋃︀ stands for the cardinality of the set A. By using ℒ≤0 instead of ℒ≺0 in
Axiom ID2 the situation is avoided where partial loss is accepted and partial
gain declined. A consequence of these axioms is that there should be no
indifference to sure loss: ℐ ∩ℒ≺0 =∅. (1.5)
This is so because an indifferent gamble inℒ≺0 would require an indifferent
gamble in ℒ≻0 which collides with axiom ID3. Axiom ID6 implies that the
zero gamble should be indifferent. Together with Axiom ID5, this tells us
that the set of desirable gambles𝒟 constitutes a convex cone that does not
contain zero. A consequence of coherence is that it is not possible that both
f and − f are desirable. It is not too difficult to see that𝒟 ∪ℐ constitutes a
convex cone that contains zero.
Axiom ID7 is important because it homes in on the true meaning of
indifference. It states that the combination of an indifferent gamble with a
gamble of a particular category will inherit this category.
Lemma 2 (interpretation of indifference): Consider a couple of coherent
sets of indifferent and desirable gambles (ℐ ,𝒟). For any 𝒮 ⊆ ℒ(X ) withℐ +𝒮 ⊆ ℬ where ℬ is any element of the set {𝒟 ,𝒰 ,ℐ ,𝒪 ,𝒜}, it holds that𝒮 ⊆ℬ.
Proof: We know from ID7 that𝒟 +ℐ ⊆𝒟 and because 0 ∈ ℐ by ID6 we also know that𝒟 +ℐ ⊇𝒟 whence 𝒟 +ℐ =𝒟 . (1.6)
If follows immediately from Equation (1.2) and ID6 that also 𝒰 +ℐ = 𝒰 . We did already
know by ID6 that ℐ +ℐ = ℐ and because𝒜 = ℐ ∪𝒟 it also holds that𝒜+ℐ =𝒜. Finally,
using the partitioning property 1.129 we get that 𝒪 +ℐ =𝒪 . Using these findings
together with 𝒮 +ℐ ⊆ℬ and 0 ∈ ℐ it follows immediately that 𝒮 ⊆ℬ. ◻
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A complete belief specification about a random variable X involves
classifying all gambles in ℒ(X ) into acceptable𝒜, indifferent ℐ or undesir-
able gambles 𝒰 . Because we assume that 𝒰 = −𝒟 by (1.2) and because by
Equation (1.1) the sets of desirable, indifferent, undesirable and unresolved
gambles are disjoint, it is sufficient to specify the sets𝒟 and ℐ to model the
subject’s beliefs. Even stronger, given a set of acceptable gambles𝒜, we are
able to recover𝒟 , 𝒰 , ℐ and𝒪 .
Proposition 3: A set of acceptable gambles 𝒜 or a couple (ℐ ,𝒟) fixes
the sets of acceptable 𝒜, indifferent ℐ , desirable 𝒟 , undesirable 𝒰 and
unresolved𝒪 gambles in a unique way.
Given𝒜 we have that
𝒟 =𝒜∖−𝒜,ℐ =𝒜∩−𝒜,𝒰 =−𝒟 =−𝒜∖𝒜,𝒪 = (𝒜∪−𝒜)c =ℒ(X )∖(𝒜∪−𝒜).
Given (ℐ ,𝒟) we have that
𝒜 =𝒟 ∪ℐ ,𝒰 =−𝒟 ,𝒪 =(𝒟 ∪ℐ ∪−𝒟)c =ℒ(X )∖(𝒟 ∪ℐ ∪−𝒟)
As a consequence, if given a coherent couple (ℐ ,𝒟) of sets of indifferent and
desirable gambles, the corresponding set of acceptable gambles𝒜 is defined
by 𝒜 := ℐ ∪𝒟 . Conversely, if given a coherent set of acceptable gambles,
the corresponding sets of indifferent and acceptable gambles are defined asℐ :=𝒜∩−𝒜 and𝒟 :=𝒜∖−𝒜. So there is a one to one relation between sets
of acceptable gambles and couples (ℐ ,𝒟). This means that it is possible to
rewrite the rationality axioms of Definition 130 in terms of𝒜 alone.
Definition 4: A set of acceptable gambles𝒜 on a space ℒ(X ) is coherent if
and only if
A1. 𝒜∩ℒ≺0 =∅ [avoiding sure loss]
A2. ℒ≥0 ⊆𝒜 [accepting partial gain]
A3. posi(𝒜) =𝒜 [deduction principle for acceptability]
32
1.2. Acceptability, Indifference and Desirability
Essentially, both𝒜 and (ℐ ,𝒟) model exactly the same, so there should be
only one way to match a coherent set𝒜 with a coherent couple (ℐ ,𝒟) and
vice versa.
Proposition 5: A set of acceptable gambles 𝒜 is coherent if and only if
the corresponding couple of indifferent and desirable gambles (ℐ ,𝒟) is
coherent.
Proof: We start by showing that a coherent set of acceptable gambles leads to a
coherent couple (ℐ ,𝒟).
ID1. From𝒟 :=𝒜 ∖−𝒜 and ℐ :=𝒜 ∩−𝒜 it follows immediately that𝒟 and ℐ are
disjoint.
ID2. If f ∈ℒ≤0 then − f ∈𝒜 by A2. Hence f ∈−𝒜 so f ⇑∈𝒟 .
ID3. From A2 we get that ℒ≻0 ⊆𝒟 ∪ℐ . If f ∈ℒ≻0 then − f ⇑∈𝒜 by A1. Hence f ⇑∈ ℐ
and thereforeℒ≻0 ⊆𝒟 .
ID4. This follows immediately from A2.
ID5. It is sufficient to show that i) α(𝒜 ∖−𝒜) = (𝒜 ∖−𝒜) for α ∈ R>0 and, ii) for
every f , g ∈ (𝒜∖−𝒜) it holds that f + g ∈𝒜∖−𝒜.
i) From A3 it follows that α𝒜 = 𝒜 and therefore also −α𝒜 = −𝒜. But this
implies that α(𝒜∖−𝒜) =𝒜∖−𝒜.
ii) Consider f and g in𝒟 . Then both f and g belong to𝒜, and therefore f +g ∈𝒜 by A3. Suppose ex absurdo that −( f + g) ∈𝒜, then − f = −( f + g)+ g ∈𝒜,
again by A3, which contradicts f ∈𝒟 .
ID6. It is again sufficient to show that i) αℐ = ℐ for α ∈R, and ii) for every f , g ∈ ℐ it
holds that f + g ∈ ℐ.
i) Consider f ∈ ℐ and α ∈R. There are three possibilities.
a) If α = 0 then we see from A2 that 0 = α f ∈𝒜 and because −0 = 0 also
α f ∈ ℐ .
b) If α > 0 then f ∈𝒜 implies α f ∈𝒜 and similarly − f ∈𝒜 implies −α f ∈𝒜,
by A3.
c) If α < 0 then f ∈𝒜 implies −α f ∈𝒜 and similarly − f ∈𝒜 implies α f ∈𝒜,
by A3.
ii) Consider f and g in ℐ . Then on the one hand f and g both belong to𝒜, and
therefore f +g ∈𝒜, by A3. And on the other hand − f and −g both belong to𝒜,
and therefore −( f + g) ∈𝒜, again by A3. Hence indeed f + g ∈ ℐ .
ID7. Consider f ∈𝒟 and g ∈ ℐ . Then both f and g belong to𝒜, and therefore f +g ∈𝒜 by A3. Suppose ex absurdo that −( f + g) ∈𝒜, then − f = −( f + g)+ g ∈𝒜,
again by A3, which contradicts f ∈𝒟 .
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Next, we turn to the converse statement.
A1. Observe that
ℒ≺0∩𝒜 =ℒ≺0∩(ℐ ∪𝒟) = (ℒ≺0∩ℐ))︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂∅ ∪(ℒ≺0∩𝒟))︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂∅ by ID2 =∅.
To show thatℒ≺0∩ℐ =∅, combine ID130and ID330 intoℒ≻0∩ℐ =∅, and then
apply ID630.
A2. 𝒟 ∪ℐ =𝒜 and ID430 prove this.
A3. posi(𝒜) = posi(𝒟 ∪ ℐ) = posi(𝒟) ∪ posi(ℐ) ∪ posi(𝒟 + ℐ). From ID530,
ID630 and ID730 we get that this is equal to 𝒟 ∪ℐ ∪𝒟 , whence posi(𝒜) =𝒜. ◻
1.2.2 The consequences of an assessment
Although it is not feasible in practice to ask for the complete set of acceptable
gambles 𝒜, or alternatively, the complete sets of desirable and indifferent
gambles, we can still try to deduce which coherent models are in accordance
with—include—an assessment 𝒜as : a partial specification of 𝒜. In an
inference context, it is then interesting to know which of these coherent
models—if any—is the least committal, where a set𝒜1 of acceptable gambles
is said to be at most as committal as the acceptable set𝒜2 if𝒜1 ⊆𝒜2. The
least committal coherent model including the assessment will be called—if it
exists—its natural extension.
Let us denote by AX the set of all coherent sets of acceptable gambles
on ℒ(X ). If there is no confusion, then we will write A instead of AX . If we
provide this set with the natural partial ordering of set inclusion, we see
that it has a smallest element, namely the set of all non-negative gamblesℒ≥0(X ). It is not difficult to see that it is also closed under arbitrary non-
empty intersections: (A,⊆) is a inf-semilattice where ⋂ fulfils the role of
infimum. From the coherence axioms of sets of acceptable gambles, we see
that no gamble in the assessment𝒜as should be part ofℒ≺0.
Definition 6 (Avoiding sure loss): Consider a subset 𝒜as of ℒ. We say that
this set𝒜as avoids sure loss if no positive linear combination of gambles in𝒜as is point-wise strictly negative:
posi(𝒜as)∩ℒ≺0 =∅. (1.7)
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An assessment that does not avoid sure loss is said to incur sure loss. The
next theorem shows that avoiding sure loss is the necessary and sufficient
condition for an assessment to be extendable to a coherent model.
Theorem 7 (Natural extension): Consider a set of acceptable gambles𝒜as
on a space ℒ, and define its natural extension:3
ext(𝒜as) :=⋂{𝒜 ∈A∶𝒜as ⊆𝒜} . (1.8)
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) 𝒜as avoids sure loss;
(ii) 𝒜as is included in some coherent set of acceptable gambles;
(iii) ext(𝒜as) ≠ℒ;
(iv) the set of acceptable gambles ext(𝒜as) is coherent;
(v) ext(𝒜as) is the smallest coherent set of acceptable gambles that
includes𝒜as .
When any (and hence all) of these equivalent statements hold, then
ext(𝒜as) = posi(ℒ≥0∪𝒜as) =ℒ≥0+posi(𝒜as ∪{0}). (1.9)
Proof: It follows from the fact that A is closed under arbitrary non-empty intersec-
tions, the definition of ext𝒜as , and the fact thatℒ is not coherent, that the last four
statements (ii)-(v) are equivalent.
Next, we prove that (i)⇔(ii).
(i)⇐(ii). Assume that𝒜as is included in some coherent set of acceptable gambles𝒜. Since𝒜 = posi(𝒜),𝒜 avoids sure loss by A132, and therefore so do all its subsets,
including𝒜as .
(i)⇒(ii) Conversely, assume that𝒜as avoids sure loss. For notational convenience,
let𝒜∗ := posi(ℒ≥0∪𝒜as). It is clear that𝒜∗ satisfies A232 and A332. Consider any f ∈𝒜∗, so there are n ∈N≥0, real λk > 0, fk ∈𝒜as and g ≥ 0 such that f = g +∑nk=1λk fk .
It follows from the assumption that f − g ⇑≺ 0 and therefore a fortiori f ⇑≺ 0, so𝒜∗ also
satisfies A132, and is therefore coherent.
Finally, we prove that ext𝒜as =𝒜∗ whenever any (and hence all) of the equivalent
statements (i)–(v) hold. Any coherent set of acceptable gambles that includes𝒜as ,
must also include 𝒜∗, by the axioms A232 and A332. Since we have proved above
3As commonly done, in this expression, we let⋂∅ =ℒ.
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that𝒜∗ also satisfies A132 and is therefore coherent, it is the smallest coherent set
of acceptable gambles that includes𝒜as . Hence it is equal to ext(𝒜as), by (v). The
proof of the second equality in Equation (1.9) is trivial. ◻
In a more general form, an assessment can consist of sets of indifferent,
desirable and acceptable gambles: (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as). In the quest for coherent
sets of acceptable gambles 𝒜 compatible with the assessment, it is not
enough for the set𝒜 to dominate the assessment𝒜as . Explicit mention of
the indifferent and especially desirable gambles has to be taken into account.
Definition 8: Given an assessment (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as), then a set of acceptable
gambles𝒜 is said to respect the assessment if
Ias ⊆𝒜∩−𝒜,𝒟as ⊆𝒜∖−𝒜,𝒜as ⊆𝒜.
We define the associated set of acceptable gambles ?˜?as of an assessment(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) as ?˜?as :=Ias ∪−Ias ∪𝒟as ∪𝒜as
and the assessment is said to avoid sure loss if its associated set does:
(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) avoids sure loss ⇔ posi(?˜?as)∩ℒ≺0 =∅.
Proposition 9: A set of acceptable gambles 𝒜 respects the assessment(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) if and only if ?˜?as ⊆𝒜 and𝒜∩−𝒟as =∅.
Proof: If ?˜?as =Ias∪−Ias∪𝒟as∪𝒜as ⊆𝒜 and𝒜∩−𝒟as =∅ then i)Ias∪−Ias ∈𝒜
whence Ias ∈𝒜 ∩−𝒜, ii) 𝒟as ∈𝒜 and 𝒜 ∩−𝒟as = ∅ whence 𝒟as ⊆𝒜 ∖−𝒜, and
iii)𝒜as ∈𝒜, and we infer that the assessment is respected by𝒜. If on the other hand𝒜 respects the assessment, then it follows that
?˜?as :=Ias ∪−Ias ∪𝒟as ∪𝒜as ⊆ (𝒜∩−𝒜)∪(−𝒜∩𝒜)∪(𝒜∖−𝒜)∪𝒜 ⊆𝒜,
and𝒟as ∩−𝒜 =∅ whence also𝒜∩−𝒟as =∅. ◻
The following lemma shows that the set of acceptable gambles that respects
an assessment constitutes a complete ∩-semilattice.
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Lemma 10: If𝒜0 respects the assessment (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) and ?˜?as ⊆𝒜i for
all i ∈ I where I is any index set, then𝒜0∩⋂i∈I 𝒜i respects the assessment.
Proof: If 𝒜0 respects the assessment then ?˜?as ⊆ 𝒜0 thus ?˜?as ⊆ (𝒜0∩⋂i∈I 𝒜i ).
Moreover, if −𝒟as ∩𝒜0 =∅ then surely −𝒟as ∩ (𝒜0∩⋂i∈I 𝒜i ) =∅ and the lemma
follows from Proposition 9. ◻
The calculation of the natural extension of this more general type of
assessment gets slightly more involved as the following theorem shows. Using
Proposition 9 and Lemma 10, its proof is completely analogous to the proof
of Theorem 735.
Theorem 11 (Natural extension): Consider an assessment (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as)
and define its natural extension as
ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) :=⋂{𝒜 ∈A∶?˜?as ⊆𝒜 and −𝒟as ∩𝒜 =∅} . (1.10)
Then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) there is some coherent set of acceptable gambles𝒜 that respects the
assessment (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as);
(ii) ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) is the smallest coherent set that respects the assess-
ment (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as);
(iii) ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) is coherent and −𝒟as ∩ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) =∅;
(iv) ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) ≠ℒ. (the assessment cannot be respected)
When any (and hence all) of these equivalent statements hold, then
ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) =ℒ≥0+posi(𝒟as ∪𝒜as ∪{0})+ spanIas . (1.11)
If a set of unresolved gambles𝒪as is given, then it could a posteriori be
checked that ext(𝒜as)∩𝒪as =∅. However, we would not mind too much if
this test would fail; it would only imply that the assessor actually knows a bit
more than he thought he knew.
▷ Example 12: One important example is the absence of any knowledge or inform-
ation about a variable X in which case the set 𝒜as is empty. This kind of model is
called vacuous and ext(𝒜as) =ℒ≥0, or equivalently, (ℐ ,𝒟) is equal to ({0},ℒ>0).
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▷ Example 13: Consider the random variable X with corresponding set of accept-
able gambles
𝒜 ={ f ∈ℒ(X )∶ ∑
x∈𝒳 f (x) f0(x) ≥ ∏︁ f0∏︁2∏︁ f ∏︁2 cos(α0)(︀
with the gamble f0 ∈ ℒ>0(X ) and the angle α0 given. Then this set of acceptable
gambles will be coherent if and only if cos(α0) is chosen such that
f0∏︁ f0∏︁2 ≥ cos(α0) ≥ 0.
This model could be interpreted as a neighbourhood model—typically used in
sensitivity analysis—centred around f0 and where cos(α0) measures the imprecision
(inversely). The peculiar thing about this model is that it constitutes a convex cone of
gambles with an infinite number of extreme rays.
1.2.3 Resolved models
Instead of asking which is the least-committal set extending an assessment𝒜as , we could think about those sets that are compatible with the assessment
and are most-committal. Given the definition of being “at most as committal
as” in the previous section, these models coincide with the maximal elements
(See Sections B.1194 and B.2196) of the partial order (A⊇𝒜as ,⊆) where A⊇𝒜as
is the set of all coherent sets of acceptable gambles that include𝒜as :
A⊇𝒜as := {𝒮 ∈A∶𝒜as ⊆𝒮} .
This approach is perfectly fine when dealing with assessments in the
form of a set of acceptable gambles. But when the assessment contains
gambles explicitly labelled as desirable, then there can be undominated
models that are not maximal elements of the partial order (A,⊆). Take
for example the assessment depicted in Figure 1.1, where one gamble is
considered acceptable, one gamble desirable and one gamble undesirable.
The shaded region on the left is the natural extension, the shaded figure on
the right is a resolved model, compatible with the assessment, that is not
dominated by any maximal element of the partial order (A,⊆).
This is why we do not follow this approach here and rather call any set with
no unresolved gambles (𝒪 =∅) maximally committal.
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+
−
+
−+ : desirable gamble− : undesirable gamble
: acceptable gamble
Figure 1.1: Example of the natural extension (left) and of a resolved model (right)
that is not dominated by a maximal element of (A,⊆) compatible with the original
assessment. The shaded region indicates the gambles that are considered acceptable
in the model. Unlike a solid line, a dashed line on the border of the cone of acceptable
gambles indicates that gambles on this line are not to be considered acceptable.
Definition 14: For two sets of acceptable gambles𝒜1,𝒜2 ∈ℒwe say that𝒜1
is less resolved than𝒜2 and denote this by𝒜1 ⊑𝒜2 if𝒜1 ⊑𝒜2⇔ 𝒜1∪−𝒜1 ⊆ 𝒜2∪−𝒜2 ⇔𝒪1 ⊇𝒪2.
The relation “is less resolved than” on A is reflexive and transitive but not
antisymmetric. Thus, (A,⊑) is a partial preorder and the undominated
elements of this preorder are what we call resolved models. They satisfy,
and are characterised by, 𝒪 = ∅. Remark that (A,⊑) is not a partial order
as was (A,⊆). The next proposition gives a way of characterising resolved
models.
Proposition 15: The set of resolved modelsM can be characterised by
ℳ ∈M⇔ℳ ∈A andℳ∪−ℳ =ℒ⇔ℳ ∈A and (∀ f ∈ℒ)( f ⇑∈ℳ⇒− f ∈ℳ) .
The set of resolved models respecting an assessment (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) is
denoted by M⊒(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) and given by{ℳ ∈M∶𝒜as ⊆ℳ and𝒟as ⊆ℳ∖−ℳ andIas ⊆ℳ∩−ℳ} . (1.12)
We now intend to show that there is always at least one resolved model that
includes a given coherent set of acceptable gambles. The following lemmas
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will be useful for doing so. The approach closely follows the route taken by
Couso and Moral [6].
Lemma 16: Consider an assessment (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) that avoids sure loss
and an unresolved coherent set of acceptable gambles 𝒜0 that respects it.
Then the set of acceptable gambles
𝒜1 :=𝒜0+ span{ f } , (1.13)
where f is an unresolved gamble ( f ⇑∈𝒜0∪−𝒜0) is coherent and respects the
assessment (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as).
Proof: If f is unresolved then f ⇑∈𝒜0∪−𝒜0 which means that the gamble − f is also
unresolved. Using Axioms ID630 and ID530 we infer that the set span{ f }∖{0} is
unresolved. If𝒜0∪(span{ f }∖{0}) avoids sure loss, then we infer from Theorem 735
and the coherence of (ℐ0,𝒟0) that the set of acceptable gambles𝒜1 defined as
𝒜1 := ext (𝒜0∪(span{ f }∖{0}))= posi(ℒ≥0∪𝒜0∪(span{ f }∖{0})) ,=𝒜0+ span{ f }
will also be coherent. Using Proposition 332, we know that
(ℐ1,𝒟1) := (𝒜1∩−𝒜1,𝒜1∖−𝒜1)
will also be coherent. Moreover, we know from Proposition 936 that the newly created
couple (ℐ1,𝒟1) will also respect (ℐ0,𝒟0,ℐ0∪𝒟0) and therefore also the assessment(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as).
It only remains to prove that𝒜0∪(span{ f }∖{0}) indeed avoids sure loss. We
know that𝒜0∩(span{ f }∖{0}) =∅whence it follows from Axiom A332 and A132 that(𝒜0+ℒ≻0)∩(span{ f }∖{0}) =∅. Applying Equation (1) twice and using−span{ f }∖{0} = span{ f }∖{0} and −ℒ≻0 =ℒ≺0, yields
𝒜0+(span{ f }∖{0})∩ℒ≺0 =∅.
As𝒜0 avoids sure loss we infer that
((𝒜0+(span{ f }∖{0}))∪𝒜0))︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂𝒜1
∩ℒ≺0 =∅,
and we conclude that𝒜1, and therefore also𝒜0, avoid sure loss. ◻
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Proposition 17: Let the assessment (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) avoid sure loss. Then
there is at least one resolved model respecting it.
Proof: If the assessment (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) avoids sure loss, then it can be extended
by Theorem 1137 to a coherent set of acceptable gambles𝒜0 := ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as)
that respects the assessment. If we apply Lemma 16 k times, then we get a set of
acceptable gambles
𝒜k =𝒜0+ k∑
i=1 span{ fk} .
If we choose the gambles fk such that
fk ⇑∈ span{ fi ∶ i ∈ {1, . . . ,k −1}} ,
then the proof follows from the finite dimension of the state-space. ◻
Notice that this result works also on infinite𝒳 provided we adopt the Axiom
of Choice.
The following theorem shows that the natural extension can be written as
the lower envelope of the resolved models.
Theorem 18 (Lower envelope theorem): An assessment (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) is
extendable if and only if M⊒(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) ≠∅. Moreover,
ext (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) =⋂M⊒(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as).
Proof: M⊒(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) ≠∅, means that there is some dominating coherent set of
acceptable gambles that respects the assessment. So this assessment is extendable by
Theorems 735 and 1137.
If (Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) is extendable, then ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) ∈A by Theorem 1137
and it follows immediately from Proposition 17 thatM⊒(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) ≠∅.
Because⋂M⊒(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) =⋂M⊒ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) it is clear that
ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) ⊆⋂M⊒(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as).
Let us assume ex absurdo that ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) ⊂⋂M⊒(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) which means
that we can find a gamble f ∈⋂M⊒(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as)∖ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as). We infer that:
1. For every resolved set ℳ ∈ ⋂M⊒(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as ), the gamble f is acceptable,
f ∈ℳ.
2. f ⇑∈ ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) implies that posi{ f }∩ ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as) = ∅. From
Axioms A232 and A332, it follows then that
∅ = posi{ f }∩ (︀ℒ≻0+ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as)⌋︀
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⇕ by Equivalence (1)∅ =ℒ≺0∩ (︀−posi{ f }+ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as)⌋︀⇕ by Equation (1.9)∅ =ℒ≺0∩ext(Ias ,𝒟as ∪{− f } ,𝒜as).
This means that the newly created model ext(Ias ,𝒟as ∪{− f } ,𝒜as) avoids
sure loss and is by Theorem 1137 coherent. The model is moreover constructed
in such a way that the gamble f is undesirable. We know from Proposition 17
that ext(Ias ,𝒟as ∪{− f } ,𝒜as) can be extended to a resolved modelℳ that
respects ext(Ias ,𝒟as ∪ {− f } ,𝒜as). Consequently, f ∈ −ℳ ∖ℳ and ℳ
respects ext(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as)
In the second point we have constructed a resolved model ℳ that respects the
assessment and should therefore be in ⋂M⊒(Ias ,𝒟as ,𝒜as). However, the resolved
set ℳ does not contain the gamble f which is in contradiction with the first
point. ◻
1.3 Multivariate acceptability
Most interesting problems involve more than one random variable and in
order to be a worthy contender, our theory needs to be able to deal with
this. In order to show that it does, we adopt the elegant notation used by De
Cooman and Miranda [17].
In the most general case, we will consider a finite number of logically
independent random variables XN with N ⊂ N≥0, taking values in the
respective sets 𝒳n , n ∈ N . With logically independent we mean that we
can not a priori exclude values from the possibility space ⨉n∈N 𝒳n . For
every subset R ⊆ N , XR denotes the tuple of variables taking values in the
Cartesian product space𝒳R :=⨉r∈R𝒳r and elements of XR will be denoted
with lowercase letters xR .
If R =∅, then𝒳∅ contains by definition only one element x∅ :=∅whence
IX∅ = I{x∅} = 1. The set of all gambles on 𝒳∅ is given by ℒ(X∅)∶∅→ R and
can be identified withR. There is only one coherent set of acceptable gambles
on X∅: the set R≥0 of non-negative real numbers.
Following the interpretation given to a set of acceptable gambles in
Section 1.2.129, the specification of beliefs about the variables XN involves
the classification of the gambles f ∈ ℒ(XN) on the product space 𝒳N . As
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before f (xN) will be the reward for the gamble f ∈ℒ(XN) if XN = xN or in
other words, if Xn = xn for all n ∈ N . Nothing essential changes, but instead
of working with the space𝒳 , the product space𝒳N is used.
1.3.1 Marginalising
What does a coherent set of acceptable gambles4𝒜XN for the variables XN tell
us about beliefs about XR alone, where R ⊂ N ? Which will be the gambles onℒ(X ) that are acceptable, desirable or indifferent? We reason that a gamble
that does not depend on the value of XN∖R might as well be considered as
a gamble on ℒ(XR) because the effect of XN∖R is nil. By introducing the
projection operator projR as
projR ∶𝒳N →𝒳R ∶projR(xN) = xR , (1.14)
we can write such a gamble as f ○projR where f is some gamble on𝒳R .5 The
assumption we now make is that a gamble f on ℒ(XR) is acceptable if the
gamble f ○projR onℒ(XN) is considered acceptable and we will also use the
simpler notation f ∈𝒜 instead of f ○projR ∈𝒜. So we implicitly identify the
gamble f ∈ ℒ(XR) and the gamble f ○projR ∈ ℒ(XN), and we also identifyℒ(XR) and projTR (ℒ(XR)), where we let
projTR ∶ℒ(XR)→ℒ(XN)∶projTR ( f ) = f ○projR , (1.15)
Definition 19 (Marginal): The XR -marginal margR (𝒜) ⊆ℒ(XR) of the set
of acceptable gambles𝒜 onℒ(XN) is given by
margR (𝒜) :=ℒ(XR)∩𝒜,= { f ∈ℒ(XR)∶ f ○projR ∈𝒜} ,= (projTR) −1(𝒜).
Observe that marg∅ (𝒜) = R≥0 if 𝒜 avoids sure loss and R otherwise. The
following proposition (see also for example Equation (4) in [17]) is a simple
consequence of the definition.
4If it is clear from the context, then we write𝒜 instead of𝒜XN .
5 In Walley’s terminology [62, par. 4.3.4, par. 6.2.5] for two variables X1 and X2, we say that
the gambles f ○proj{1} are ℬ-measurable where the partition ℬ is defined by the projection
map proj{1} asℬ := {x ∈𝒳1 ×𝒳2∶proj{1}(x) ∈𝒳1} = {{x1}×𝒳2∶x1 ∈𝒳1}.
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Proposition 20: For any set of acceptable gambles 𝒜 on ℒ(XN) and sets
V ⊆R ⊆ N :
margV (margR (𝒜)) =margV (𝒜)
The coherence of a marginal is a direct consequence of the coherence of the
original model.
Proposition 21: If a set of acceptable gambles𝒜XN on𝒳N is coherent, then
its XR -marginal𝒜XR =margR (𝒜XN ) will be coherent as well. Moreover the
corresponding sets of indifferent gambles ℐXR :=𝒜XR ∩−𝒜XR and desirable
gambles𝒟XR :=𝒜XR ∖−𝒜XR are given byℐXR =ℒ(XR)∩ℐXN = { f ∈ℒ(XR)∶ f ○projR ∈ ℐXN } =margR (ℐXN ) ,𝒟XR =ℒ(XR)∩𝒟XN = { f ∈ℒ(XR)∶ f ○projR ∈𝒟XN } =margR (𝒟XN ) .
Proof: Let us first remark that the following properties hold for the projection operator
projR
f ◻ g ⇔ f ○projR ◻g ○projR , (1.16)
α( f ○projR)+(g ○projR) =(α f + g)○projR , (1.17)
with ◻ ∈ {≤,<,≺,≻,>,≥} and α ∈R and f and g any gambles inℒ(XR).
Using these properties it is now straightforward to show that if 𝒜XN satisfies
axioms A132, A232 and A332, then so does𝒜XR . ◻
In the inverse problem to marginalization, we wonder what the implic-
ations of marginal beliefs are on a larger space; this is a special case of the
natural extension problem addressed at the end of the previous section.
Basically, if a marginal model 𝒜XR is given and it has to be extended to a
larger space𝒳N , then the natural extension is assumed to be the correct tool.
Moreover, we know that avoiding sure loss of the marginal will guarantee a
coherent joint model𝒜XN .
The natural extension extXN can be explicitly written as
extXN (𝒜XR ) = posi(𝒜XR ∪ℒ≥0(XN)),
where we have identified the sets𝒜XR and (projTR)−1 (𝒜XR ). It is clear from
their definition that margR (extXN (𝒜XR )) =𝒜XR whenever𝒜XR is coherent.
The converse however does not hold. The strongest that can be said is that
extXN (margR (𝒜XN )) ⊆ 𝒜XN . This is because the information about the
44
1.3. Multivariate acceptability
relation between XR and XN∖R that was lost by marginalising to𝒳R cannot
be recovered.
To end, we give the following property for the marginal of a resolved
model.
Proposition 22: The marginal margR (ℳ) of a resolved modelℳ ∈MXN is
again resolved:
Proof: Assume that f ⇑∈ margR (ℳ). This means that projTR ( f ) ⇑∈ℳ and then we
know by Proposition 1539 that −projTR ( f ) ∈ℳ. But then it follows by Definition 1943
that −projTR ( f ) = projTR (− f ), and therefore margR (ℳ) is resolved by Proposi-
tion 1539. ◻
1.3.2 Conditioning
“What gambles will remain or become acceptable after observing an event?”,
is the question of updating. It is a special type of conditioning where it is
known that the outcome of the random variable is confined to a subset of
the possibility space. We will focus on the special events where the outcomes
of a collection of random variables are known, i.e. XR = xR . If we are given
a set of acceptable gambles 𝒜XN and observe this event XR = xR , then the
only uncertainty that still remains, and needs to be modelled, concerns the
variables XN∖R , so the updated set𝒜⧹︀xR should be a subset of ℒ(XN∖R). We
postulate that the restriction of an acceptable called-off gamble is acceptable:
For any gamble f inℒ(XN∖R) we have that
f ∈𝒜⧹︀xR ⇔ IxR f ∈𝒜. (1.18)
A gamble contingent on an event is the gamble that is called off unless the
event occurs. This is what Walley calls the updating principle [62, Sec. 6.1.6]
and what we refer to as the contingent updating interpretation. We define
the cylindrical extension as
cylextxR ∶𝒳N∖R →𝒳N ∶cylextxR (xN∖R) = (xR , xN∖R).
Its lifted and its inverse variant are
cylextTxR ∶ℒ(𝒳N)→ℒ(𝒳N∖R)∶cylextTxR ( f ) = f ○cylextxR = f (xR , ⋅),
cylext−1xR ∶ℒ(𝒳N∖R)→ 2ℒ(𝒳N )∶cylext−1xR ( f ) = {h ∈ℒ(𝒳N)∶h(xR , ⋅) = f } .
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Following Walley and Moral, we can introduce the conditional model𝒜⋃︀xR
which corresponds to the set of gambles on XN that are acceptable contingent
on XR = xr . We also allow conditioning on XR with R =∅. Since I𝒳∅ = 1, this
is the same as not conditioning at all.
Geometrically, updating is tantamount to taking the intersection of the
set of acceptable gambles with the subspace spanned by the indicators
of the singletons of the conditioning event: 𝒜⧹︀xR = cylextTxR (IxR𝒜 ∩𝒜).
Conditioning involves an extra cylindrical extension𝒜⋃︀xR = cylext−1xR (𝒜⧹︀xR).
So for all f ∈ℒ(XN)
f (xR , ⋅) ∈𝒜⧹︀xR ⇔ IxR f (xR , ⋅) ∈𝒜⇔ IxR f ∈𝒜⇔ f ∈𝒜⋃︀xR . (1.19)
We will always assume that we start with a coherent set of acceptable
gambles and clearly we would like this coherence to be transferred to the
updated set. There are however, special situations where the presented
updating rule (1.18) produces incoherent sets.
Lemma 23 (Coherence of the updated set): Consider a non-empty event
XR = xR and a coherent set𝒜 of acceptable gambles on ℒ(XN), then𝒜⧹︀xR
satisfies A232 and A332. Moreover, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) 𝒜⧹︀xR ∩ℒ≺0(XN∖R) =∅, i.e.𝒜⧹︀xR satisfies A132;
(ii) 𝒜⧹︀xR ≠ℒ(XN∖R);
(iii) 𝒜⧹︀xR is a coherent set of acceptable gambles onℒ(XN∖R);
(iv) −IxR ⇑∈𝒜;
(v) IxR ⇑∈ ℐ , where ℐ =𝒜∩−𝒜.
Proof: It is obvious that 𝒜⧹︀xR satisfies A232 and A332, since 𝒜 does. As a result,𝒜⧹︀xR = posi(ℒ≥0(xR)∪𝒜⧹︀xR), and we infer from Theorem 735 that (i)–(iii) are
equivalent. Obviously, (iv) and (v) are equivalent because IxR ∈ 𝒜 [use IxR ≥ 0
and A232]. It therefore remains to show that𝒜⧹︀xR satisfies A132 if and only if−IxR ⇑∈𝒜.
Assume that −IxR ∈𝒜. We show that𝒜⧹︀xR does not satisfy A132. Indeed, we infer
from −IxR ∈𝒜 and Equation (1.18) that the gamble −1 belongs to𝒜⧹︀xR . Hence𝒜⧹︀xR
does not satisfy A132.
Conversely, assume that𝒜⧹︀xR does not satisfy A132. This means that there is
some g ∈𝒜⧹︀xR such that s :=max g < 0. By Equation (1.18), IxR g ∈𝒜, and therefore
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IxR s = IxR g + IxR (︀s − g⌋︀ ∈𝒜, using A232 and A332. Use A332 one more time to find
that −IxR ∈𝒜. ◻
The situation that leads to incoherence corresponds to updating on an
event considered to be impossible. We call an observation XR = xr such
that IxR ∈ ℐ practically impossible. If no extra information is given, then
we assume that the rational thing to do when updating on a practically
impossible event, is to assume the vacuous model (see Example 1237) for𝒜⧹︀xR .
Definition 24: Given a model𝒜 ⊆ℒ(𝒳N) for XN and an event XR = xR , then
the conditional model𝒜⋃︀xR ⊆ℒ(XN) and the updated model𝒜⧹︀xR :=𝒜⋃︀xR ∩ℒ(XN∖R) are given by
𝒜⋃︀xR ∶=)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
cylext−1xR (IxR𝒜∩𝒜) when IxR ⇑∈ ℐ ,ℒ≥0(𝒳N) otherwise,
𝒜⧹︀xR =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
cylextTxR (IxR𝒜∩𝒜) when IxR ⇑∈ ℐ ,ℒ≥0(XN∖R) otherwise.
For any gamble f ∈ℒ(XN∖R), this can be formulated as
f ∈𝒜⧹︀xR ⇔ (︀(IxR f ∈𝒜)∧(−IxR ⇑∈𝒜)⌋︀∨ f ≥ 0⇔ (︀(IxR f ∈𝒜)∧(IxR ⇑∈ ℐ)⌋︀∨ f ≥ 0. (1.20)
We could have saved ourselves some trouble by making the rationality
axioms stricter. In particular, if we had chosen ℒ≥0 ⊆𝒟 as a rationality axiom
instead of accepting sure gain (Axiom ID230), then the updating rule would
have been𝒜⧹︀xR := cylextTxR (IxR𝒜∩𝒜)without extra conditions. The resulting
set of rationality axioms would be stronger and less expressive than the
ones presented. The newly created model would also force an elicitor to
avoid assessments that correspond to a judgement of practical impossibility,
whereas the model given here deals with these practical impossibilities by
recognising them and resetting the beliefs when observing a practically
impossible event [62, §2.1.2].
The question naturally arises whether updating on XR = xR with R ⊆ N
and then updating on XV = xV with V ⊆ N is the same as updating on XR∪V =
xR∪V . The following proposition shows that the order of updating is of no
importance.
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Proposition 25 (commutativity of updating): Consider a collection of ran-
dom variables XN and a coherent set of acceptable gambles 𝒜 ⊆ ℒ(XN).
Given two disjoint, nonempty sets T ⊆ N and V ⊆ N , it holds that
𝒜⧹︀xR∪V =(𝒜⧹︀xR)⧹︀xV =(𝒜⧹︀xV )⧹︀xR .
Proof: Using Equation (1.20) we see that for any f ∈ℒ(XN∖(R∪V ))
f ∈(𝒜⧹︀xR)⧹︀xV ⇔ (︀(IxV f ∈𝒜⧹︀xR)︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂(A) )∧(−IxV ⇑∈𝒜⧹︀xR)︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂(B) )⌋︀∨( f ≥ 0). (1.21)
Notice that IxV ∈ ℒ(XN∖R). We develop statements (A) and (B) separately using
Equation (1.20)
IxV f ∈𝒜⧹︀xR ⇔ (︀IxR∪V f ∈𝒜)∧(−IxR ⇑∈𝒜)⌋︀∨(IxV f ≥ 0)⇔ (︀IxR∪V f ∈𝒜)∧(−IxR ⇑∈𝒜)⌋︀∨( f ≥ 0),−IxV ⇑∈𝒜⧹︀xR ⇔ (−IxR∪V ⇑∈𝒜)∨(−IxR ∈𝒜).
By substituting these expressions back into Equation (1.21), and by putting the logical
expression in its conjunctive normal form, we get
f ∈(𝒜⧹︀xR)⧹︀xV ⇔ (︀(IxR∪V f ∈𝒜)∧(−IxR ⇑∈𝒜)∧(−IxR∪V ⇑∈𝒜)⌋︀∨ (︀(IxR∪V f ∈𝒜)∧(−IxR ⇑∈𝒜)∧(−IxR ∈𝒜)⌋︀∨ (︀( f ≥ 0)∧(−IxR∪V ⇑∈𝒜)⌋︀∨ (︀( f ≥ 0)∧(−IxR ∈𝒜)⌋︀∨( f ≥ 0)⇔ (︀(IxR∪V f ∈𝒜)∧(−IxR ⇑∈𝒜)∧(−IxR∪V ⇑∈𝒜)⌋︀∨( f ≥ 0).
The last equivalence can be simplified. Because IxR ≥ IxR∪V , it follows from Lem-
ma 231 and A232 that if −IxR ∈𝒜 then −IxR∪V ∈𝒜. We thus get that
f ∈(𝒜⧹︀xR)⧹︀xV ⇔ (︀(IxR∪V f ∈𝒜)∧(−IxR∪V ⇑∈𝒜)⌋︀∨( f ≥ 0)⇔ f ∈𝒜⧹︀xR∪V . ◻
It can be shown rather easily that the updating rule keeps indifferent gambles
indifferent and desirable gambles desirable in the conditioning subspace,
under the assumption that the updating event is not practically impossible.
Proposition 26: Given a model (ℐ ,𝒟) for XN and an event XR = xR , then
the updated setsℐ ⧹︀xR := (𝒜⧹︀xR)∩(−𝒜⧹︀xR) and 𝒟⧹︀xR := (𝒜⧹︀xR)∖(−𝒜⧹︀xR)
are given by
ℐ ⧹︀xR = { f ∈ℒ(XN∖R)∶ IxR f ∈ ℐ and IxR ⇑∈ ℐ}∪{0} ,
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𝒟⧹︀xR = { f ∈ℒ(XN∖R)∶ IxR f ∈𝒟 and IxR ⇑∈ ℐ}∪ℒ≻0(xN∖R).
The updated model is defined on the space 𝒳N∖R , but if a gamble on
the complete space𝒳N is provided and if we know for some reason that the
outcome will assume XR = xR , then the conditional model𝒜⋃︀xR can be used.
This model does not care about the gamble’s values in {xR}c ×𝒳N∖R .
If, on the other hand, the conditional model is considered to be a local
assessment for a greater space, then it is a bit presumptuous to assume
that the updating event will certainly take place. The contingent updating
interpretation dictates that the only assumption we want to make in this case
is that the extended and the updated models are equal in the hyperplane
defined by the updating event XR = xr . In other words, given a conditional
model𝒜⧹︀xR with R ⊂ N , then the most conservative coherent extension toℒ(XN) is given by ext(𝒜⧹︀xR). When the updating event is not practically
impossible, this extension is equal to ext(IxR𝒜 ∩𝒜) and is also called the
weak extension by Moral [42].
1.3.3 Combining partial models
We see from Definitions 1943 and 2447 that—apart from a degenerate
situation where the updating event lies in the boundary of the cone of
desirable gambles—both marginalising and updating amount to taking
intersections of the set of acceptable gambles with a hyperplane: ℒ(𝒳R)
when marginalising to 𝒳R and I{xR}×𝒳N∖Rℒ(𝒳N) when updating on XR =
xR . Intuitively we know that the order in which intersections are taken is
irrelevant, which means that the marginal of the conditional is exactly the
same as the conditional of a marginal. This is made explicit in the following
proposition whose counterpart for sets of desirable gambles was proved
by Moral [42] and de Cooman, Miranda & Zaffalon [17, Proposition 9]. The
proof of the proposition follows the idea behind the discussion in the latter
paper.
Proposition 27: For a coherent set of acceptable gambles 𝒜 ∈ ℒ(XN) and
two disjoint sets V ⊆ N and R ⊆ N it holds that
margR∪V (𝒜)⧹︀xR =margV (𝒜⧹︀xR) .
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Proof: Let us first remark that IxR ∈ ℐ := 𝒜 ∩ −𝒜 is equivalent to IxR ∈ 𝒜 ∩−𝒜 ∩ ℒ(XR∪V ) = margR∪V (𝒜) ∩ −margR∪V (𝒜) because IxR ∈ ℒ(XR∪V ) and−ℒ(XR∪V ) =ℒ(XR∪V ).
Consider any f ∈ℒ(XV ) and observe the following chain of equivalences:
f ∈margR∪V (𝒜)⧹︀xR ⇔ (︀(IxR f ∈margR∪V (𝒜))∧(IxR ⇑∈margR∪V (ℐ))⌋︀∨( f ≥ 0)⇔ (︀(IxR f ∈𝒜)∧(IxR ⇑∈ ℐ)⌋︀∨( f ≥ 0)⇔ f ∈𝒜⧹︀xR
and since f ∈ℒ(XV ), this is equivalent with f ∈margV (𝒜⧹︀xR). ◻
The question to address now, is how to combine local models, i.e.
conditional and marginal models, into a joint model. A local model that
carries the modeller’s belief about XV after updating on XR = xR will be
denoted by𝒜V ⧹︀xR . When each of the local models is coherent, we say that
the local models are separately coherent.
Definition 28: Consider a collection of local models {𝒜
Vi (︁xRi }i∈I with I any
index set, then we say that the local models are separately coherent if and
only if each𝒜
Vi (︁xRi in the collection is a coherent set of acceptable gambles
inℒ(XVi ).
Before moulding local models into a joint model𝒜, we have to consider the
behavioural consequences for each local model𝒜V ⧹︀xR on the joint space𝒳N .
For example, if a (marginal) gamble f ∈ℒ(XV ) is considered acceptable, then
each gamble in projTN( f ) is acceptable inℒ(XN) as well by Definition 1943.
Similarly, if a gamble in ℒ(XN∖R) is considered acceptable after updating
on XR = xR , then the gamble IxR f is by Definition 2447 acceptable in ℒ(XN).
As we know from Proposition 27 that the order in which we update and
marginalise is irrelevant, we infer that whenever a gamble f belongs to a local
model𝒜V ⧹︀xR , then the gambles IxR projTN∖R( f ) are acceptable inℒ(XN) as
well, where we assume that N ⊇V ∪R.
Once the local models are reinterpreted on the joint domain, the natural
extension of the union of these reinterpreted local models can be computed
to get the most conservative model 𝒜 that represents the behavioural
consequences of the local models on the joint space. Unfortunately, this
natural extension however is not guaranteed to be a coherent set of
acceptable gambles, even if the local models are separately coherent. This
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is because the combination of different local models can incur sure loss in
which case no coherent extension exists. But, even if this natural extension𝒜
is coherent, it is not guaranteed that every local model𝒜V ⧹︀xR is actually equal
to margV (𝒜⧹︀xR). This can for instance occur when the event XR = xR turns
out to be practically impossible in which case this apparent incompatibility is
not a problem, on the contrary, the model𝒜V ⧹︀xR should then be considered as
extra information, as a refinement of the modeller’s belief. If the discrepancy
between the model derived from the joint and the local model is not due to
the conditioning on a practical impossible event, then this means that the
modeller specified too stringent a local model. If the natural extension is
coherent, then this local model can be extended, but the modeller should at
least be informed whether that is really what he wants.
Definition 29: The joint𝒜 of a collection of separately coherent local models{𝒜
Vi (︁xRi }i∈I on a joint domain𝒳N with⋃i∈I (Ri ∪Vi ) ⊆ N , is given by
𝒜 := ext(⋃
i∈I IxRi projTN∖Ri (𝒜Vi (︁xRi )) .
If the joint𝒜 is coherent and if it holds for every i ∈ I that
𝒜
Vi (︁xRi =margVi (𝒜⧹︀xRi ) whenever −IxRi ⇑∈𝒜,
then we say that the local assessments𝒜
Vi (︁xRi are jointly coherent.
As explained before, in general nothing can be said a priori about the
coherence of the joint model, let alone about joint coherence of the local
models. There are, however, specific cases where statements about joint
coherence can be made on beforehand. One such a situation is marginal
extension, which is the acceptability counterpart of the Towering Equality,
or the Law of Iterated Expectation, in classical probability theory P X ,Y (⋅) =
P X (P Y (⋅⋃︀X )).
Theorem 30 (Marginal extension): Consider a coherent set of acceptable
gambles 𝒜X on ℒ(X ). Consider moreover an updated coherent set of
acceptable gambles𝒜Y ⧹︀x ⊆ℒ(Y ) for every x ∈𝒳 . Then local models𝒜X and𝒜Y ⧹︀x are jointly coherent, and their joint𝒜 ⊆ℒ(X ,Y ) called the marginal
extension, is given by
𝒜 := ∑
x∈𝒳 I{x}𝒜Y ⧹︀x +projTX (𝒜X )
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= ∑
x∈𝒳 I{x}𝒜Y ⧹︀x +𝒜X ,
Proof: We start by showing that𝒜 is coherent.
A1: Assume that𝒜 does not avoid sure loss. Then for some x ∈𝒳 and ² > 0 there are
h ∈𝒜X and fx ∈𝒜Y ⧹︀x such that∑x∈𝒳 I{x} fx +projTX (h) <−². Since h ∈𝒜X and𝒜X avoids sure loss, we know that maxh ≥ 0. So there is some x∗∈ 𝒳 such that
h(x∗) ≥ 0, where fx∗(y)+h(x∗) <−² and therefore
fx∗(y) <−²−h(x∗) for all y ∈𝒴
But this would mean that fx∗≺ 0 which contradicts the assumption that 𝒜Y ⧹︀x∗
avoids sure loss.
A2: As all local models accept partial gain, we see that∑x∈X I{x}ℒ≥0(Y )+ℒ≥0(X ) =ℒ≥0(X ,Y ) ⊆𝒜.
A3: Assume that f and h belong to𝒜. Then we know that there are gambles fx , hx ∈𝒜Y ⧹︀x and g f , gh ∈𝒜X such that
f = ∑
x∈𝒳 I{x} fx +projTX (g f ),
h = ∑
x∈𝒳 I{x}hx +projTX (gh).
It follows from the separate coherence of the local models that for every α > 0 and
β > 0, α fx +βhx ∈𝒜Y ⧹︀x and αg f +βgh ∈𝒜X , whence also α f +βh ∈𝒜.
We conclude that𝒜 is indeed coherent and from Lemma 29 we also know that it is
the least committal one.
To prove joint coherence we show first that the X -marginal of 𝒜 equals 𝒜X .
As margX (𝒜) = ℒ(X )∩𝒜 we look for gambles in ∑x∈X I{x}𝒜Y ⧹︀x +𝒜X that do
not depend on Y . Clearly every gamble in 𝒜X is in margX (𝒜). Assume that f ∈∑x∈𝒳 I{x}𝒜Y ⧹︀x then f ∈ℒ(X ) implies that f (x, y1) = f (x, y2) for any y1 and y2 in𝒴 . This means that a constant gamble is picked from every𝒜Y ⧹︀x and as𝒜Y ⧹︀x avoids
sure loss, we conclude that f ≥ 0 and𝒜X +{ f } ⊆𝒜X whence margX (𝒜) =𝒜X .
To finish, we must show that:
𝒜⧹︀x =𝒜Y ⧹︀x for all x such that − I{x} ⇑∈𝒜X .
1. It is easy to show that𝒜Y ⧹︀x ⊆𝒜⧹︀x. Indeed, g ∈𝒜Y ⧹︀x requires that I{x}g ∈𝒜
and by Definition 2447 this implies that g ∈𝒜⧹︀x.
2. Conversely, let g ∈𝒜⧹︀x, so we know that I{x}g ∈𝒜 because −I{x} ⇑∈𝒜X and
then −I{x} ⇑∈𝒜. So there are h ∈𝒜X and fz ∈𝒜Y ⧹︀z , z ∈𝒳 such that
I{x}g = h+ ∑
z∈𝒳 I{z} fz .
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Hence g(⋅) = h(x)+ fx(⋅) and 0 = h(z)+ fz(⋅) for all z ∈ 𝒳 ∖ {x}. For any
z ≠ x we see that fz is constant and therefore fz ≥ 0 whence h(z) ≤ 0. This
implies that h(x) ≥ 0 because h ∈𝒜X and 𝒜X avoids sure loss. Since g ≥ fx
and fx ∈𝒜Y ⧹︀x it follows that g ∈𝒜Y ⧹︀x . ◻
1.4 Derived models
The (ℐ ,𝒟)-model described so far is probably amongst the most expressive
models capable of describing uncertainty. The downside of this expressive
wealth is that it comes with serious computational problems that boil down
to the problem that no current software library can do exact calculations
with polyhedra that are partly open and partly closed.6 To overcome these
problems, the (ℐ ,𝒟)-model can be relaxed a bit. One natural way to relax
the conditions is by demanding all indifferent gambles to be desirable, or
alternatively to be not desirable. This is what the the models in the upcoming
sections partly do. Additional assumptions that reduce the expressiveness
but improve the computability may be used. Of course one can think of
different models that approach the (ℐ ,𝒟)-model, at least one such model is
the weak-desirability model given in [20]. We will restrict ourselves to natural
and regular extension: the models most often referred to in the literature.
1.4.1 Almost-desirability
Almost-desirability was introduced by Walley [62, §3.7] and is closely related
to regular extension [62, Appendix J]. We denote the set of almost desirable
gambles by ℛ and a gamble is said to be almost desirable if adding any
positive amount of utility to it results in a desirable gamble:
f ∈ℛ⇔ (∀² > 0)( f +² ∈𝒟). (1.22)
Lemma 31: The set of almost desirable gamblesℛ corresponding to𝒜 (or
to (ℐ ,𝒟)) is given by
ℛ =⋂
²>0(𝒟 −²) =⋂²>0(𝒜−²).
6The Parma Polyhedra Library [2] can do calculations for what they call Nearly Closed
Polyhedra which are polyhedra that have faces that are either open or closed. Cones of acceptable
gambles that have faces that are partly open, partly closed cannot be modelled with this library.
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Proof: From Equation (1.22) we know that f ∈ℛ if and only if f ∈𝒟 −² for any ² > 0
and thereforeℛ =⋂²>0(𝒟 −²).
To prove the second equality, it is sufficient to show that⋂²>0(𝒜−²) ⊆⋂²>0(𝒟−
²) since𝒟 ⊆𝒜 immediately leads to the inverse inclusion. Assume for a moment that
this equality does not hold. Then there must be some gamble f such that
f ∈ ⋂
²>0(𝒜−²) or equivalently (∀δ > 0) f +δ ∈𝒜,
and
f ⇑∈ ⋂
²>0(𝒟 −²) or equivalently (∃² > 0) f +² ⇑∈𝒟 .
Let δ < ², then ²−δ > 0 and by ID330 also ²−δ ∈𝒟 . Then we infer from ID530 and
ID730 that f +² = f +δ⧸︀∈𝒜 + ²−δ⧸︀∈𝒟 ∈𝒟 , a contradiction. ◻
A set of almost desirable gambles has a number of properties that make it
coherent as a set of acceptable gambles.
Proposition 32: Let𝒜 be a coherent set of acceptable gambles on a spaceℒ
andℛ the corresponding set of almost desirable gambles. Then
AD1. ℛ∩ℒ≺0 =∅ [avoiding sure loss]
AD2. ℒ≥0 ⊆ℛ [accepting partial gain]
AD3. posi(ℛ) =ℛ [deduction]
AD4. ⋂²>0(ℛ−²) =ℛ [closure7]
A setℛ that satisfies these conditions is said to be a coherent set of almost
desirable gambles.
Proof: AD1: If f ≺ 0 then there is some ² > 0 such that f +² < 0. So by A132, f +² ⇑∈𝒟 ,
whence f ⇑∈ℛ.
AD2: If f ≥ 0 then by ID330 it holds for all ² > 0 that f +² ∈𝒟 , whence f ∈ℛ.
AD3: if f1 ∈ℛ and f2 ∈ℛ then for all ² > 0 and α > 0 there are ²1 > 0 and ²2 > 0 such
that ² =α²1 + ²2 and f1 + ²1 ∈𝒟 and f2 + ²2 ∈𝒟 . This implies by axiom ID530
that α f1+ f2+² ∈𝒟 and therefore α f1+ f2 ∈ℛ.
AD4: ⋂
²>0(ℛ−²) = ⋂²>0 ⋂δ>0(︀𝒟 −(²+δ)⌋︀ =⋂²>0(𝒟 −²) =ℛ. ◻
7This axiom, taken together with AD1-AD3 makes sure that the cone ℛ is closed in the
usual Euclidean topology on the finite dimensional linear spaceℒ.
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If we compare the definition of coherence for sets of almost desirable
gambles with that of coherent sets of acceptable gambles, we see that the
only difference is the addition of the extra closure axiom AD4. From a
mathematical perspective, a coherent set of almost desirable gambles is
just a special type of coherent set of acceptable gambles. This means that we
can take over most of the machinery developed for acceptability models; we
only need to add an extra check for the closure axiom AD4.
▷ Example 33: The vacuous model is given byℛ =ℒ≥0.
If provided with a finite partial assessmentℛas , then nothing changes
with respect to the acceptability case as the application of the posi operator
will automatically produce a closed set. The only condition that needs to be
checked in order for a partial assessment to be extendable to a set of almost
desirable gambles is again the avoiding sure loss axiom AD1. In the most
general case, with an infinite assessment, the extension has to take care of
the closed character of the set of almost desirable gambles. The resulting
extension is what we call the regular extension and is, for an assessmentℛas , given by
regext(ℛas) :=⋂
²>0(ext(ℛas)−²) , (1.23)
the topological closure of the natural extension as we know it.
The condition for a partial assessmentℛas to be made coherent is again
avoiding sure loss, which also means that there can only be a corresponding
coherent set of acceptable gambles compatible withℛ ifℛ avoids sure loss.
One of the advantages is that for finite assessments, the cone of almost
desirable gambles is now a finite intersection of half spaces and therefore
by definition a closed polytope. This means that computations can be done
using existing software packages for dealing with closed polytopes.
Updating sets of almost desirable gambles. The reasoning used for up-
dating in the acceptability model remains the same when updating a set of
almost desirable gambles. Gambles that were almost desirable are assumed
to stay almost desirable after updating, unless this results in an incoherent set.
As in the acceptability case, this will happen when the semispace spanned by
the atoms of the updating event is a boundary of the cone of almost desirable
gambles.
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Proposition 34: Given a coherent set of almost desirable gambles ℛ ∈ℒ(XN) and an event XR = xr with R ⊆ N , then the updated model ℛ⧹︀xR
given by
ℛ⧹︀xR :=)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
cylextTxR (IxRℛ∩ℛ) when − IxR ⇑∈ℛ,ℒ≥0(XN∖R) otherwise,
is a coherent set of almost desirable gambles. Alternatively,
f ∈ℛ⧹︀xR ⇔ (︀(IxR f ∈ℛ)∧(−IxR ⇑∈ℛ)⌋︀∨( f ≥ 0).
Proof: As coherent sets of almost desirable gambles are coherent sets of acceptable
gambles with the extra condition that Axiom AD454 should be fulfilled, we only need
to check this last axiom.
To prove AD454 we infer from AD354, AD254 and Equation (1.22) that
f ∈ℛ⧹︀xR ⇒ (∀δ > 0) f +δ ∈ℛ⧹︀xR ⇔ f ∈ ⋂
δ>0(ℛ⧹︀xR −δ), and
f ∈ ⋂
δ>0(ℛ⧹︀xR −δ)⇔ (∀δ > 0)IxR ( f +δ) ∈ℛ⇔ (∀δ > 0)(∀² > 0)IxR ( f +δ)+² ∈ℛ⇒ (∀γ > 0)IxR f +γ ∈ℛ⇔ IxR f ∈ℛ⇔ f ∈ℛ⧹︀xR ,
where the unconditional version of Axiom AD454 was used to get the last implication.
These implications prove that indeed f ∈ℛ⧹︀xR ⇔ f ∈⋂δ>0(ℛ⧹︀xR −δ). ◻
1.4.2 Strictly desirable gambles
As explained before, the set of almost desirable gambles is actually the
topological closure of the set of desirable gambles. This means that in the
worst case, some gambles might be called almost desirable that are actually
undesirable. To prevent this situation, we could also opt for a simplified
model that is a subset rather than a superset of the set of desirable gambles𝒟 . The natural extension model we introduce here does just this by allowing
only gambles that are strictly desirable, which means that
f ∈𝒩 ⇔ (∃² > 0)( f −² ∈𝒜)⇔ (∃² > 0)( f −² ∈𝒟) (1.24)
where 𝒩 is the set of strictly desirable gambles. To show that the last
equivalence holds it is sufficient to see that if there is an ² > 0 such that
f −² ∈𝒜, then f − ²⇑2 ∈𝒜+ ²⇑2 ⊆𝒟 by ID330, ID530 and ID730.
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Proposition 35: Let𝒜 ⊂ℒ be a coherent set of acceptable gambles and𝒩
the corresponding set of strictly desirable gambles. Then
SD1. 𝒩 ∩ℒ≤0 =∅ [avoiding sure loss]
SD2. ℒ≻0 ⊆𝒩 [accepting sure gain]
SD3. posi(𝒩 ) =𝒩 [deduction]
SD4. ⋃²>0(𝒩 +²) =𝒩 [openness]
A set 𝒩 that satisfies these conditions is called a coherent set of strictly
desirable gambles.
Proof: From Equation (1.24) we infer that f ⇑∈ 𝒩 ⇔ (∀² > 0)( f − ² ⇑∈ 𝒜)⇔ f ⇑∈⋃²>0(𝒜+²), whence 𝒩 = ⋃
²>0(𝒜+²). (1.25)
SD1: For any ² > 0 it holds by A132 that𝒜∩(ℒ≤0−²) =∅ and this is by Equation (1)
equivalent to (𝒜+²)∩ℒ≤0 =∅. Hence⋃²>0 ((𝒜+²)∩ℒ≤0) =ℒ≤0∩⋃²>0(𝒜+
²) =∅, and thereforeℒ≤0∩𝒩 =∅, by Equation (1.25).
SD2: If f ≻ 0 then there is some ² > 0 such that f −² ≥ 0 whence f −² ∈𝒟 by A232.
SD3: if α ≥ 0, f1 ∈𝒩 and f2 ∈𝒩 then there are ²1 > 0 and ²2 > 0 such that f1−²1 ∈𝒟
and f2 − ²2 ∈𝒟 whence by ID530 α f1 + f2 +α²1 + ²2 ∈𝒟 , which implies that
α f1+ f2 ∈𝒩 .
SD4: Using Equation (1.25) we infer that
⋃
²>0(𝒩 +²) = ⋃²>0(⋃δ>0(𝒜+δ)+²) = ⋃²>0(𝒜+²) =𝒩 . ◻
It is not possible to interpret a set of strictly desirable gambles𝒩 as a special
type of sets of acceptable gambles. This is because SD4 and ID130 demand
that 0 ⇑∈𝒩 which is in conflict with ID430.
Given a set of strictly desirable gambles 𝒩as , we can again calculate
the natural extension ext(𝒩as), the smallest coherent set containing the
assessment 𝒩as . This resulting set will only be coherent if the assessment
avoids sure loss, i.e. if no gamble in posi(𝒩as) is in ℒ≤0, and it is given by
natext(𝒩as) := posi(𝒩as)+ℒ≻0. (1.26)
▷ Example 36: The vacuous model corresponds to𝒩 =ℒ≻0.
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The direct relation between coherent sets of strictly desirable gambles
and coherent sets of almost desirable gambles is given in the following
proposition.
Proposition 37: Consider a coherent set of acceptable gambles𝒜 then the
corresponding sets of almost desirable and strictly desirable gambles satisfy:
ℛ =⋂
²>0(𝒩 −²),𝒩 = ⋃
δ>0(ℛ+δ).
Proof: From Lemma 3153, Equation (1.24), AD454 and SD4, we infer that
h ∈ℛ⇔ (∀² > 0)(∃ f² ∈𝒜) f²−² = h
Because every ² > 0 can be written as ² = α−β with α > 0 and β > 0, we rewrite this
equivalence as
h ∈ℛ⇔ (∀α > 0)(∃β > 0)(∃ fα ∈𝒜) ∈𝒩⟨︀fα+β−α = h⇔ (∀α > 0)(∃ fα ∈𝒩 ) fα−α = h⇔ h ∈ ⋂
α>0(𝒩 −α)
From Lemma 3153, Equation (1.24), AD454 and SD4, we infer that
h ∈𝒩 ⇔ (∀² > 0)(∃ f² ∈𝒜) f²−² = r
Because every ² > 0 can be written as ² = α−β with α > 0 and β > 0, we rewrite this
equivalence as
h ∈𝒩 ⇔ (∀α > 0)(∃β > 0)(∃ fα ∈𝒜) ∈𝒩⟨︀fα+β−α = h⇔ (∀α > 0)(∃ fα ∈𝒩 ) fα−α = h⇔ h ∈ ⋂
α>0(𝒩 −α) ◻
Updating sets of strictly desirable gambles. Again we could try to use the
updating rule f ∈𝒩 ⧹︀xR ⇔ IxR f ∈𝒩 leading to an updated set
cylextTxR (IxR𝒩 ∩𝒩 ).
The problem with this rule however is that there are situations where IxR𝒩 ∩𝒩 is empty. However, if we know that the set of strictly desirable gambles is
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derived from a coherent set of acceptable gambles, then we wish the updated
set𝒩 ⧹︀xR to be also coherent. This issue can be resolved easily: we just assume
that the updated set is the vacuous model whenever IxR𝒩 ∩𝒩 is empty.
Definition 38: Consider a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles 𝒩 ⊆ℒ(XN) and an event XR = xR where R ⊆ N . Then the updated model𝒩 ⧹︀xR is
given by
𝒩 ⧹︀xR :=ℒ≻0(XN∖R)∪cylextTxR (IxR𝒩 ∩𝒩 ),
or equivalently,
f ∈𝒩 ⧹︀xR ⇔ (IxR f ∈𝒩 )∨( f ≻ 0).
The updated set of strictly desirable gambles is again a coherent set of strictly
desirable gambles as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 39: Consider a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles𝒩 ⊆ℒ(XN) and an event XR = xR where R ⊆ N . Then the updated model𝒩 ⧹︀xR is
coherent.
Proof: SD1: Let f ∈ℒ(XN∖R). Because𝒩 avoids sure loss, there is an xN∖R ∈𝒳N∖R
and xR ∈𝒳R such that IxR (xR) f (xN∖R) > 0 and therefore also that f (xN∖R) >
0.
SD2: By definition,ℒ≻0(XN∖R) ⊆𝒩 ⧹︀xR .
SD3: Assume without loss of generality that IxR𝒩 ∩𝒩 ≠ ∅. If f ∈𝒩 ⧹︀xR and g ∈𝒩 ⧹︀xR , then IxR f ∈𝒩 and IxR g ∈𝒩 . Because𝒩 is coherent and by SD357 it
follows for α > 0 that IxR (α f + g) ∈𝒩 , whence α f + g ∈𝒩 ⧹︀xR .
SD4: To prove SD457 we may restrict ourselves to the case where f ⇑∈ℒ≻0(XN∖R).
Under this assumption, f ∈ 𝒩 ⧹︀xR implies that IxR f ∈ 𝒩 . We infer from
Axiom SD457 that then there is some ² > 0 such that IxR f − ² ∈𝒩 and from
Axioms SD257 and SD357 it follows that IxR ( f −²) ∈𝒩 whence
𝒩 ⧹︀xR ⊆ ⋃
²>0(𝒩 ⧹︀xR +²).
The reverse inclusion is almost trivial: if f ∈⋃²>0(𝒩 ⧹︀xR +²) then there is an
² > 0 such that f −² ∈𝒩 ⧹︀xR whence f ∈𝒩 ⧹︀xR by SD257 and SD357. ◻
The following lemma will prove helpful further on.
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Lemma 40: Consider a coherent set of strictly desirable gambles𝒩 ⊆ℒ(XN)
and an event XR = xR where R ⊆ N . Then the updated set of strictly desirable
gambles𝒩 ⧹︀xR is given by
𝒩 ⧹︀xR =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
cylextTxR (IxR𝒩 ∩𝒩 ) if IxR ∈𝒩 ,ℒ≻0(XN∖R) if IxR ⇑∈𝒩 .
or equivalently,
f ∈𝒩 ⧹︀xR ⇔ (︀(IxR f ∈𝒩 )∧(IxR ∈𝒩 )⌋︀∨( f ≻ 0).
Proof: We only have to prove that IxR𝒩 ∩𝒩 = ∅ if and only if IxR ⇑∈𝒩 . Of course,
IxR ∈𝒩 ⇒ IxR𝒩 ∩𝒩 ≠∅ because IxR IxR = IxR . On the other hand, if IxR𝒩 ∩𝒩 ≠∅,
then by SD257 and SD357 there is some gamble f ∈ℒ≻0(XN∖R) that is not constant
and with IxR f ∈𝒩 . Because𝒩 is coherent, there is a set of acceptable gambles𝒜
such that 𝒩 = ⋂²>0(𝒜 − ²) whence there is an ² > 0 such that (IxR f − ²) ∈ 𝒜. By
A332 it follows that (IxR f −²)⇑(max( f )−min( f )) ∈𝒜. Because IxR −²⇑(max( f )−min( f )) ≤(IxR f −²)⇑(max( f )−min( f )) it follows by A232 and A332 that IxR − ²⇑(max( f )−min( f )) ∈𝒜 and therefore IxR ∈𝒩 . ◻
1.4.3 Previsions
If an agent models his beliefs about the variable X through a set of acceptable
gambles, then we can say which gambles he would or would not accept if they
were offered to him for free. An interesting question pops up now: how much
would this person—who meets a minimum of rationality requirements—be
willing to pay to accept a gamble, or how much would he want to get paid
to accept a gamble? The tool to get this information is what we call a lower
prevision and we denote it by P X , or by P when it is clear from the context
about which variable we are talking. Clearly, paying an amount α (positive
or negative) for a gamble f will result in getting a net gamble f −α, but
this means that the question boils down to checking what is the maximal
number α we can subtract from f such that f −α is acceptable. The cone
of acceptable gambles is not necessarily closed so the maximum might not
actually exist. To circumvent this problem we ask for the supremum price the
agent is willing to pay.
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Definition 41: The lower prevision of a gamble f given a set of acceptable
gambles𝒜 is given by
P( f ) :=sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈𝒜} .
Because of the supremum in the definition, boundary information—the
knowledge whether the faces of the cone of acceptable gambles are included
or excluded—about the set of acceptable gambles 𝒜 is actually ignored,
which means that the definition could just as well have been formulated in
terms of sets of (almost or strictly) desirable gambles.
Proposition 42: The lower prevision of a gamble f given a set of acceptable
gambles𝒜 is given by
P( f ) =sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈𝒜}=sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈𝒟}=max{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈ℛ}=sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈𝒩 } .
Proof: For any f ∈𝒜 there is a δ > 0 such that for all 0 < ² < δ:
f −² ∈ℛ⇔ f ∈𝒜⇒ f + ²⇑2 ∈𝒟⇒ f +² ∈𝒩 ⇒ f +² ∈ℛ,
and consequently
−²+{α∶ f −α ∈ℛ} = sup{α∶ f −α−² ∈ℛ}≤ sup{α∶ f −α ∈𝒜}≤ sup{α∶ f −α+² ∈𝒟} = ²⇑2+{α∶ f −α ∈𝒟}≤ sup{α∶ f −α+² ∈𝒩 } = ²+{α∶ f −α ∈𝒩 }≤ sup{α∶ f −α+² ∈ℛ} = ²+{α∶ f −α ∈ℛ}
and since this holds for all 0 < ² < δ, we see that
sup{α∶ f −α ∈ℛ} ≤ sup{α∶ f −α ∈𝒜} ≤ sup{α∶ f −α ∈𝒟}≤ sup{α∶ f −α ∈𝒩 } ≤ sup{α∶ f −α ∈ℛ} ,
so all are equal. The sup turns into max forℛ becauseℛ is closed by axiom AD454.◻
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▷ Example 43: If we take the vacuous model from Example 1237, then we see that
P( f ) =sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈𝒜} ,=sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈ℒ≥0} ,=sup{α ∈R∶ f ≥α} =min f .
This example also shows why the set of indifferent gambles does not appear
in Proposition 42. The only indifferent gamble for the vacuous model is the
zero gamble and for most gambles {α∶ f −α ∈ ℐ} is empty. One could think
of using sup{α∶ f −α+p ∈ ℐ for some p ∈ℒ≥0} which will evaluate to P( f )
in case the vacuous model is assumed. In general, this equality will not hold,
and in fact, it is not possible to come up with an expression for the lower
prevision based on the set of indifferent gambles.
▷ Example 44: For the set of acceptable gambles in Example 1338, the lower
prevision is given by
P( f ) =sup{α ∈R∶ ∑
x∈𝒳( f (x)−α) f0(x) ≥ ∏︁ f −α∏︁2∏︁ f0∏︁2 cos(α0)(︀ ,
and can be obtained by solving the equation
∑
x∈𝒳 (︀ f (x)−P( f )⌋︀ f0(x) = ∏︁ f −P( f )∏︁2∏︁ f0∏︁2 cos(α0).
If we define the function F0∶𝒳 ×𝒳 →R as8
F0(x, y) := f0(x) f0(y)
cos2(α0)∏︁ f0∏︁22 −δx y , (1.27)
and define a,b and c as
a := ∑
x∈𝒳 ∑y∈𝒳 F0(x, y),
b := ∑
x∈𝒳 ∑y∈𝒳 F0(x, y) f (y),
c := ∑
x∈𝒳 ∑y∈𝒳 f (x)F0(x, y) f (y),
The lower prevision P( f ) is given by
P( f ) = b−⌋︂b2−ac
a
on condition that ∑
x∈𝒳( f (x)−P( f )) f0(x) ≥ 0.
8Here δx y stands for the Kronecker delta.
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In the special case where f0 is a constant, positive gamble and we define f :=∑x∈𝒳 f (x)⇑⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀, we get F0(x, y) = 1⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀cos2(α0) −δx y , whence
a⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀ = tan2(α0), b⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀ = f tan2(α0) and c⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀ = f 2 tan2(α0)− ∏︁ f − f ∏︁
2
2⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀ ,
and the lower prevision P( f ) is given by:
P( f ) = f − ∏︁ f − f ∏︁2⌈︂⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀ cot(α0).
Likewise, we could think of the minimal price the agent would like to
get for selling the gamble f or in other words: for what value of α does the
gamble α− f become acceptable? This value is denoted P( f ) and is called
the upper prevision of f .
Definition 45: The upper prevision P( f ) of a gamble f is given by
P( f ) := inf{α ∈R∶α− f ∈𝒜} ,= inf{α ∈R∶α− f ∈𝒟} ,=min{α ∈R∶α− f ∈ℛ} ,= inf{α ∈R∶α− f ∈𝒩 } .
Observe that there is a conjugacy relation
P( f ) =−P(− f )
between upper and lower previsions.
If the lower prevision is given for all gambles in a domain ℒ(X ) then
it could also be viewed as a model describing uncertainty about X . As the
boundary information of the cone of acceptable gambles is not present in
the lower prevision, it is not possible to determine which set of acceptable
gambles𝒜P is being represented by the lower prevision. This is in general not
a problem, but when conditioning, the inherent ambiguity can give problems.
Definition 46: Given a lower prevision P on a domainℱ ⊆ℒ
ℛP :=regext ({ f −P( f )∶ f ∈ℱ}) =⋂
²>0(𝒩P −²), (1.28)𝒩P :=natext ({ f −P( f )∶ f ∈ℱ}) =⋃
²>0(ℛP +²). (1.29)
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A lower prevision P is said to be coherent if its corresponding set of almost
desirable gamblesℛP is coherent. The extension of P fromℱ to ℒ is given
by
P( f ) = sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈ℛP} . (1.30)
We do know that 𝒩P ⊆𝒟P ⊂𝒜P ⊆ℛP (1.31)
so we see that the represented set𝒜P can be approximated by the sets𝒩P
and ℛP . The following proposition gives an alternative expression for the
setsℛP and𝒩P that is easier to interpret.
Proposition 47: Consider a coherent lower prevision P on ℒ(𝒳 ), then the
corresponding coherent set of almost desirable gamblesℛP and coherent
set of strictly desirable gambles𝒩P are given by:
𝒩P = { f ∈ℒ(𝒳 )∶P( f ) > 0} ,ℛP = { f ∈ℒ(𝒳 )∶P( f ) ≥ 0} .
Proof: We infer from Equation (1.30) that
P( f ) ≥ 0⇔ sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈ℛP} ≥ 0⇔ (∀α ≥ 0)( f +α ∈ℛP )
⇔ f ∈ ⌊︀⋂
α>0(ℛP −α)∩ℛP }︀⇔ f ∈ℛP ,
where the last equivalence is the result of AD454. In a similar way we infer that
P( f ) > 0⇔ sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈ℛP} > 0⇔ (∃δ > 0)(∀² > 0)( f −δ+² ∈ℛP )⇔ (∃δ > 0)( f −δ ∈ℛP )⇔ f ∈ ⋃
δ>0(ℛP +δ)⇔ f ∈𝒩P ,
where Proposition 3758 was used in the last equivalence. ◻
Properties of lower previsions The following properties of lower and upper
previsions were proved by Walley [62].
Proposition 48: Let P be defined on the linear space ℒ(X ) and assume that
f and g are elements ofℒ(X ). Then the prevision P is coherent if and only if
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P1. min f ≤ P( f ) ≤ P( f ) ≤max f [boundedness]
P2. P( f )+P(g) ≤ P( f + g) [super-additivity]
P3. P(α f ) =αP( f ) for all real α ∈R≥0 [non-negative homogeneity]
Moreover the following properties will hold for any coherent P .
P4. P( f +β) = P( f )+β for all real β [constant additivity]
P5. f ≤ g implies that P( f ) ≤ P(g) [monotonicity]
P6. P(µ) =µ for any constant gamble µ ∈ℒ(X ).
Proposition 49: Given a set of acceptable gambles 𝒜 with corresponding
set of indifferent gambles ℐ and lower prevision P , it holds for all f ∈ℒ and
i ∈ ℐ that P(i) = P(i) = 0 and P( f + i) = P( f ) and P( f + i) = P( f ).
Proof: Because i and −i ∈𝒜 it follows from Definition 4160 that P(i) ≥ 0 and P(−i) ≥
0. From P6 and P2 we see that 0 ≤ P(i)+P(−i) ≤ P(0) = 0 whence P(i) = 0. Similarly,
P(−i) = 0 so P(i) = 0.
Using that 0 = P(i) = P(i) and super-additivity [P2] we see that P( f ) ≤ P( f + i) ≤
P( f )+P(i) = P( f ). The last inequality comes from P( f + i)+P(−i) ≤ P( f ) together
with the conjugacy property of the lower and upper prevision. ◻
If P( f ) = P( f ) for any gamble f on X , then we say that P defined by
P( f ) = P( f ) = P( f ) is a linear prevision. It follows immediately from the
conjugacy relation, P2 and P3 that a linear prevision P is indeed a linear
functional. It is interesting to lay bare the link between linear previsions and
resolved models.
Proposition 50: With a resolved model ℳ ∈M there corresponds a linear
prevision Pℳ . Models that correspond to a linear prevision P are resolved.
Proof: The set MP( f ) ∶= {α∶ f −α ∈ℳ} is a downset of R:
α1 ≤α2⇒ f −α1 ≤ f −α2⇒ (︀α2 ∈ MP( f )⇒α1 ∈ MP( f )⌋︀,
so MP( f ) has the form (−∞,Pℳ( f )) or (−∞,Pℳ( f )⌋︀. In any case, we see that
Pℳ( f ) = sup{α∶ f −α ∈ℳ} = inf{β∶ f −β ⇑∈ℳ}
and sinceℳ is resolved f −β ⇑∈ℳ⇒β− f ∈ℳ, so
Pℳ( f ) = inf{β∶β− f ∈ℳ} = Pℳ( f ).
65
1. MODELLING UNCERTAINTY
To prove that a model can correspond with a linear prevision only if it is resolved,
we infer from Definition 4663 and Proposition 4764 that
f ⇑∈ℛP ⇒ P( f ) < 0⇔ P(− f ) > 0⇔− f ∈ℛP .
But then it follows from Proposition 1539 thatℛP must be resolved. ◻
Conditional previsions The conditional lower prevision P(⋅⋃︀xr ) on the
linear space ℒ(XN∖R) for a conditioning event XR = xr can be calculated
from its corresponding updated set of acceptable gambles.
Definition 51: Consider a coherent set of acceptable gambles𝒜 on ℒ(XN),
a conditioning event XR = xR (R ⊆ N ) and a gamble f ∈ℒ(XN∖R). Then the
lower prevision and upper prevision of f conditional on XR = xR are defined
as:
P( f ⋃︀xR) = sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈𝒜⧹︀xR} ,
P( f ⋃︀xR) = inf{α ∈R∶α− f ∈𝒜⧹︀xR} .
What happens if P is given instead of a coherent set of acceptable gambles?
We know that 𝒜P is not uniquely determined by P, and so it cannot be
expected that P(⋅⋃︀⋅) is uniquely defined. We know that we can bound the
compatible sets of acceptable gambles, and from Inequality (1.31) we know
that 𝒩P ⊆ 𝒜P ⊆ ℛP and consequently, we are able to confine the lower
prevision. The conditional previsions, corresponding to these extremes are
called the lower prevision under natural extension N if𝒩 is assumed and
the lower prevision under regular extension R ifℛ is assumed.
Definition 52: Given a coherent lower prevision P on ℒ(XN) and a condi-
tioning event XR = xR then the conditional lower prevision under regular and
natural extension are respectively given by:
R( f ⋃︀xR) :=sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈ℛP (︁xR} (1.32)
N( f ⋃︀xR) :=sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈𝒩P (︁xR} (1.33)
withℛP and𝒩P as in Definition 4663.
Although the exact lower prevision cannot be known from the information
available, we can safely assume that it resides somewhere in the interval(︀N,R⌋︀. In practical applications, usually one of the two bounds is assumed,
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either natural or regular extension. It is interesting to note that𝒩P )︁xR will
differ fromℛP )︁xR if and only if IxR𝒩P ∩𝒩P =∅, as the following proposition
indicates.
Proposition 53 (Generalised Bayes Rule): The lower prevision of a gamble
f ∈ℒ(xN∖R), conditional on an event XR = xR with R ⊆ N for a given coherent
(unconditional) lower prevision P onℒ(XN) is the solution of)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
P(IxR (︀ f −P( f ⋃︀xR)⌋︀) = 0 if P(IxR ) > 0,
P( f ⋃︀xR) =min f if P(IxR ) = 0. (1.34)
When P(IxR ) = 0 < P(IxR ), then the conditional lower prevision P(⋅⋃︀xR) is
not uniquely determined , but has bounds
N( f ⋃︀xR) =min f ,
R( f ⋃︀xR) =max{α ∈R∶P(IxR (︀ f −α⌋︀) ≥ 0} .
Proof: It follows from P165 and Proposition 4764 that IxR ⇑∈𝒩P ⇔ P(IxR ) = 0. From
Lemma 4060 we infer then that for any f ∈ℒ(XN∖R)
N( f ⋃︀xR) =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
sup{α∶ IxR ( f −α) ∈𝒩P} if P(IxR ) > 0,
min f if P(IxR ) = 0.
Analogously, it is not too difficult to show that −Ixr ∈ ℛP ⇔ P(IxR ) = 0. From
Definition 3859 we infer that
R( f ⋃︀xR) =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
max{α∶ IxR ( f −α) ∈ℛP} if P(IxR ) > 0,
min f if P(IxR ) = 0.
We see that 𝒩P )︁xR and ℛP )︁xR will result in a different lower prevision only if
P(IxR ) = 0. If P(IxR ) = 0, then both bounds coincide with the vacuous model.
Therefore, assuming that 0 < P(IxR ) ≤ P(IxR ), we see that the value of P( f ⋃︀xR)
is uniquely determined and given by
P( f ⋃︀xR) =max{α ∈R∶ IxR (︀ f −α⌋︀ ∈ℛP} .
Observing that IxR (︀ f −α⌋︀ ∈ℛP ⇔ P(IxR (︀ f −α⌋︀) ≥ 0, we can rewrite the conditional
lower prevision in terms of the unconditional one
P( f ⋃︀xR) =max{α ∈R∶P(IxR (︀ f −α⌋︀) ≥ 0} .
From Lemma 54 we conclude that if P(IxR ) > 0 then there is a unique root for
P(IxR (︀ f −α⌋︀) whence
P(IxR (︀ f −P( f ⋃︀xR)⌋︀) = 0. ◻
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Equation (1.34) is called the generalised Bayes Rule [62, par. 6.4.1].
Lemma 54: Let P be a coherent prevision. Then the map
ρ f ∶R→R∶α→ P (IxR (︀ f −α⌋︀)
is continuous, concave and non-increasing. ρ f is decreasing when P(IxR ) > 0.
Proof: Assume that α1 ≤α2, then by coherence of P we infer from Proposition 4864
that
P(IxR (︀ f −α1⌋︀)−P(IxR (︀ f −α2⌋︀) ≤ P(IxR (︀α2−α1⌋︀) = (α2−α1)P(IxR ),
and we conclude that ⋂︀ρ f (α1)−ρ f (α2)⋂︀ ≤ ⋃︀α1−α2⋃︀P(IxR ) for all α1,α2 ∈ R, which
implies that ρ f is (Lipschitz) continuous.
To show that ρ f is concave, we just apply Properties P265 and P365:
ρ f (²α1+(1−²)α2) = P(IxR (︀² f −²α1+(1−²) f −(1−²)α2⌋︀)≥ ²P(IxR (︀ f −α1⌋︀)+(1−²)P(IxR (︀ f −α2⌋︀)= ²ρ f (α1)+(1−²)ρ f (α2).
From property P565, it follows immediately that ρ f is non-increasing.
To prove that ρ f is decreasing when P(IxR ) > 0 we let α ∈R and ² ∈R>0 and infer
from P265 that
ρ f (α−²) ≥ ρ(α)+P(²IxR ).
By using P365 and P(IxR ) > 0 we infer that
ρ f (α−²) > ρ(α),
whence ρ f must be a decreasing function. ◻
1.5 Structural judgements
1.5.1 Irrelevance and independence
A coherent set margY (𝒜⧹︀X = x) represents your current attitude towards
acceptance of gambles in ℒ(Y ) when X assumes a value in x ∈𝒳 .9 If your
attitude towards accepting gambles in ℒ(Y ) does not depend on whether
9Following de Cooman, Miranda & Zaffalon [17] we demand only the independence towards
atoms instead of independence towards every possible subset.
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you have learned something about the possible values that X can assume,
then we say that X is epistemically irrelevant to Y . It means that it does not
matter whether we do or do not learn something about X when having to
make decisions about Y .
Definition 55: Let 𝒜 ∈ ℒ(XN) be a coherent set of acceptable gambles
modelling your beliefs on XN , and let R and V be any disjoint subsets of
N . Then we say that XR is epistemically irrelevant to XV and denote this
XR EI XV if learning the outcome of XR will not alter your beliefs about XV :
XR EI XV ⇔ (∀xR ∈𝒳R)(margV (𝒜⧹︀xR) =margV (𝒜)) . (1.35)
Very often, an irrelevance statement is made and some marginals are
given and the question is which joint model coincides with these assessments
and if possible, which compatible model is the least committal one.
Theorem 56 (irrelevant natural extension): The least committal, jointly co-
herent set of acceptable gambles on ℒ(X ,Y ) that expresses the epistemic
irrelevance X EI Y given the separately coherent marginals 𝒜X and 𝒜Y is
given by
𝒜X EI Y := ∑
x∈𝒳 I{x}𝒜Y +projTX (𝒜X )
:= ∑
x∈𝒳 I{x}𝒜Y +𝒜X .
Proof: It is clear that𝒜X EI Y should at least include∑x∈𝒳 I{x}𝒜Y +𝒜X .
The rest of the proof follows from the fact that the irrelevant natural extension is
a special type of marginal extension (see Theorem 3051) where all conditional models
are given by𝒜Y ⧹︀x =𝒜Y and the marginal model is𝒜X . ◻
▷ Example 57: Consider two variables X and Y with𝒳 = {x1, x2} and 𝒴 = {y1, y2}.
The set of acceptable gambles𝒜X is the nonnegative linear hull of the two extreme
gambles a := −I{x1} +2I{x2} and b := 3I{x1} − I{x2}. 𝒜Y is the nonnegative linear
hull of the two extreme gambles c :=−I{y1}+4I{y2} and d := I{y1}− I{y2}.𝒜X =posi{a,b,0} = {αa+βb∶α,β ≥ 0} , (1.36)𝒜Y =posi{c,d ,0} = {γc +δd ∶γ,δ ≥ 0} . (1.37)
If we assume that X is epistemically irrelevant to Y : X EI Y , then we use Theorem 56
to get
𝒜X EI Y := ∑
x∈𝒳 I{x}𝒜Y +projTX (𝒜X ),
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=I{x1}𝒜Y + I{x2}𝒜Y +projTX (𝒜X ),={I{x1}(︀ f (x1)+ g1⌋︀+ I{x2}(︀ f (x2)+ g2⌋︀∶ f ∈𝒜X ∧ g1, g2 ∈𝒜Y } . (1.38)
If we define a basis ℬ = {I{x1,y1}, I{x1,y2}, I{x2,y1}, I{x2,y2}}, then the vector repres-
entation (︀𝒜X EI Y ⌋︀ℬ is given by
(︀𝒜X EI Y ⌋︀ℬ =
)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−α+3β−γ1+δ1−α+3β+4γ1−δ1
2α−β−γ2+δ2
2α−β+4γ2−δ2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
∶α,β,γ1,γ2,δ1,δ2 ≥ 0
[︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌈︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌊︀
.
The fact that the Y -marginal is equal to 𝒜Y can be seen the easiest from Equa-
tion (1.38).
marg𝒴 (𝒜X EI Y ) ={ f (x1)+ g1∶ f ∈𝒜X , g1, g2 ∈𝒜Y , f (x1)+ g1 = f (x2)+ g2} .
Note that g1 = g2 + c where c is a constant. Because 𝒜X is coherent we know that
max f ≥ 0 and therefore either f (x2)+ g2 ∈𝒜Y or f (x1)+ g1 ∈𝒜Y . Because f (x1)+
g1 = f (x2)+ g2 we see that f (x1)+ g1 ∈𝒜Y .
The X -marginal marg𝒳 (𝒜X EI Y ) is given by
{I{x1}(︀ f (x1)+ g1⌋︀+ I{x2}(︀ f (x2)+ g2⌋︀∶ f ∈𝒜X , g1, g2 ∈𝒜Y ∩ℒ(X )} .
Because𝒜Y is coherent,𝒜Y ∩ℒ(X ) consists solely of non-negative constant gambles
(including zero) whence marg𝒳 (𝒜X EI Y ) =𝒜X .
To end this example, we check whether marg𝒴 (𝒜X EI Y ⋃︀x1) =𝒜Y . Again, from
Equation (1.38) we get that
marg𝒴 (𝒜X EI Y ⋃︀x1) = { f (x1)+ g ∶ f ∈𝒜X , g ,h ∈𝒜Y , f (x2)+h = 0} .
Because f (x2)+h has to be equal to 0, h is a constant gamble which is non-negative
because of coherence of𝒜Y . But this means that f (x2) ≤ 0 and because of coherence
of𝒜X , f (x1) has to be non-negative. Thus marg𝒴 (𝒜X EI Y ⋃︀x1) =𝒜Y .
If learning about X will not alter our beliefs about Y and vice versa,
learning about Y does not alter our beliefs about X then we say that X and Y
are epistemically independent.
Definition 58: Two variables X and Y are said to be epistemically inde-
pendent if X is epistemically irrelevant to Y and Y is epistemically irrelevant
to X
X ind Y ⇔ X EI Y and Y EI X .
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As in Theorem 5669 we can try to extend marginals again, but now under
the independence criterion.
Lemma 59 (independent natural extension): The least committal set onℒ(X ,Y ) embedding epistemic independence between the two variables
X and Y given the separately coherent X -marginal𝒜X and Y -marginal𝒜Y
is given by 𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y := ∑
x∈𝒳 I{x}𝒜Y +∑y∈𝒴 I{y}𝒜X ,
This extension is jointly coherent with the local models.
Proof: Clearly𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y should include both𝒜X EI Y and𝒜Y EI X and ext(𝒜X EI Y ∪𝒜Y EI X ) is the smallest—possibly coherent—set doing this. This natural extension
will be coherent if and only if 𝒜X EI Y ∪𝒜Y EI X avoids sure loss. Given the co-
herence of the epistemic irrelevant extensions, ext(𝒜X EI Y ∪𝒜Y EI X ) is equal to∑x∈𝒳 I{x}𝒜Y +𝒜X +∑y∈𝒴 I{y}𝒜X +𝒜Y which can also be written as∑
x∈𝒳 I{x}𝒜Y + ∑y∈𝒴 I{y}𝒜X .
Next we show that marg𝒳 (𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y ) =𝒜X . Let f ∈ ((𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y )∩ℒ(X )). This
means that there are hx ∈𝒜Y and hy ∈𝒜X such that
f = f (⋅, y) = ∑
x∈𝒳 I{x}hx(y)+hy for any y ∈𝒴 .
But this is an element of 𝒜X EI Y ∩ℒ(X ) = marg𝒳 (𝒜X EI Y ) = 𝒜X and therefore
marg𝒳 (𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y ) ⊆𝒜X . Because𝒜X ⊆marg𝒳 (𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y ) by definition, we have
shown that marg𝒳 (𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y ) =𝒜X . This also shows that𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y avoids sure loss
because if it did not then𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y ∩ℒ(X ) =ℒ(X ) ≠𝒜X .
We know from Definition 58 that marg𝒳 ((𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y )⋃︀y) ⊇ 𝒜X so we only
have to show the reverse in the remainder of the proof. We start from the ex-
pression marg𝒳 ((𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y )⋃︀y) = ℒ(X )∩ I{y}(𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y )∩ (𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y ). Because
we know that marg𝒳 (𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y ) = 𝒜X , we see that marg𝒳 ((𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y )⋃︀y) =
I{y}(𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y )∩𝒜X ⊆𝒜X . From symmetry it follows that marg𝒴 ((𝒜X ⊗𝒜Y )⋃︀x) =𝒜Y . ◻
Independence can again be used when the marginals for a multitude
of variables XN are given. The product ⊗n∈N𝒜Xn can be constructed in a
recursive manner because the operator ⊗ is commutative and associative.
A product that is built this way is completely independent, meaning that
for any subsets S,R of N with S ∩R = ∅, XR ⊗ XS . In general, pairwise and
complete independence are not the same however.
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Proposition 60: The operator ⊗ is commutative and associative. The inde-
pendent product of a finite number of random variables XN , N := {1,2, . . . ,n}
with corresponding coherent sets of acceptable gambles 𝒜Xi , i ∈ N is
therefore given by
⊗i∈N𝒜Xi :=∑
i∈N ∑z∈XN∖{i} I{z}𝒜Xi .
Proof: It follows at once from Lemma 59 that ⊗ is commutative. The associativity of⊗ follows from
(𝒜X1 ⊗𝒜X2)⊗𝒜X3
=⎛⎝ ∑x2∈𝒳2 I{x2}𝒜X1 + ∑x1∈𝒳1 I{x1}𝒜X2⎞⎠⊗𝒜X3
= ∑
x3∈𝒳3 I{x3}
⎛⎝ ∑x2∈𝒳2 I{x2}𝒜X1 + ∑x1∈𝒳1 I{x1}𝒜X2⎞⎠+ ∑z3∈𝒳1∶2 I{z3}𝒜X3= ∑
z1∈𝒳2∶3 I{z1}𝒜X1 + ∑z2∈𝒳1,2 I{z2}𝒜X2 + ∑z3∈𝒳1∶2 I{z3}𝒜X3
= ∑
z1∈𝒳2∶3 I{z1}𝒜X1 + ∑x1∈𝒳1 I{x1}⎛⎝ ∑x3∈𝒳3 I{x3}𝒜X2 + ∑x2∈𝒳2 I{x2}𝒜X3⎞⎠=𝒜X1 ⊗ (𝒜X2 ⊗𝒜X3) .
To see that the necessary irrelevancies hold, observe for any R,S ⊆ N with R ∩S =∅,
that
margR (⊗n∈N𝒜Xn (︁xs) =margR ((︀(⊗r∈R𝒜Xr )⊗ (⊗s∈S𝒜Xs )⌋︀(︁xs)=⊗r∈R𝒜Xr ,
where the last equality is a consequence of Lemma 59. ◻
As De Cooman and Miranda [17] prove, independent sets have an
interesting factorisation property.
Proposition 61 (Factorisation): Let 𝒜N := ⊗n∈N𝒜Xn ⊆ ℒ(XN) be the inde-
pendent product of the coherent sets of acceptable gambles𝒜n . Then for all
disjoint subsets I and O of N and for all f ∈ℒ(XO):
f ∈𝒜N ⇔ (∀g ∈ℒ≥0(X I )) f g ∈𝒜N . (1.39)
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Proof: Fix arbitrary disjoint subsets I and O of N and any f ∈ ℒ(XO); We show
that Equation (1.39) holds. The ‘⇐’ part is trivial, For the ‘⇒’ part, assume that
f ∈ 𝒜N and consider any g ∈ ℒ≥0(X I ). We have to show that f g ∈ 𝒜N . Since
g = ∑xI ∈𝒳I I{xI}g(xI ), we see that f g = ∑xI ∈𝒳I g(xI )I{xI} f . Now since f ∈
margO (𝒜N ), we infer from the independence of𝒜N that f ∈𝒜N ⧹︀xI and therefore
I{xI} f ∈𝒜N for all xI ∈𝒳I . We conclude that f g is a positive linear combination of
elements I{xI} f of𝒜N , and therefore belongs to𝒜N by coherence. ◻
The independent natural product of a finite collection of marginal lower
previsions P n , n ∈ N is defined by(⊗n∈N P n)( f ) := sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈⊗n∈N𝒩P n} .
We used sets of strictly desirable gambles in the definition, but any set of
acceptable gambles that is compatible with the marginal lower prevision,
would result in the same lower prevision. Moreover, some of the interesting
properties of the ⊗ operator are inherited by this product.
Proposition 62: Let f ∈ ℒ(𝒳N). The independent natural product of a
collection of coherent marginal lower previsions P n , n ∈ N is coherent and
satisfies (⊗n∈N P n)( f ) =max{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈⊗n∈NℛP n} .
If h ∈ℒ(𝒳R) with R ⊆ N , then(⊗n∈N P n)(h) = (⊗r∈R P r )(h). (1.40)
Proof: If we define the closure cl(𝒜) of a set 𝒜 by cl(𝒜) := ⋂²>0(𝒜 − ²), then we
infer from Proposition 4261, that
(⊗n∈N P n)( f ) =max{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈ cl(⊗n∈N𝒩P n )}=max{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈⊗n∈N cl(𝒩P n )}=max{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈⊗n∈NℛP n} .
Here we used Lemma 63 in the middle, and Definition 4663 in the last step.
The coherence of ⊗n∈N P n is (by Definition 4663) an immediate consequence of
the coherence of ⊗n∈NℛP n (by Proposition 60).
To prove Equation (1.40), it is sufficient to notice that
projTR (h)−α ∈⊗n∈NℛP n ⇔ projTR (h−α) ∈⊗n∈NℛP n⇔ (h−α) ∈margR (⊗n∈NℛP n )
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⇔ (h−α) ∈⊗r∈RℛP r ,
where the last equivalence follows by Proposition 6072. ◻
Lemma 63: Let𝒜n ∈ℒ(Xn), n ∈ N , be coherent sets of acceptable gambles
and define cl(𝒜) :=⋂²>0(𝒜−²). Then
cl(⊗n∈N𝒜n) =⊗n∈N (cl𝒜n) ,
Proof: It follows from the definition of cl, A232 and A332 that
f ∈ cl(⊗n∈N𝒜n)⇔ (∀δ > 0) f +δ ∈⊗n∈N𝒜n⇒ (∀δ > 0)(∀²n,z > 0) f +δ+ ∑
n∈N ∑z∈XN∖{n} I{z}²n,z ∈⊗n∈N𝒜n⇒ (∀δ > 0)(∀²n,z > 0) f + ∑
n∈N ∑z∈XN∖{n} I{z}(²n,z +δ⇑N) ∈⊗n∈N𝒜n⇒ (∀²n,z > 0) f + ∑
n∈N ∑z∈XN∖{n} I{z}²n,z ∈⊗n∈N𝒜n⇒ (∀²n,z > 0) f +max ∑
n∈N ∑z∈XN∖{n} I{z}²n,z ∈⊗n∈N𝒜n⇒ (∀δ > 0) f +δ ∈⊗n∈N𝒜n ,
whence
f ∈ cl(⊗n∈N𝒜n)⇔ (∀²n,z > 0) f + ∑
n∈N ∑z∈XN∖{n} I{z}²n,z ∈⊗n∈N𝒜n .
If we use Proposition 6072, we infer that,
f ∈ cl(⊗n∈N𝒜n)⇔ (∀²i ,z > 0) f ∈ ∑
n∈N ∑z∈XN∖{n} I{z} (𝒜n −²i ,z)⇔ f ∈ ∑
n∈N ∑z∈XN∖{n} I{z} cl(𝒜n)⇔ f ∈⊗n∈N cl(𝒜n) . ◻
1.5.2 Symmetry
At the end of this chapter we feel obliged to say a few words about symmetry
because this is where the concept of indifference really stands out. We
consider a monoid 𝒯 of transformations T of ℒ, and some agent’s claim
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that there is symmetry with respect to this monoid. What does that mean?
It could be that the agent’s dispositions towards the acceptance of gambles
stay invariant under transformations of 𝒯 . This type of symmetry is called
weak symmetry and is also called symmetry of the model by De Cooman
and Miranda [15] or symmetry in beliefs by Walley [62, Chapter 9]. As the set
of indifferent gambles is the workhorse model when it comes to symmetry,
we define everything in terms of (ℐ ,𝒟) assessments. The definition in terms
of sets of acceptable gambles follow at once from Proposition 332.
Definition 64: A set of acceptable gambles isweakly symmetricwith respect
to a monoid of transformations 𝒯 if
𝒯 𝒟 ⊆𝒟 and 𝒯 ℐ ⊆ ℐ and 𝒯 𝒰 ⊆ 𝒰 and 𝒯 𝒪 ⊆𝒪 ,
where 𝒯 𝒟 := {T f ∶ f ∈𝒟 and T ∈ 𝒯 }, and similarly for the other sets.
This type of symmetry tells something about current views on the modelled
variable, but the symmetry will most likely be broken when additional
assessments are made, hence the adjective weak. Because the symmetry
can break relatively easily we consider this case of less importance—but by
no means unimportant—and will not focus on it further.
It could also be possible that the assessor believes that he cannot
distinguish between gambles and their transformations. This means that
he cannot choose between f ∈ℒ and T f with T any transformation from the
monoid of transformations 𝒯 . But this means that f −T f is perceived as an
indifferent gamble by the assessor. When additional assessments are made,
then either the symmetry will not be broken, or a sure loss situation is created
and so making a statement about this type of symmetry is very strong. This
type of symmetry is called strong symmetry or model of symmetry by De
Cooman and Miranda [15] or symmetry in evidence by Walley [62, Chapter
9].
Definition 65: A set of acceptable gambles 𝒜 is strongly symmetric with
respect to a monoid of transformations 𝒯 if
ℐ𝒯 := span{ f −T f ∶ f ∈ℒ,T ∈ 𝒯 } ⊆ ℐ =𝒜∩−𝒜.
▷ Example 66: Suppose n different random variables X1, X2, . . . Xn representing n
different experiments on the same space𝒳 . All variables are logically independent
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and so their joint outcome is defined on the cartesian product space 𝒳 n . Given
a permutation pi∶{1,2, . . . ,n} → {1,2, . . . ,n}, we define the permutation pi f of
the gamble f ∈ ℒ(𝒳 n) by pi f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) := f (xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . , xpi(n)). If you
claim that a coherent model 𝒜X n is permutable [62, §9.4] and state that you are
predisposed to accept a gamble f , then you are automatically also predisposed to
accept any permutation pi f of the accepted gamble. If you claim that the model
is exchangeable [62, §9.5], [20], then you are willing to change any gamble f for a
permuted version pi f and you are indifferent towards the gamble f −pi f .
The transformations considered in the literature are usually defined on the
underlying possibility space𝒳 rather than on the set of gamblesℒ(𝒳 ). This
is not a problem as the transformation can in this case be lifted [15] to a
linear transformation on the corresponding gamble space as in Example 66.
Remark that strong symmetry with respect to a monoid of transformations
requires that ℐ𝒯 ⊆ ℐ which means that also spanℐ𝒯 ⊆ ℐ .
A strong symmetry claim can be considered as a specification of a set of
indifferent gambles ℐ𝒯 . If the strong invariance is the only assessment that is
made, then the only requirement for this assessment to be valid is that there
should be by Equation (1.5) no indifference to sure loss.
Lemma 67 (Amenability of the monoid): A strong invariance assessment
corresponding to a monoid of transformations 𝒯 avoids sure loss if and only
if
spanℐ𝒯 ∩ℒ≺0 =∅. (1.41)
Equivalently
(∀ fk ∈ℒ)(∀Tk ∈ 𝒯 )max∑
k
( fk −Tk fk) ≥ 0. (1.42)
Proof: Because by definition, ℐ𝒯 ⊆ ℐ , we know from ID630 that spanℐ𝒯 ⊆ ℐ and
therefore, it should hold by Equation (1.5) that
spanℐ𝒯 ∩ℒ≺0 =∅,
which can be rewritten as (∀ fk ∈ ℒ)(∀Tk ∈ 𝒯 )(∑k( fk − Tk fk) ⇑≺ 0) which is
equivalent to 1.42. ◻
The term amenability of a semigroup was used by Walley following Green-
leaf and actually means that there is a 𝒯 -invariant linear prevision [62, §3.5.6,
note 3]. This follows immediately from Propositions 1741 and 5065. Another
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interesting problem is the question whether a strong invariance statement is
compatible with a given assessment.
Theorem 68 (Dominance theorem): A strong invariant assessment ℐ𝒯 is
compatible with10 a coherent set of acceptable gambles𝒜 if
spanℐ𝒯 ∩(𝒜∖−𝒜) =∅, (1.43)
and
(𝒜+ spanℐ𝒯 )∩ℒ≺0 =∅. (1.44)
Under these conditions, the natural extension𝒜 + spanℐ𝒯 of ℐ𝒯 and𝒜 is
coherent and the corresponding lower prevision for a gamble f ∈ℒ can be
written as
P( f ) = sup{E( f − i)∶ i ∈ spanℐ𝒯 } ,= sup{E𝒯 ( f − g)∶g ∈𝒜} ,
where
E(h) := sup{α∶h−α ∈𝒜} ,
E𝒯 (h) := sup{α∶h−α ∈ ext(spanℐ𝒯 )} ,
and ext(spanℐ𝒯 ) =ℒ≥0+ spanℐ𝒯 .
Proof: Because a gamble can not be indifferent and desirable at the same time,
spanℐ𝒯 ∩𝒜∖−𝒜 has to be empty. From ID630 it follows then that ℐ𝒯 ∩−𝒜∖𝒜 =∅
and both assessments𝒜 and ℐ𝒯 will not be in conflict.
From Equation (1.9) we see—keeping the coherence of 𝒜 in mind—that the
natural extension of spanℐ𝒯 and𝒜 is given by spanℐ𝒯 +𝒜 which has to avoid sure
loss: (spanℐ𝒯 +𝒜)∩ℒ≺0 =∅.
We know that the natural extension of the union of both assessment is given by
spanℐ𝒯 +𝒜 so the lower prevision of a gamble f ∈ℒ is defined as
P( f ) = sup{α∶ f −α ∈ spanℐ𝒯 +𝒜} ,= sup{α∶ f − i −α ∈𝒜 and i ∈ spanℐ𝒯 } ,= sup{sup{α∶ f − i −α ∈𝒜} ∶ i ∈ spanℐ𝒯 } ,= sup{E( f − i)∶ i ∈ spanℐ𝒯 } .
10With “is compatible with” we mean that the assessment (ℐ𝒯 ,∅,𝒜) can be extended to a
coherent set of acceptable gambles.
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Alternatively, we infer from Axiom A232 and the fact that 0 ∈ℒ≥0, that
P( f ) = sup{α∶ f −α ∈ spanℐ𝒯 +𝒜+ℒ≥0} ,= sup{α∶ f −a−α ∈ spanℐ𝒯 +ℒ≥0 and a ∈𝒜} ,= sup{sup{α∶ f −a−α ∈ spanℐ𝒯 +ℒ≥0} ∶a ∈𝒜} ,= sup{E𝒯 ( f −a)∶a ∈𝒜} ,
which concludes the proof. ◻
Here E𝒯 is the smallest and most conservative 𝒯 -invariant lower prevision,
meaning that E𝒯 ( f ) = 0 for all f ∈ spanℐ𝒯 .
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CHAPTER 2
Imprecise probability trees
The legend goes that probability theory sprouted from the correspondence
on the “Problème des partis” between Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat.
Each of them however, was according to Christiaan Huygens1 so occupied
with “weighty issues” that they kept their findings to themselves, and as a
reaction to that, Huygens decided to publish his results on the subject in
a manuscript: “Van rekeningh in spelen van geluck”. This manuscript was
translated by Van Schooten into Latin and became the first book ever on
probability theory: “De ratiociniis in ludo aleae”. Huygens did not claim that
the findings were completely his own2 but one thing that seems to be original
is the appearance of what is arguably the first ever published probability
tree. The probability tree appeared in an attempt to solve a variation on the
Problem of Points (See Figure 2.1).
▷ Example 69: The Problem of Points is as follows [26]. Let two players A and B stake
equal money on being the first to win n points in a game in which the winner of each
point is decided by the toss of a fair coin, heads for A and tails for B. If such a game is
interrupted when A still lacks a points and B lacks b, how should the total stakes be
divided between them?
1In a letter to Franciscus van Schooten jr. (April 27, 1657), Huygens writes: [the French are so
occupied with] “swaere questien” [that they] “nochtans elck sijn maniere van uytvinding bedeckt
hebben gehouden.”
2In the same letter to Van Schooten, Huygens assures that his findings correspond to those
of the French.
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Figure 2.1: Extract from Huygens’s manuscript taken from [53] with permission of
Glenn Shafer.
What we will do in this chapter is in some sense a revision of Huygens’s
approach to the Problem of Points, but now, our beliefs about the dice are
allowed to be imprecise, and we use conservative reasoning. The question of
“what a gamble is worth” remains to us as fundamental as it was in Huygens’s
solution. Clearly, we intend to develop a framework that can handle a whole
variety of problems and not just the Problem of Points. We aim for an account
of event-driven random processes.
We start the chapter with the introduction of event trees, which can
be seen as probability trees with the probabilities removed. These event
trees formalise the possible situations the world can be in. Notation and
new concepts will be introduced following Shafer’s work on causality [53].
Once the event tree is known, the modelling agent’s beliefs about possible
transitions between situations have to be incorporated. It is assumed
throughout this chapter that the agent only expresses beliefs about situations
that follow immediately, using sets of acceptable gambles or lower previsions.
Another theory of uncertainty, where imprecise (lower and upper) prob-
abilities and previsions, rather than precise (or point-valued) probabilities
and previsions, have a central part is Glenn Shafer and Vladimir Vovk’s game-
theoretic account of probability [55]. When comparing Walley’s behavioural
theory [62] and Shafer and Vovk’s game-theoretic framework, they seem to
have a rather different interpretation, and they certainly have been influenced
by different schools of thought: Walley follows the tradition of Frank Ramsey
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[48], Bruno de Finetti [24] and Peter Williams [69] in trying to establish
a rational model for a subject’s beliefs in terms of her behaviour. Shafer
and Vovk follow an approach that has many other influences as well, and is
strongly coloured by ideas about gambling systems and martingales. They use
Cournot’s Principle to interpret lower and upper probabilities (see [54]; and
[55, Chapter 2] for a nice historical overview), whereas in Walley’s approach,
lower and upper probabilities are defined in terms of a subject’s betting rates.
We have shown in [12] that in many practical situations, the two approaches
are strongly connected. This implies that quite a few results, valid in one
theory, can automatically be converted and reinterpreted in terms of the
other. As an example of this, we will further on prove a generalisation of
Hoeffding’s inequality.
Although we shall assume below that every local set of acceptable gambles
in an imprecise probability tree is only allowed to take values on a finite
possibility space, the infinite depth of the tree can result in gambles on
an infinite number of situations. As a result, our theory of coherent sets of
acceptable gambles, as set out in Chapter 128, is no longer directly applicable.
The main problem is that the maximum of a gamble (or minimum) is not
guaranteed to exist. The common way to treat this problem is by redefining
the ≺ operator: f ≺ g if and only if sup( f −g) < 0. The elements in the setℒ≺0
that appear in the avoiding sure loss axiom are the gambles whose supremum
is strictly smaller than zero. So when allowing for infinite possibility spaces,
A132 changes slightly. Both A232 and A332 remain unchanged. Theorem 735
also generalises in a fairly straightforward fashion. When considering lower
(or upper) previsions, there are slight complications:
P( f ) := sup{α ∈R∶ f −α ∈𝒜} ,
can now also assume infinite values, so P( f ) ∈R∗ with R∗ :=R∪{−∞,+∞}.
For more details we refer to [21].
2.1 Event trees
Assume that the world, or system, you describe is in a known initial situation
and that there is some kind of demigod, which we will call Reality, who
repeatedly decides which situation the world is going to be in next. Reality
has to follow some plan, however, and the plan is telling him which possible
situations it can choose from, in any particular situation. One feature of
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this plan is that two situations can never evolve into the same situation,
which implements the importance of history. This requirement renders
Reality’s roadmap into a tree where the nodes are the situations and the
edges are (Humean) events. This tree is what we call the event tree: a roll-out,
a roadmap of all possible and relevant situations that Reality can go through.
In order to specify the event tree, we see that we need to specify a set of
possible situations and some kind of graph that tells us which situations are
connected to each other. Also, there is a particular time or causal order, which
has to be respected.
2.1.1 Situations and events
In order to define the event tree in a mathematically sound way, we start with
the specification of a set Swhose elements we call situations. These are all
the situations that Reality can possibly be in. On this set S, we assume we
have a partial order relation ⊑ that dictates the direction of the evolution
through situations. For any two situations s, t ∈S we say that s precedes t , or
t follows s, if s ⊑ t or equivalently, t ⊒ s. If s ⊑ t or t ⊑ s then we say that s and t
are ordered. If s and t are not ordered, we write s ∥ t . s ⊏ t is an abbreviation
for s ⊑ t and s ≠ t and we call it the “strictly precedes” relation; likewise we
have the “strictly follows” relation ⊐. The set of all situations that follow a
situation t is denoted by ↑t := {s ∈S∶ s ⊒ t}. Any element of this set—but not
t itself—is called a descendant or successor of t . The set of all situations
preceding t is denoted ↓t := {s ∈S∶ s ⊑ t}. Any situation that strictly precedes
t is called an ancestor or predecessor of t .
We are now able to give the formal definition of an event tree.
Definition 70: A partially ordered set S with partial order relation ⊑ is a
(discrete) event tree (S,⊑) if it satisfies:
ET1. the set ↓t of any situation t ∈S is well-ordered by ⊑,3
ET2. there is some element ◻ ∈S that precedes all elements of S: S has a
bottom.
The unique initial situation ◻ that precedes all elements is also called the
root of the tree. Maximal elements of ⊑ are called the leaves of the tree
3Remember that a set is well-ordered if it is totally ordered and every nonempty subset has
an infimum (See Definition 150197 in Appendix B194).
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a
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d
e
f
g
h i
j
k
l
Figure 2.2: A simple event tree for Reality, displaying the initial situation ◻, other
non-terminal situations (such as a, g ,h) as grey circles, and terminal situations,
(such as f , l ,k) as black circles. Observe that g ⊏ i , g ∥ a and e ⊒ a. Observe also↑a = {a,b,c,d ,e} and ↓a = {◻, a}. This means that the initial situation ◻ is the only
ancestor of a, whereas {b,c,d ,e} are the descendants of a.
or terminal situations as they have no successor. The set of all terminal
situations, is denoted byΩ, and is also called the sample space of the tree.
From the first requirement ET1, it follows that any two situations can
only be unordered if they have no common descendants, which effectively
transforms the partial order into a tree. The direction of the order relation ⊑
tells us how Reality can evolve through the situations. Often this evolution
can be thought of as an evolution in time. In this sense, ET1 implies (amongst
other things) that the branches of the tree diverge as time elapses. In this
interpretation, s ⊏ t means then that the situation s happens before t , which
leads to a natural way of formalising causality. This is why Shafer [53] adopted
this approach.4
Consider the set desc(t) := ↑t ∖{t} of all descendants of t . We prove that
this set has minimal elements in non-terminal situations. These minimal
elements are called the children of t and the set of all children is denoted
by ch(t). We also prove that the children of t are the immediate successors
of t . If the chain ↓t ∖{t} has a greatest element, it is unique, and called the
mother of s and denoted by mo(s). Clearly, if s ∈ ch(t), then t is the mother
of s, mo(s) = t . For the event tree of Figure 2.2, ch(b) = {c,d} and mo(b) = a.
Proposition 71: Let t be any situation that is not terminal, i.e. desc(t) ≠∅.
Then it holds that:
4Total ordering instead of the stronger well-ordering ET1 is required in Shafer’s definition of
event trees. However, Shafer demands well-ordering when he defines regular event trees.
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1. ch(t) := {c ∈S∶c is a minimal element of desc(t)} ≠∅,
2. For every element s of desc(t), there is a unique element c of ch(t) such
that c ⊑ s,
3. No two elements of ch(t) are ordered, so ch(t) is an antichain. 5
Proof: 1. Consider any (maximal) chain C in ↑t ∖{t} and any element s of C . Then↓s is well-ordered by ET183. As ↓s∩C is a subset of ↓s, it will be well-ordered as well.
This implies that ↓s∩C has a smallest element which is also the smallest element
of C . So any chain C in desc(t) has a smallest element in desc(t), which implies,
by Zorn’s lemma, that desc(t), has minimal elements.
2. Take any s ∈ desc(t). Then ↓s∩desc(t) is well-ordered and therefore has a smallest
element c. Clearly, c ⊑ s and we know that c is a minimal element of desc(t), so
belongs to ch(t).
Ex absurdo, suppose there is some c′ ∈ desc(t) such that c′ ⊏ c. Then c′ ∈ ↓s ∩
desc(t), which contradicts that c is the smallest element of ↓s∩desc(t).
Finally, for unicity: suppose c1,c2 ∈ ch(t) and c1 ⊑ s, c2 ⊑ s. This implies that
c1,c2 ∈ ↓s. As ↓s is a chain, c1 ⊑ c2 or c2 ⊑ c1 and it follows from 3. that c1 = c2.
3. Consider any c1,c2 ∈ ch(t) and assume that c1 ⊑ c2. But c1,c2 ∈ desc(t) and are
undominated by definition. This implies that c1 = c2. ◻
Chains, paths, events and cuts
Shafer [53, §1.7 page 23] makes the distinction between Humean and de
Moivrean events where the former correspond to something localised in time
and space whereas the de Moivre event corresponds to the usual subset of
the sample space. We will adopt the de Moivre interpretation where events
are subsets of the sample space. However, some technicalities have to be
taken into account when trees with infinite depth are considered. The depth
of the tree can be understood as the supremum cardinality of all the chains.6
Definition 72: A pathω ∈ 2S is a chain that is maximal. The set of all paths is
denoted by P.
5 An antichain C is a non-empty and unordered subset of S. (∀s, t ∈ C)(s ∥ t) (See
Definition 149195 in Appendix B194)
6 A chain C is a non-empty subset of S that is totally ordered by ⊑. (∀s, t ∈C)(s ⊑ t or t ⊑ s)
(See Definition 148195 in Appendix B194)
85
2. IMPRECISE PROBABILITY TREES
A path ω is a chain that is not included in any other chain and the set of
all paths that contain or go through a situation t is denoted by Pt . Clearly,
P coincides with P◻. Even if the depth of the tree is infinite, the Axiom of
Choice (Hausdorff’s Maximal Chain Principle) guarantees that every chain is
included in some path.
Every path can be identified with a terminal situation when the tree
has a finite depth. When the depth is infinite however, then a path may fail
to contain a terminal situation, so paths can no longer be identified with
terminal situations. To overcome this problem, a regularity axiom can be
added to the definition of the event tree.
Definition 73: A poset (S,⊑) is a regular event tree if it is a discrete event
tree (satisfies ET183 and ET283) and if in addition
ET3. every chain in S has a greatest element in S.
Remark that this axiom is trivially fulfilled when the depth of the tree is finite.
If a tree is not regular then it can always be made regular by adding extra
situations to the tree [53]. Therefore, we assume from now on that every
event tree we consider is regular. In a regular event tree, we can identify
paths and terminal situations. We will do so throughout the text.
A (de Moivrean) event A is a set of paths A ⊆ P. Because paths can be
identified with their terminal situations in a regular event tree, we can also
speak without confusion about the event that corresponds to the set of
terminal situations B ⊆ Ω and we will also call this the event B . With an
event A, we can associate its indicator I A , which is the real-valued map onΩ
that assumes the value 1 on A, and 0 elsewhere.
We denote by E(t) := {ω ∈Ω∶ t ⊑ω} the set of all terminal situations that
are preceded by t or equivalently, the set of all paths that go through t . E(t)
is the event that corresponds to Reality getting to a situation t .
Cuts of a situation
Unless explicitly stated differently, we will assume that the event tree is
regular: so, from now on, every path corresponds with a terminal situation.
Definition 74: Let t be a situation in an event tree (S,⊑). A cut U of t is a
maximal antichain in ↑t .
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As with paths, Hausdorff’s Maximal Chain Principle tells us that we can always
extend any set of not-ordered nodes (an antichain) to a cut.
a
b c
d
e
f
g
h i
j
k
l
U
Figure 2.3: A simple event tree for Reality. The set U := {g , f ,e,b} defines a cut (of ◻)
which precedes the cutΩ = {l ,k, j , i , f ,e,d ,c} of terminal situations: U ⊑Ω. The set{e,b} is not a cut of the tree, but it is a cut of situation a, {e,b} = ch(a) ∈Ua .
If a situation s ⊒ t precedes (follows) some element of a cut U of t , then
we say that s precedes (follows) U , and we write s ⊑U (s ⊒U ). Similarly for
“strictly precedes (follows)”. For two cuts U and V of t , we say that U precedes
V if each element of U is followed by some element of V . Also, the setΩ of
terminal situations is a cut of ◻, called its terminal cut. The event E(t) is the
corresponding terminal cut of a situation t .
The next lemma gives some of the more useful properties of cuts and
paths.
Lemma 75:
1. In a regular event tree, a path and a cut intersect in exactly one
situation.
2. If a set of situations has exactly one situation in common with each cut,
then the set is a path.
3. If a set of situations has exactly one situation in common with each
path, then the set is a cut.
4. Every ancestor of an element of a path is again in the same path.
5. If s is a situation and U is a cut, then exactly one of the following is true:
s is in U , s has a strict descendant in U , or s has a strict ancestor in U .
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The proof can be found in [53, Proposition 11.2].
We can also define the set of all cuts of a situation t , which is denoted by
Ut . The set U◻ of all cuts of ◻ will also be denoted U. The set of all cuts of
the situation t that precede the cut U is denoted UUt . Shafer [53] proved the
following interesting property of the set of cuts of a regular event tree.
Proposition 76: Consider any situation t ∈ S of a regular event tree (S,⊑).
Then (Ut ,⊑) is a complete lattice.
As the child of a non-terminal situation t is a situation that immediately
follows it, we see that the set ch(t) of children of t constitutes a cut of t ,
called its children cut (See Proposition 7184). We will also call it the move
space of Reality in the situation t as it consists of the only situations Reality
can evolve to immediately after arriving in t . Although not strictly necessary,
we assume that every move space consists of at least two elements, otherwise
Reality is confronted with a trivial choice.
2.1.2 Processes and variables
We now have all the necessary tools to represent Reality’s possible evolution
and have laid the foundations for what can be seen as an event-driven, rather
than a time-driven, account of a theory of uncertain, or random, processes.
The driving events are, of course, the moves that Reality makes. In a theory
of processes, we generally consider things that depend on (a succession of)
these moves. This leads to the following definitions.
Any (partial) function on the set of situations S is called a process, and
any process whose domain includes ↑t is called a t-process. We will denote
processes by capital letters. Of course, a t-process is also an s-process for all
s ⊒ t as ↑s ⊆ ↑t ; when we call it an s-process, this means that we are restricting
our attention to its values in all situations that follow s.
Similarly, any function defined (at least) on the terminal situations
following t is called a t-variable. A real-valued t-variable can be seen as
a gamble on E(t) and will be denoted by a lowercase letter. Given a t-process
F , we define the corresponding t-variable f = varE(t)F on E(t) by:
varE(t)F(ω) := F(ω) for any ω ∈ E(t). (2.1)
If U is a cut of t , then we call a t-variable f U -measurable if for all u
in U , f assumes the same value f (u) ∶= f (ω) for all terminal situations ω
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that follow t , ω ∈ E(t). In that case we can also consider f as a variable or a
gamble on U and will often denote it as f U or write f ∈ℒ(U). We say that
the cut U is a resolving cut for f . Given a t-process F and a cut U ∈Ut , we
define the U -measurable t-variable varU F as in Equation (2.1) where now
E(t) has been replaced with U .
varU F(ω) := F(u) for any ω ∈ E(u) and u ∈U . (2.2)
Consider a t-process F and U ∈ Ut any cut of t , then the U-stopped
process StopU F is the t-process defined by
StopU F(s) :=)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
F(s) s ⊑U ,
F(u) u ⊏ s and u ∈U .
The cut U is also called a stopping time. The corresponding variable is given
by varU F and is clearly U -measurable:
varE(t) (StopU F) = varU F. (2.3)
Remark that varE(t)F = varU F does not imply that F = StopU F .
Consider a t-process F and U ∈Ut any cut of t , then the U-killed process
KillU F is the t-process defined by
KillU F(s) :=)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
F(s) s ⊑U ,
0 u ⊏ s and u ∈U .
Here
varU (KillU F) = varU F. (2.4)
If var, Stop or Kill are applied to a set of processes, we always assume that
they are applied pointwise.
▷ Example 77 (Flipping coins): Consider flipping two coins, one after the other.
This leads to the event tree depicted in Figure 2.4. The identifying labels for the
situations should be intuitively clear: e.g., in the initial situation ‘◻ =?, ?’ none of the
coins have been flipped, in the non-terminal situation ‘h, ?’ the first coin has landed
‘heads’ and the second coin has not yet been flipped, and in the terminal situation
‘t , t ’ both coins have been flipped and have landed ‘tails’.
First, consider the real process N , which in each situation s, returns the number
N(s) of heads obtained so far, e.g., N(?, ?) = 0 and N(h, ?) = 1. If we restrict the
process N to the set Ω of all terminal elements, we get a real variable n := varΩN ,
whose values are: n(h,h) = 2, n(h, t) = n(t ,h) = 1 and n(t , t) = 0.
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?, ?
t , ?
t , t
t ,h
h, ?
h, t
h,h
X1 U
Figure 2.4: The event tree associated with two successive coin flips. Also depicted are
two cuts of the initial situation, X 1 and U .
Consider the cut U of the initial situation, which corresponds to the following
stopping time: “stop after two flips, or as soon as an outcome is heads”; see Figure 2.4.
The values of the corresponding variable nU are given by: nU (h,h) = nU (h, t) =
1, nU (t ,h) = 1 and nU (t , t) = 0. So nU is U -measurable, and can therefore be
considered as a map on the elements h, ? and t ,h and t , t of U , with in particular
nU (h, ?) = 1.
Next, consider the processes F,G , H ∶S→ {h, t , ?}, defined as follows:
s ?, ? h, ? t , ? h,h h, t t ,h t , t
F(s) ? h t h t h t
G(s) ? h t h h t t
H(s) ? ? ? h t h t
F returns the outcome of the latest, G the outcome of the first, and H that of the
second coin flip. The associated variables g := varΩG and h := varΩH give, in each
element of the sample space, the respective outcomes of the first and second coin
flips.
The variable g is X1-measurable: as soon as we reach (any situation on) the cut
X1, its value is completely determined, i.e., we know the outcome of the first coin flip;
see Figure 2.4 for the definition of X1.
We can associate with the process F the variable f X1 := varX1 F that is also X1-
measurable: it returns, in any element of the sample space, the outcome of the first
coin flip. Alternatively, we can stop the process F after one coin flip, which leads to
the X1-stopped process StopX1 F . This new process is of course equal to G , and for
the corresponding variable, we have that g := varΩG = varΩ StopX1 F = varX1 F .
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2.2 Imprecise probability trees
Until now we have focussed on the situations Reality can be in and on how
Reality can pass through these situations. In this section we introduce a
second player, whom we will call Subject and who has beliefs about the actual
transition Reality will make once he is in a situation t . We assume that the
local belief models are given as coherent sets of acceptable gambles. These
local models represent Subject’s beliefs when reality is in the initial situation◻ about what Reality will do immediately after getting to a particular situation.
We call such a model, where the event tree and the immediate prediction
beliefs are put together, an imprecise probability tree.
Definition 78: An imprecise probability tree (S,⊑,𝒜⋅) is an event tree(S,⊑) with local model𝒜s attached to each non-terminal situation s ∈S∖Ω.
A local model𝒜s in a non-terminal situation s is a coherent set of acceptable
gambles on the children cut ch(s), conditional on getting to the situation s.
In order to simplify proofs and manoeuvre away the discrepancy between
terminal and non-terminal nodes, we assume that a coherent set is assigned
to each terminal node as well. More specifically, the coherent set 𝒜s of a
terminal node s consist of all non-negative real numbers R≥0:𝒜s :=R≥0 for all s ∈Ω. (2.5)
A local belief model𝒜t should not be interpreted dynamically. In other
words, 𝒜t does not stand for the set of acceptable gambles on ch(t) that
Subject accepts after Reality has got to situation t . All beliefs should be fixed
and specified explicitly beforehand, in the initial situation ◻.
▷ Example 79: Assume a coin is tossed three times. This means that at every non-
terminal situation, either heads h or tails t is concatenated with the current situation.◻
h
hh
hhh hht
ht
hth htt
t
th
thh tht
tt
tth ttt
𝒜◻
𝒜h 𝒜t
𝒜hh 𝒜tt𝒜th𝒜ht
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The event tree is unrolled and in every non-terminal situation s, a local prediction
model is given in terms of a coherent sets of acceptable gambles on ch(s). If the
outcome of the first toss was heads for example, then we are in situation h and the
beliefs about the possibility of going to one of the next situations ht , hh is thus given
by the coherent set of acceptable gambles𝒜h defined for all gambles inℒ({hh,ht}).
From now on, we will consider only a special class of imprecise event
trees, which we call finitary imprecise probability trees. These are imprecise
probability trees that satisfy two extra constraints: 1. every situation has only
a finite number of children: ⋃︀ch(s)⋃︀ ∈N≥0; and 2. there are only a finite number
of paths that contain local models with practically impossible events.
2.2.1 Selections and gamble processes
When given an imprecise probability tree, we can consider a special partial
process that is not real-valued, but instead returns a gamble for every
situation. Such a process is called a gamble-valued process. If the returned
gamble is acceptable and if, on every path, only a finite number of acceptable
gambles are selected that differ from zero, then we call the gamble-valued
process a selection and denote this process by 𝒮 . Moreover, when we
write 𝒮(s)(u) with s ⊏ u, we mean the acceptable gamble 𝒮(s) selected
from 𝒜s evaluated in the child of s that precedes u (which is unique by
Proposition 7184).
Definition 80: Consider an imprecise probability tree (S,⊑,𝒜⋅) and a situ-
ation t . Then we call t-selection any t-process 𝒮 that satisfies:
1. 𝒮(s) ∈𝒜s ,
2. 𝒮(s) ≠ 0 only for a finite number of situations s in each path correspond-
ing to an element of E(t):
(∀ω ∈ E(t))⋃︀{s ∈ ↓ω∶𝒮(s) ≠ 0}⋃︀ ∈N≥0
We call a ◻-selection simply a selection.
With a t-selection, we can construct a real-valued t-process∑t𝒮 , called
the summed t-selection process, whose value in any s ⊒ t is given by
∑t𝒮(s) := ∑
t⊑v⊏s𝒮(v)(s), (2.6)
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so∑t𝒮(t) = 0.
A selection is allowed to differ from zero in only a finite number of situations
in each path. This prevents the sum in Equation (2.6) from diverging. We
denote the set of all t-selections by Selst(𝒜⋅) and the set of all summed
t-selections by SumSelst(𝒜⋅),
SumSelst(𝒜⋅) := {∑t𝒮 ∶𝒮 ∈ Selst(𝒜⋅)} . (2.7)
We can also focus on the t-variables varU (∑t𝒮), U ∈ Ut , that cor-
respond with the summed t-selections ∑t𝒮 evaluated in U . For the set
varU (SumSelst(𝒜⋅)), we can prove the following useful properties.
Lemma 81:
1. varU (∑t𝒮) = varU (∑t(KillU 𝒮)) for any t-selection 𝒮 ∈ Selst(𝒜⋅)
2. varU (SumSelst(𝒜⋅)) = {varU ∑t𝒮 ∶𝒮 ∈KillU (Selst(𝒜⋅))}.
Proof: We know from Equation (2.6) that StopU ∑t𝒮 =∑tKillU 𝒮 whence
varU (∑t𝒮) = varU (StopU (∑t𝒮)) = varU (∑t(KillU 𝒮))
by Equation (2.3).
To prove Property 81.2, it follows from the definition of SumSelst (𝒜⋅) and
Lemma 81.1 that
varU (SumSelst (𝒜⋅)) = {varU (∑t𝒮) ∶𝒮 ∈ Selst (𝒜⋅)}= {varU (∑(KillU 𝒮t )) ∶𝒮 ∈ Selst (𝒜⋅)}= {varU (∑t𝒮) ∶𝒮 ∈KillU (Selst (𝒜⋅))} . ◻
Ideally, we would like the set of gambles varE(t) (SumSelst(𝒜⋅)), asso-
ciated with all t-selections, to be coherent. It follows immediately from
Equation (2.6) and A332 that, given α ∈R≥0,
∑t(α𝒮1+𝒮2) =α∑t𝒮2+∑t𝒮2. (2.8)
We infer that posi(varE(t) (SumSelst(𝒜⋅))) = varE(t) (SumSelst(𝒜⋅)) so
varE(t) (SumSelst(𝒜⋅)) satisfies Axiom A332. There is however a problem
with Axiom A232 as ℒ≥0(E(t)) ⇑⊆ varE(t) (SumSelst(𝒜⋅)). The reason for
this is that in the summation in Equation (2.6), no selections in terminal
situations are incorporated. For this reason, we introduce, for any U ∈Ut , the
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U -measurable summed t-selections (see also Lemma 83 further on for the
justification of the use of “measurable” here):7
𝒜UE(t) := varU (SumSelst(𝒜⋅))+ℒ≥0(U)= {varU ∑t𝒮 ∶𝒮 ∈ Selst(𝒜⋅)}+ℒ≥0(U).
The set𝒜E(t)
E(t) will also be denoted by𝒜E(t), and𝒜{ω}E(ω) =𝒜ω = R≥0, for any
terminal situation ω. We now prove that 𝒜UE(t) ⊂ℒ(U) is a coherent set of
acceptable gambles on U .
Proposition 82: Let (S,⊑,𝒜⋅) be an imprecise probability tree, t one of its
situations and U ∈Ut a cut of t . Then the set of all U -measurable summed
t-selections𝒜UE(t) is a coherent set of acceptable gambles on ℒ(U).
Proof:
A1. As𝒜UE(t) ⊆𝒜E(t) :=𝒜E(t)E(t), and𝒜E(t) = varE(t) (SumSelst (𝒜⋅))+ℒ≥0(E(t)), it
is sufficient to show that varE(t) (SumSelst (𝒜⋅)) avoids sure loss. We will prove
something stronger, namely that, whatever selection 𝒮 we take, we can always find
a terminal situation ω such that∑t𝒮(ω) ≥ 0. So fix a t-selection 𝒮 and consider to
this end the following algorithm.
N := {s ∈ ↑t ∖Ω∶𝒮(s) ≠ 0}
c := t
N =∅ pick any ω ∈ E(c)
pick any s ∈ N
m :=min(↓s∩N)
pick c ∈ ch(m) such that:𝒮(m)(c) ≥ 0
N := N ∩↑c
yes
no
The situations in N
are the only ones that
have an effect on the
resulting summed t-
selection varE(t)∑t𝒮 .
By construction:
∑t𝒮(ω) ≥ 0.
m exists because ↓s is
well-ordered.
Because 𝒮 satisfies
A132, c can be chosen
such that 𝒮(m)(c) ≥ 0.
It follows then that∑t𝒮(c) ≥ 0.
Stop
7Recall from Section 2.1.288 that ℒ≥0(U) with U ∈ Ut can be identified with the non-
negative gambles on E(t) that are U -measurable.
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It is clear that A132 is proved if we can show that the algorithm is guaranteed to
stop. Suppose, ex absurdo, that the algorithm does not terminate. This means that
there is a sequence {cn ,mn}n∈N≥0 such that
c1 ⊑m1 ⊏ c2 ⊑m2 ⊏ c3 ⊑m3 ⊏ . . .
and 𝒮(mk) ≠ 0. But this is clearly in contradiction with the requirement that,
on each path, a selection differs from zero in only a finite number of situations
(Definition 8092).
A2. By definition,𝒜UE(t) includesℒ≥0(U).
A3. If f and g in 𝒜UE(t) and α ≥ 0, then we infer from Lemma 8193 that there are
(U -killed) selections 𝒮1 and 𝒮2, and non-negative gambles r1,r2 ∈ℒ≥0(U) such
that
α f + g =α(varU ∑t𝒮1+ r1)+varU ∑t𝒮2+ r2= varU ∑t(α𝒮1+𝒮2)+αr1+ r2.
where we used Equation (2.8) in the last step. It follows immediately from A332
that α𝒮1+𝒮2 is again a U -killed selection and obviously, αr1+r2 ∈ℒ≥0(U), hence
we conclude that α f + g ∈𝒜UE(t). ◻
It is not necessarily the case, as pointed out in Section 2.1.288, that a
U -measurable variable can be written as the variable resulting from a U -
killed selection process (or U -stopped summed selection process). When
considering summed t-selections however, we have the following interesting
relation, which explains the name we gave earlier to𝒜UE(t).
Lemma 83: 𝒜UE(t) is the set of all U -measurable summed t-selections.
𝒜UE(t) = { f ∈𝒜E(t)∶ f is U -measurable} .
Proof: Clearly, every varU (∑t𝒮) is U -measurable for any 𝒮 ∈ Selst (𝒜⋅).
Conversely, consider any 𝒮 ∈ Selst (𝒜⋅) such that varE(t) (∑t𝒮) is U -measurable.
Then it is sufficient to show that there is some β ∈ℒ≥0(U) such that
varE(t) (∑t𝒮) = varU (∑tKillU 𝒮)+β.
Fix any u ∈U , then for all ω,ω′ ∈ E(u):
varE(t) (∑t𝒮)(ω) = ∑
t⊑s⊏u𝒮(s)(u)+∑u𝒮(ω),
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varE(t) (∑t𝒮)(ω′) = ∑
t⊑s⊏u𝒮(s)(u)+∑u𝒮(ω′),
and we infer from the U -measurability of varE(t) (∑t𝒮) that varE(u) (∑u𝒮) must
be a constant map on E(u). We also know that varE(u) (∑u𝒮) ∈𝒜E(u) and because𝒜E(u) avoids sure loss by Proposition 8294, we infer that varE(u) (∑u𝒮) =β(u)IE(u)
with β(u) ∈R≥0.
As this reasoning holds for any u ∈U , we infer that there is a β ∈ℒ≥0(U) such that
varE(t) (∑t𝒮)(ω) = ∑
t⊑s⊏u𝒮(s)(u)+β(u),
whence
varE(t) (∑t𝒮) = varU (∑tKillU 𝒮)+β ∈𝒜UE(t). ◻
Sets of summed t-selections satisfy the following, very interesting
property, because it can be seen as a generalised version of marginal
extension.
Theorem 84: Let t be a situation of an imprecise probability tree (S,⊑,𝒜⋅)
and consider cuts U ,V ∈Ut such that U ⊑V . Then it holds that:𝒜VE(t) =𝒜UE(t)+∑
u∈U IE(u)𝒜VE(u).
Proof: From Equation (2.6), we infer for any t-selection 𝒮 that
∑t𝒮 = StopU ∑t𝒮 + ∑
u∈U I↑u∑u𝒮 ⋃︀↑u=∑tKillU 𝒮 + ∑
u∈U I↑u∑u𝒮 ⋃︀↑u (2.9)
If we define the t-selection 𝒮U and the u-selections 𝒮u , u ∈U , by
𝒮U :=KillU 𝒮 ,𝒮u := 𝒮 ⋃︀↑u ,
then we infer from Equation (2.9) that
varV ∑t𝒮 = varV ∑t𝒮U + ∑
u∈U IE(u) varV ∑u𝒮u= varU ∑t𝒮U + ∑
u∈U IE(u) varV ∑u𝒮u ,
and it follows fromℒ≥0(V ) =∑u∈U IE(u)ℒ≥0(↑u∩V ) that
𝒜VE(t) ⊆𝒜UE(t)+ ∑
u∈U IE(u)𝒜VE(u).
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To prove that 𝒜VE(t) ⊇ 𝒜UE(t) +∑u∈U IE(u)𝒜VE(u) we consider any U -killed t-
selection 𝒮U and any V -killed u-selection 𝒮u , u ∈ U . Then we can define a new
t-process 𝒮 by
𝒮(s) :=)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
𝒮U (s) if t ⊑ s ⊏U ,𝒮u(s) if u ∈U and u ⊑ s.
𝒮 is again a t-selection since clearly only a finite number of nonzero acceptable
gambles is selected on each path through t . Because this result holds for any choice
of 𝒮U and 𝒮u , u ∈U , and becauseℒ≥0(U) ⊆ℒ≥0(V ), it follows at once that𝒜VE(t) ⊇𝒜UE(t)+∑u∈U IE(u)𝒜VE(u). ◻
To conclude, we show that 𝒜E(s) can be interpreted as the set of all
summed t-selections, updated on the event E(s)where s ⊒ t . When updating
was defined (See Definition 2447), it was said that updating on a practically
impossible event will result in the vacuous model, unless extra information
is given, which is clearly the case here.
Proposition 85: The family 𝒜E(t), t ∈ S of coherent sets of acceptable
gambles satisfies the following properties:
1. 𝒜E(t))︁E(s)=𝒜E(s),
2. margch(s) (𝒜E(t))︁E(s)) =𝒜s ,
for all situations s ⊒ t with −IE(s) ⇑∈ 𝒜E(t). It can therefore be considered
jointly coherent.
Proof: 1. Assume −IE(s) ⇑∈𝒜E(t) and consider any f ∈ℒ(E(s)). Then it follows at
once from Lemma 8899 further on that
IE(s) f ∈𝒜E(t)⇔ IE(s) f ∈𝒜E(s).
2. We infer from Lemma 8395 that
margch(s) (𝒜E(t))︁E(s)) =margch(s) (𝒜E(s))= { f ∈𝒜E(s)∶ f is ch(s)-measurable}=𝒜ch(s)
E(s) =𝒜s . ◻
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2.2.2 Cut conglomerability
Of course we would like to make inferences on imprecise probability trees
by using our extension to Williams’s and Walley’s theory of conservative
reasoning. This means that we adopt the rationality criteria for sets of
acceptable gambles, cf. Definition 432. Walley adds an extra “rationality”
condition that makes the generalised Bayes rule (Proposition 5367) produce
smallest coherent inferences, also on infinite spaces. This condition is called
conglomerability. We impose conglomerability with respect to all partitions
consisting of exact events.
Definition 86 (Cut conglomerability):
A4. Given t ∈ S. Let U ∈Ut and assume that IE(u) fu ∈𝒜 ⊆ℒ(E(t)), where
fu ∈ℒ(E(u)) for all u ∈U . Then it must hold that∑u∈U IE(u) fu ∈𝒜.
Instead of demanding conglomerability for every possible combination of
situations, we only ask for conglomerability on cuts, which we believe is the
only combination of situations it makes sense to condition on: we agree
to condition only on exact events, i.e. events of the form ↑u where u is a
situation of the tree. If the tree contains only a finite number of situations,
then cut conglomerability is a consequence of axiom A332.
A set of acceptable gambles is coherent if it avoids sure loss, incurs partial
gain and when it is closed with respect to the posi operator. In analogy to this
posi operator, we can introduce a new operator cccl and rephrase the new
axiom, cut conglomerability, as being closed with respect to this operator:
given t ∈S,
ccclt𝒜 :={∑
u∈U IE(u) fu ∶ IE(u) fu ∈𝒜, fu ∈ℒ(E(u)) for all u ∈U and U ∈Ut(︀ .
So, we say that the set 𝒜 ⊆ ℒ(E(t)) is cut conglomerable if it is invariant
under cccl:
ccclt𝒜 ⊆𝒜.
Considering Theorem 8496, it is not all that surprising that𝒜E(t) is a cut
conglomerable set of acceptable gambles.
Proposition 87: The coherent set of acceptable gambles𝒜E(t) is cut-con-
glomerable.
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Proof: Take any cut U ∈Ut and assume that IE(u) fu ∈𝒜E(t) for every u ∈U where
fu ∈ℒ(E(u)). If we fix U , then this means, by Lemma 88, that there are hu ∈𝒜E(u)
and αu ∈R≥0 such that −αu IE(u) ∈𝒜UE(t) and
IE(u) fu =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
IE(u)hu if − IE(u) ⇑∈𝒜UE(t),−αu IE(u)+ IE(u)hu if − IE(u) ∈𝒜UE(t). (2.10)
Let S := {u ∈U ∶−IE(u) ∈𝒜E(t)}, then we infer from Equation (2.10) that
∑
u∈U IE(u) fu =∑s∈S−αs IE(s)+ ∑u∈U IE(u)hu (2.11)
We know by Proposition 8294 that𝒜UE(t) is coherent, so it follows from the finitary
character of the imprecise probability tree that ⋃︀S⋃︀ ∈N≥0 [see Lemma 89] and therefore∑s∈S −αs IE(s) ∈ 𝒜UE(t). So we infer from Equation (2.11) and Theorem 8496 that
indeed ∑
u∈U IE(u) fu ∈𝒜UE(t)+ ∑u∈U IE(u)𝒜E(u) =𝒜E(t). ◻
Lemma 88: Consider U ∈ Ut and any u ∈ U and fu ∈ ℒ(E(u)) such that
IE(u) fu ∈𝒜E(t). Then there are hu ∈𝒜E(u) andαu ∈R≥0 such that−αu IE(u) ∈𝒜UE(t) and
IE(u) fu =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
IE(u)hu if − IE(u) ⇑∈𝒜UE(t),−αu IE(u)+ IE(u)hu if − IE(u) ∈𝒜UE(t).
Proof: If IE(u) fu ∈𝒜E(t), then we know by Theorem 8496 that there are hU ∈𝒜UE(t)
and hv ∈𝒜E(v), v ∈U such that
IE(u) fu = IE(u)hU + ∑
v∈U IE(v)hv .
This implies that hv must be constant and equal to −hU (v) for all v ∈U ∖{u}, and
since each corresponding𝒜E(v) avoids sure loss, we find that necessarily hU (v) ≤ 0,
and that
IE(u) fu = IE(u)(︀hU (u)+hu⌋︀.
So we can assume without loss of generality that hU (v) = 0 for all v ∈U ∖{u}. [To
see this, let gU := hU +∑v∈U∖{u} IE(v)hv , then as ∑v∈U∖{u} IE(v) ∈ ℒ≥0(U) and
therefore, by coherence, gU ∈𝒜UE(u). Moreover, if we let gu := hu ∈𝒜E(u) and gv :=
0 ∈𝒜E(v) for all v ∈U ∖{u}, then clearly also IE(u) fu = IE(u)gU +∑v∈U IE(v)gv .]
99
2. IMPRECISE PROBABILITY TREES
The proof is now complete if we observe that hU (u) < 0 implies, by coherence
and the fact that hU is zero elsewhere, that −IE(u) ∈ 𝒜UE(t). So if −IE(u) ∈ 𝒜UE(t),
then hU (u) ≥ 0, and by coherence the result of adding this non-negative constant to
hu will still belong to𝒜E(u). ◻
Lemma 89: Let (S,⊑,𝒜⋅) be a finitary imprecise probability tree, and
assume that −IE(u) ∈𝒜E(t) where u ∈U and U ∈Ut . Then there is a situation
s ⊑ u such that −I{s} ∈𝒜mo(s).
Consequently, in a finitary imprecise probability tree, there can only be a
finite number of situations u ∈U such that −IE(u) ∈𝒜E(t).
Proof: By A132, we may assume without loss of generality that u ≠ t .
If −IE(u) ∈ 𝒜E(t), then we know that there is a selection 𝒮 ∈ Selst (𝒜⋅) and a
gamble g ∈ℒ≥0(U), such that−IE(u) = varU ∑t𝒮 + g . (2.12)
Choose m to be the largest element of the finite chain
{s ∈ ↓u∶∑t𝒮(mo(s)) ≥ 0 and∑t𝒮(s) < 0} .
Then we infer from Equation (2.12) that8
0 =∑t𝒮(mo(m)))︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂≥0 +𝒮(mo(m))(c)+varU ∑c𝒮)︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂∈𝒜V
E(c)
+ g ⋃︀V⧸︀≥0 for all c ∈ sib(m), (2.13)
where we let V := U ∩ ↑c. Because varU ∑c𝒮 ∈ 𝒜VE(c), and since we know from
Proposition 8294 that 𝒜VE(c) avoids sure loss, we infer from its proof that there is
some situation v ∈V such that varU ∑c𝒮(v) ≥ 0. If we evaluate Equation (2.13) in this
v , then we see that 𝒮(mo(m))(c) ≤ 0 for all c ∈ sib(m),
and by construction
𝒮(mo(m))(m) =∑t𝒮(m)−∑t𝒮(mo(m)) < 0.
We know that 𝒮(mo(m)) ∈𝒜mo(m) and that𝒜mo(m) is coherent, so
h := 𝒮(mo(m))−𝒮(mo(m))(m) ∈𝒜mo(m).
Since h ≤−I{m}, we conclude that also −I{m} ∈𝒜mo(m). ◻
8sib(m) = ch(mo(m))∖{m} is the set of siblings of m.
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2.2.3 Extension to global beliefs
At this moment we are able to solve questions about local gambles, i.e.
gambles on the children cut of any situation. The question is how to broaden
this to gambles on general cuts. To answer these questions, we have to find a
way to combine local beliefs into a global belief model onΩ. Of course we
would like to find the smallest joint model that is coherent with the local
assessments. In practice this means that the coherence conditions A132-A332
and cut-conglomerability A498 have to be satisfied for the newly formed joint
model.
Consider any situation t . What the agent does when specifying the
local models that constitute an imprecise probability tree, amounts to an
assessment of a set of acceptable gambles ?˜?t on E(t):
?˜?t := ⋃
s∈↑t IE(s)𝒜s , (2.14)
where as usual we have identified gambles on a cut with cut-measurable
gambles on the terminal cut. A strategy to find the smallest coherent set lies
in applying the posi and cccl operators repeatedly until we find a set that
is invariant under both operators. The problem is that posi and cccl do not
commute in general:
posiccclt ?˜?t ≠ ccclt posi?˜?t ,
and it is not clear whether this procedure will ever converge, nor whether if it
converges, the limits will satisfy A132-A498.
Instead of walking this path, we choose to start from the previously
defined set 𝒜E(t) of all selections. We do already know that this set is
coherent (A132-A332) by Proposition 8294 and cut conglomerable (A498) by
Proposition 8798 and it clearly contains ?˜?t . It also is jointly coherent with the
elements that constitute ?˜?t by Proposition 8597. What is not clear is whether
it is the smallest such set. This is what we prove next.
Theorem 90: Consider a finitary imprecise probability tree (S,⊑,𝒜⋅), and
any t ∈S. Then the set of acceptable gambles𝒜E(t) is the smallest set that
satisfies
margch(s) (𝒜E(t))︁E(s)) =𝒜s for any s ⊒ t such that −IE(s) ∉𝒜E(t),
(2.15)
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and that is coherent and cut conglomerable.
Proof: We know from Propositions 8294 and 8798 that 𝒜E(t) satisfies A132-A498.
From Proposition 8597 we know that 𝒜E(t) is jointly coherent with the local
assessments𝒜s . We only have to prove that𝒜E(t) is the smallest cut conglomerable,
coherent set that is jointly coherent with these local assessments.
Assume, ex absurdo, that there is a coherent and cut conglomerable set of
acceptable gambles𝒜 ⊆ℒ(E(t)) that satisfies Equation (2.15) such that𝒜E(t) ⇑⊆𝒜.
Then we know that there is a gamble f ∈ 𝒜E(t) ∖𝒜. This means that there is a t-
selection 𝒮 and gamble p ∈ℒ≥0(E(t)) such that
f = varE(t)∑t𝒮 +p ∉𝒜,
so by Lemma 91, we can construct a sequence
t =: c1 ⊏ c2 ⊏ c3 ⊏ c4 . . .
such that𝒮(mo(ci+1)) ≠ 0 when i ∈N>0. But this means that the t-selection𝒮 differs
from zero on an infinite number of situations in the path through {ck}k∈N>0 , which
contradicts the finitary character of the imprecise probability tree. ◻
The following lemmas are used when proving Theorem 90.
Lemma 91: Let 𝒜 be a cut conglomerable and coherent set of acceptable
gambles on E(t) such that margch(s) (𝒜⧹︀E(s)) =𝒜s for any s ⊒ t such that−IE(s) ∉ 𝒜. Consider any t-selection 𝒮 and any gamble p ∈ ℒ≥0(E(t)). If
there is some situation c1 ⊒ t such that
varE(t)∑c1𝒮 +p ∉𝒜,
then there must be some c2 ⊐ c1 such that 𝒮(mo(c2)) ≠ 0 and
varE(t)∑c2𝒮 ∉𝒜.
Proof: Consider the set S := {s ⊒ t ∶𝒮(s) ≠ 0}. This set cannot be empty because in
that case we would have varE(t)∑c1𝒮+p = p ∈𝒜 by A232. We then know by Lemma 92
that for any ω ∈ E(t):9
∑c1𝒮(ω)+p(ω) = p(ω)+ ∑
m∈min S IE(m)(ω)⎛⎝𝒮(m)(ω)+ ∑c∈ch(m)∑c𝒮(ω)⎞⎠
9Here, min S is the set of all minimal elements of the partial order (S,⊑).
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= p(ω)+ ∑
m∈min S IE(m)(ω)𝒮(m)(ω)+ ∑
m∈min S IE(m)(ω) ∑c∈ch(m)∑c𝒮(ω)= p(ω)+ ∑
m∈min S IE(m)(ω)𝒮(m)(ω)+ ∑
m∈min S ∑c∈ch(m) IE(c)(ω)∑c𝒮(ω).
and therefore
varE(t)∑c1𝒮 +p = p + ∑
m∈min S IE(m)𝒮(m)+ ∑m∈min S ∑c∈ch(m) IE(c) varE(c)∑c𝒮 .
Clearly, every gamble IE(m)𝒮(m) ∈ 𝒜 (see Lemma 93 when −IE(m) ∈ 𝒜), and
because 𝒜 is cut conglomerable, we infer that ∑m∈min S IE(m)𝒮(m) ∈ 𝒜 and
by A332 that p +∑m∈min S IE(m)𝒮(m) ∈ 𝒜. But then we know from A332 and
varE(t)∑c1𝒮 + p ⇑∈ 𝒜 that the gamble ∑m∈min S∑c∈ch(m) IE(c) varE(c)∑c𝒮 ⇑∈ 𝒜.
Again, because 𝒜 is cut conglomerable, this implies that there must be some
m∗ ∈ minS such that ∑c∈ch(m∗) IE(c) varE(c)∑c𝒮 ⇑∈ 𝒜, and by repeating the cut
conglomerability argument for the children cut of this m∗, we know that there must
be some c2 ∈ ch(m∗) such that IE(c2) varE(c2)∑c2𝒮 ⇑∈𝒜. As mo(c2) = m∗ ∈ minS,
we conclude that 𝒮(mo(c2)) ≠ 0. ◻
Lemma 92: Let S ≠∅ be a subset of S. Then
minS =⋃
s∈S min(S ∩↓s)
and minS ≠∅.
Proof: Pick any s ∈ S. Then we know by ET183 that m := min(S∩↓s) exists and is
unique. Assume ex absurdo that m ⇑∈minS. This means that there is some situation
s∗ ∈ S such that s∗ ≠m and s∗ ⊑m. But then s∗ ∈ S ∩↓s and s∗ ⊑m, a contradiction
with m =min(S∩↓s).
We have proved that minS ⊇⋃s∈S min(S∩↓s) and therefore also that minS ≠∅.
To prove that minS ⊆⋃s∈S min(S∩↓s), it is sufficient to notice that m ∈minS implies
that m =min(S∩↓m). ◻
Lemma 93: Let 𝒜 ⊆ℒ(E(t)) be a coherent set of acceptable gambles and
assume that −IE(m) ∈𝒜. Then IE(m)ℒ(E(m)) ⊆𝒜.
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Proof: From A232 we infer that IE(m)ℒ≥0(E(m)) ⊆𝒜 and from A332 we infer that−IE(m)R≥0 ∈𝒜. Therefore, it follows from A332 that
𝒜 ⊇ IE(m)ℒ≥0(E(m))− IE(m)R≥0 = IE(m)ℒ(E(m)). ◻
2.2.4 Predictive lower and upper previsions
We now use the cut congomerable and coherent set of really desirable
gambles 𝒜E(◻) to calculate special lower previsions P(⋅⋃︀t) ∶= P(⋅⋃︀E(t)) in
situation ◻, conditional on an event E(t), i.e., on Reality getting to situation
t , as explained in Section 1.4.360.
10 We call such conditional lower previsions
predictive lower previsions. We then get, using Definition 5166, that for any
situation t and gamble f ∈ℒ(Ω),
P( f ⋃︀t) := P( f ⋃︀E(t)) = sup{α ∈R∶ IE(t)(︀ f −α⌋︀ ∈𝒜E(◻)} (2.16)= sup{α ∈R∶ f ⋃︀E(t)−α ∈𝒜E(t)} , (2.17)
where the last transition is a consequence of Theorem 90101. We also use
the notation P( f ) ∶= P( f ⋃︀◻) = sup{α∶ f −α ∈𝒜E(◻)}. It should be stressed
that Eq. (2.16) is also valid in terminal situations t =ω, where we let P( f ⋃︀ω) =
f (ω).
Before we go on, there is an important point that must be stressed and
clarified. It is an immediate consequence of Equation (2.17) that when f
and g are any two gambles that coincide on E(t), then P( f ⋃︀t) = P(g ⋃︀t). This
means that P( f ⋃︀t) is completely determined by the values that f assumes
on E(t), and it allows us to define P(⋅⋃︀t) on gambles that are only necessarily
defined on E(t), i.e., on t-gambles. We will do so freely in what follows.
In the special case of a lower (or upper) prevision of a gamble that is
measurable with respect to a cut U ∈U, we can simplify Equation (2.16) a bit.
Proposition 94: Consider an imprecise probability tree (S,⊑,𝒜⋅) and a cut
U ∈Ut . Then the lower prevision for the U -measurable t-gamble f U ∈ℒ(Ω)
are given by
P( f U ⋃︀t) = sup{α ∈R∶ f U −α ∈𝒜UE(t)} .
10We stress again that these are conditional lower previsions on the contingent/updating
interpretation, and should not be treated dynamically: they refer to beliefs of a subject at the
time Reality is in ◻, not after Reality has moved to situation t .
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Proof: We know that P( f U ⋃︀t) = sup{α ∈R∶ IE(t)(︀ f U −α⌋︀ ∈𝒜E(◻)}. But clearly,
IE(t)(︀ f U −α⌋︀ ∈𝒜E(t)⇔ f U −α ∈𝒜E(t)⇔ f U −α ∈𝒜UE(t). ◻
For any cut U of a situation t , we may define the t-variable P( f ⋃︀U) as
the gamble that assumes the value P( f ⋃︀u) in any path ω through a situation
u ∈U . So P( f ⋃︀U) is just the short-hand notation for∑u∈U IE(u)P( f ⋃︀u). This
t-variable is U -measurable by construction, and it can be considered as a
variable on U . Observe that this variable may assume values in R∗. In what
follows we let 0 ⋅±∞ = 0 by convention.
Proposition 95 (Separate coherence): Let t be any situation, let U be any
cut of t , and let f and gU be t-gambles, where gU is U -measurable.
1. P(E(t)⋃︀t) = 1;
2. P(gU ⋃︀U) = gU ;
3. P( f + gU ⋃︀U) = gU +P( f ⋃︀U);
4. if gU is moreover non-negative, then P(gU f ⋃︀U) = gU P( f ⋃︀U).
Proof: 1. From Equation (2.16) and from the coherence of𝒜E(t), we infer that
P(E(t)⋃︀t) = sup{α ∈R∶E(t)−α ∈𝒜E(t)} = sup{α ∈R∶1−α ∈𝒜E(t)} = 1.
2. This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 94, A332 and Proposi-
tion 95.1.
3. P( f + gU ⋃︀U) =∑u∈U IE(u)P( f + gU (u)⋃︀u) and this is by constant additivity
equal to∑u∈U IE(u)(︀P( f ⋃︀u)+ gU (u)⌋︀ = P( f ⋃︀U)+ gU .
4. P(gU f ⋃︀U) =∑u∈U IE(u)P(gU (u) f ⋃︀u) and this is by non-negative homogen-
eity equal to∑u∈U IE(u)gU (u)P( f ⋃︀u) = gU P( f ⋃︀U), because by convention
0 ⋅ ±∞ = 0. ◻
2.2.5 Calculating predictive lower prevision using backwards recursion
The Marginal Extension Theorem allows us to calculate the most conservative
global belief models𝒜E(t) that corresponds to the local immediate predic-
tion models 𝒜s . Here beliefs are expressed in terms of sets of acceptable
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gambles. Can we derive a result that allows us to do something similar for the
corresponding lower previsions?
To see what this question entails, first consider a local model𝒜s : a set of
acceptable gambles on ch(s), where s ∈S∖Ω. Using Definition 4160, we can
associate with𝒜s a coherent lower prevision Q s onℒ(ch(s)). Each gamble gs
on ch(s) can be seen as an uncertain reward, whose outcome gs(c) depends
on the (unknown) move from situation s to c ∈ ch(s) that Reality will make.
The local (predictive) lower prevision
Q s(gs) ∶= sup{α∶gs −α ∈𝒜s} (2.18)
for gs is the supremum acceptable price (for a subject when Reality is in ◻)
for buying gs when Reality gets to s.
But as we have seen in Section 2.2.4104, we can also, in each situation
t , derive global predictive lower previsions P(⋅⋃︀t) from the global model𝒜E(t), using Equation (2.16). For each t-gamble f , P( f ⋃︀t) is Forecaster’s
(the subject whose beliefs are modelled) inferred supremum acceptable price
(in ◻) for buying f , contingent on Reality getting to t .
Assume that we are presented with the local predictive lower previsions
Q s instead of sets of acceptable gambles𝒜s . Is there a way to construct the
global predictive lower previsions P(⋅⋃︀t) directly from the local predictive
lower previsions Q s ? We can infer that there is from the following two theor-
ems, the first of which is merely the lower prevision version of Theorem 8496.
Theorem 96 (Concatenation Formula, Law of Iterated Expectation):
Consider any two cuts U and V of a situation t such that U ⊑ V . For all
t-gambles f onΩ,11
1. P( f ⋃︀t) = P(P( f ⋃︀U)⋃︀t);
2. P( f ⋃︀U) = P(P( f ⋃︀V )⋃︀U).
Proof: It is not difficult to see that the second statement is a consequence of the first,
so we only prove the first statement.
a. P( f ⋃︀t) ≥ P(P( f ⋃︀U)⋃︀t). We infer from the super-additivity (Property 4864.2) of the
coherent lower prevision P(⋅⋃︀t), that
P( f ⋃︀t) = P( f −P( f ⋃︀U)+P( f ⋃︀U)⋃︀t)
11Here, it is implicitly assumed that all expressions are well-defined, e.g., that in the second
statement, P( f ⋃︀v) is a real number for all v ∈V , making sure that P( f ⋃︀V ) is indeed a gamble.
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≥ P( f −P( f ⋃︀U)⋃︀t)+P(P( f ⋃︀U)⋃︀t),
so it suffices to prove that P( f −P( f ⋃︀U)⋃︀t) ≥ 0.
Now, for any ² > 0, we know that
f −P( f ⋃︀U)+² = ∑
u∈U IE(u) (︀ f ⋃︀E(u)−P( f ⋃︀u)+²⌋︀)︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂∈𝒜
E(u)
Hence, it follows from Theorem 8496 that f −P( f ⋃︀U)+ ² ∈𝒜E(t) for any ² > 0.
This implies that P( f −P( f ⋃︀U)⋃︀t) ≥ 0
b. P( f ⋃︀t) ≤ P(P( f ⋃︀U)⋃︀t). Suppose that f − α ∈ 𝒜E(t). Then it follows from
Theorem 8496 that there are g
U ∈𝒜UE(t) and gu ∈𝒜E(u), u ∈U such that
f −α = gU + ∑
u∈U IE(u)gu .
If we apply the lower prevision P(⋅⋃︀u) on both sides of the equality we find
P( f ⋃︀u)−α = gU (u)+P(gu ⋃︀u) ≥ gU (u), u ∈U . (2.19)
The last inequality is a consequence of gu being an element of𝒜E(u). Because
Equation (2.19) holds for any u ∈U , we infer that P( f ⋃︀U)−α ≥ gU so P( f ⋃︀U)−α ∈𝒜UE(t). Hence P( f ⋃︀t) ≤ P(P( f ⋃︀U)⋃︀t). ◻
If a t-gamble h is measurable with respect to the children cut ch(t) of a
non-terminal situation t , then we can interpret it as gamble on ch(t). For
such gambles, the following immediate consequence of Proposition 94104
tells us that the predictive lower previsions P(h⋃︀t) are completely determined
by the local model𝒜t .
Proposition 97: Let t be a non-terminal situation, and consider a ch(t)-
measurable gamble h. Then P(h⋃︀t) =Q t(h).
Proof: Apply Proposition 94104 with U = ch(t). ◻
These results tells us that all predictive lower (and upper) previsions
for imprecise probability trees with finite depth can be calculated using
backwards recursion, by starting with the trivial predictive previsions
P( f ⋃︀Ω) = P( f ⋃︀Ω) = f for the terminal cutΩ, and using only the local models
P t . This is illustrated in the following simple example.
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▷ Example 98: Suppose we have n > 0 coins. We begin by flipping the first coin: if
we get tails, we stop, and otherwise we flip the second coin. Again, we stop if we get
tails, and otherwise we flip the third coin, . . . In other words, we continue flipping
new coins until we get one tails, or until all n coins have been flipped. This leads to
the event tree depicted in Figure 2.5. Its sample space is Ω = {t1, t2, . . . , tn ,hn}. We
h0
h1
h2
h3
hn−1
hn
tn
t4
t3
t2
t1
U1
U2
U3
Un−1
Un
Figure 2.5: The event tree for the uncertain process involving n successive coin flips
described in Example 98.
will also consider the cuts U1 = {t1,h1} of ◻, U2 = {t2,h2} of h1, U3 = {t3,h3} of h2,
. . . , and Un = {tn ,hn} of hn−1. It will be convenient to also introduce the notation h0
for the initial situation ◻.
For the purpose of this example, it will be enough to consider the local predictive
lower previsions Q hk onℒ(Uk+1), associated with𝒜hk through Eq. (2.18). Forecaster
assumes all coins to be approximately fair, in the sense that she assesses that the
probability of heads on each flip lies between 12 −δ and 12 +δ, for some 0 < δ < 12 . This
assessment leads to the following local predictive lower previsions:12
Q hk (g) = (1−2δ)]︀12 g(hk+1)+ 12 g(tk+1){︀+2δmin{g(hk+1), g(tk+1)}, (2.20)
where g is any gamble on Uk+1.
Let us see how we can for instance calculate, from the local predictive models Q hk ,
the predictive lower probabilities P( f ⋃︀s) for a gamble f on E(s) and any situation s
in the tree. First of all, for the terminal situations it is clear that
P({hn}⋃︀tn) = 0 and P({hn}⋃︀hn) = 1. (2.21)
12These so-called linear-vacuous mixtures, or contamination models, are the natural
extensions of the probability assessments Q hk ({hk+1}) = 12 −δ and Q hk ({hk+1}) = 12 +δ;
see Section 1.4.360 and [62, Chapters 3–4] for more details.
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We now turn to the calculation of P({hn}⋃︀hn−1). It follows at once from Proposi-
tion 97107 that P({hn}⋃︀hn−1) =Q hn−1({hn}), and therefore, substituting g = I{hn}
in Eq. (2.20) for k = n−1,
P({hn}⋃︀hn−1) = 12 −δ. (2.22)
To calculate P({hn}⋃︀hn−2), consider that, since hn−1 ⊑Un−1,
P({hn}⋃︀hn−2) = P(P({hn}⋃︀Un−1)⋃︀hn−2) =Q hn−2(P({hn}⋃︀Un−1))
where the first equality follows from Theorem 96106, and the second from Proposi-
tion 97107, taking into account that gn−1 ∶= P({hn}⋃︀Un−1) is a gamble on the children
cut Un−1 of hn−2. It follows from Eq. (2.21) that gn−1(tn−1) = P({hn}⋃︀tn−1) = 0 and
from Eq. (2.22) that gn−1(hn−1) = P({hn}⋃︀hn−1) = 12 −δ. Substituting g = gn−1 in
Eq. (2.20) for k = n−2, we then find that
P({hn}⋃︀hn−2) = (12 −δ)2. (2.23)
Repeating this course of reasoning, we find that more generally
P({hn}⋃︀hk) = (12 −δ)n−k , k = 0, . . .n−1. (2.24)
This illustrates how we can use a backwards recursion procedure to calculate global
predictive lower previsions from local ones.
2.3 Some Examples
This section aims at giving a few examples of what can be achieved using
imprecise probability trees.
2.3.1 Gambler’s ruin
As pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, the solution of the Problem
of Points by Huygens was the first published application of a probability tree.
Let us consider a slightly modified gambler’s ruin problem.
Imagine two players Blaise and Pierre, who repeatedly play rounds of a
game that can either be won by Blaise or by Pierre, i.e., there is no tie. As
Blaise and Pierre are both slightly addicted to gambling, they decide to play
with units of linear utility, called utiles, and the total amount of utiles is equal
to a ∈ N>0. Both players start out with a positive amount of utiles and the
player that loses a round has to pay the other player one utile. The game ends
when one of the players has no utiles left.
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X0 = 1
X1 = 0
lose
X1 = 2
X2 = 1
X3 = 0
X3 = 2
X2 = 3
(p, p)
win
Figure 2.6: Imprecise probability tree representing the gamblers ruin game. Here,
Blaise starts with 1 and Pierre with 2 utiles (hence k = 1 and a = 3) and the game is
stopped after three rounds. The probability for Blaise winning in each round lies in
the interval (p, p). The random variable Xi stands for the number of utiles of Blaise
after i rounds.
If Blaise has at a certain time a capital of k utiles left, what is then a
subject’s upper probability ρk(n) of his losing the game after at most n more
rounds? It is assumed that the subject believes that the upper probability
for Blaise winning a single round is p and his lower probability for it is p,
irrespective of the previous outcomes (if Blaise did not win or hit zero before
of course).
We know that the upper ruin probability is the conditional upper
prevision:
ρk(n) = P(IXn=0⋃︀X0 = k).
It is clear that the information about the game can be represented by an
imprecise probability tree, and the problem is best solved using the Law of
Iterated Expectation (see Figure 2.7 and observe that ρk−1(n−1) ≥ ρk+1(n−1)
by monotonicity):
ρk(n) =
)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
pρk+1(n−1)+(1−p)ρk−1(n−1) when 0 < k < a and n > 0,
ρ0(n+1) when k = 0,
ρa(n+1) when k = a,
with the initial condition:
ρk(0) =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
1 if k = 0,
0 if k > 0.
By letting n →∞ we get the upper probability ρk := limn→+∞ρk(n) of
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ρk(n)
ρk−1(n−1)
lose
ρk+1(n−1)(p, p)
win
If f ∈ ℒ({win, lose}) and f (win) ≤ f (lose),
then
Q( f ) = f (win)+ ≥0(︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂[︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂(︂(︀ f (lose)− f (win)⌋︀
1−p(︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂[︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂(︂
Q(I{lose})= p f (win)+(1−p) f (lose).
Figure 2.7: Elementary part of the imprecise event tree representing the Gambler’s
Ruin game.
Blaise losing the game when starting with a capital k by solving the difference
equation
ρk = pρk+1+(1−p)ρk−1 ,0 < k < a,
with boundary conditions ρ0 = 1 and ρa = 0. If we define ν := 1−pp , then the
solution is given by
ρk = νk −νa1−νa , 0 ≤ k ≤ a.
2.3.2 Forward irrelevance and Wald’s equation
A finite collection of independent and identically distributed random
variables on a finite space can be considered as one of the most simple
stochastic processes there are. However, given the different definitions of
independence, immediately there arise problems when trying to generalise
this process. In terms of trees, the so-called identical forward irrelevance
interpretation is probably the most straightforward generalisation of i.i.d.
processes. The generalisation we will consider can be described as an
imprecise probability tree where the local models are the same for each
non-terminal situation.
Definition 99: An identical forward irrelevant process tree with finite
index set I = {1,2, . . . ,n} and statespace𝒳 , is a finitary imprecise probability
tree (S,⊑,Q ⋅), where
1. S := {◻}∪⋃i∈I 𝒳 i ,
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◻
h
hh
hhh hht
ht
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thh tht
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Q 1
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Q 3 Q 3Q 3Q 3
Figure 2.8: A coin is flipped three times. If the lower previsions are such that Q 1( f ) =
Q 2( f ) =Q 3( f ) =Q( f ) for any f ∈ℒ({h, t}), then the imprecise probability tree we
describe here is a forward irrelevant process tree.
2. (s ⊑ t)⇔ ((s =◻) or (s = t) or (∃x ∈S∖{◻})(sx = t)),13
3. Q s =Q for each s ∈S∖Ω.
This set-up can be seen as sampling n times with replacement. If we define
the process X by X (◻) :=◻ and
X (sx) := x x ∈𝒳 and s ∈S∖Ω,
and define the cuts Ui := {s ∈S∶depth(s) = i},14 then the variable Xi :=
varUi X (here we make an exception and denote a variable with a capital
letter), can be seen as the random variable that corresponds to the outcome
of the i -th draw from an urn with possible draws 𝒳 (sampling with
replacement). It is moreover intuitively clear that
X1∶i−1 EI Xi for all i ∈ I
whence the sequence X1, X2, . . . , Xn shows indeed forward irrelevance (for
more details, see [16]).
Proposition 100: Let (S,⊑,Q ⋅) be an identical forward irrelevant process
tree with finite index set I = {1,2, . . . ,n} and statespace 𝒳 . Let f ∈ ℒ(𝒳 )
13Here we mean with sx, the concatenation of s with x. For example if 𝒳 = {h, t}, s = hht
and x = ht, then sx = hhtht.
14Here depth(s) := ⋃︀↓s⋃︀−1 stands for the depth of the situation in the tree, the distance from
the root node.
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and define the process F by F(◻) := 0 and F(sx) := F(s)+ f (x) for each s ∈
S∖Ω and x ∈𝒳 . Then
P(varΩF) = nQ( f ).
Proof: If we apply Theorem 96106 with cut Un−1 := {s ∈S∶depth(s) = n−1}, then
P(varΩF) = P (P(varΩF ⋃︀Un−1))= P (P(varUn−1 F(Un−1)+ f ⋃︀Un−1))= P (varUn−1 F +Q( f )) = P (varUn−1 F)+Q( f ).
Clearly, P(varU1 F) = Q( f ), and we we have shown by induction that P(varΩF) =
nQ( f ). ◻
Imagine now that there is another random variable N taking values
in I = {1, . . . ,n}, and we have a lower prevision Q N that describes the
uncertainty about N . The random sum∑Ni=1 f (Xi ) can then be reinterpreted
as the random stopped process KillτN F , where
τN ∶ I →U∶τN(n) = {s ∈S∶depth(s) = n} .
We are now able to formulate a particular equation, known in classical
process theory as Wald’s equation.
Proposition 101 (Wald’s equation): If N is epistemically irrelevant to the
variables X1, X2, . . . , Xn linked with the identical forward irrelevant process
tree from Proposition 100, then
P(varτN F) =Q N(N Q( f )) =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
Q N(N)Q( f ) if Q( f ) ≥ 0,
Q N(N)Q( f ) if Q( f ) < 0
Proof: The problem can be restated as an imprecise probability tree where the first
layer determines the outcome of N , and from the node corresponding with N = n
starts the identical forward irrelevant process tree with depth n. So the sets of situation
in this new tree are the concatenation of an element of N and the situations of the
identical forward irrelevant process tree. Clearly the newly created tree is an imprecise
probability tree and it follows immediately from Theorem 8496, Proposition 100 and
property P365 of Proposition 4864 that
P (varτN F) =Q N (P(varτN (N)F ⋃︀N)) =Q N (N Q( f )) . ◻
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◻
N = 1 N = 2 . . . N = n
2.4 Martingales
The use of martingales—in essence, a summed selection process with an
additive offset—is central in Shafer and Vovk’s game-theoretic probability [55].
Using their game-theoretic martingales, they are able to derive weak and
strong laws of numbers in an elegant manner. The weak laws can be
transferred relatively easy to our imprecise probability event tree framework.
Definition 102: A real-valued t-process M is a t-submartingale if it can be
written as a summed t-selection∑t𝒮 plus a constant M (t) ∈R:
M = M (t)+∑t𝒮 .
A t-process M is a t-supermartingale if its negation −M is a t-submartin-
gale.
From Equation (2.6) it follows immediately that
varch(s)M −M (s) ∈𝒜s , for all s ⊒ t (2.25)
if M is a t-submartingale. A submartingale is therefore a process that selects
an acceptable gamble in each situation. The difference with a summed t-
selection process is that there is an initial offset. Whenever an imprecise
probability tree has a finite number of situations, Equation (2.25) is also a
sufficient condition for the t-process M to be a t-submartingale.
In the following lemma, we give an example of a supermartingale that
will be useful when proving our version of the weak law of large numbers.
The proof given here is a slightly shorter version of the one given in [12, Proof
of Theorem 10], which builds on an intriguing idea, used by Shafer and Vovk
in a different situation and in a form that is perhaps hard to recognise; see
[55, Lemma 3.3].
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Lemma 103: Consider an imprecise probability tree with a finite number of
situations.Then, the t-process M defined by:
M (s) := M (t) ∏
t⊑v⊏s (1−ξhv(s)) , for all s ⊒ t (2.26)
where ξ ∈R, hs ∈𝒜s ∖{0} and hs ≤B for all s ⊒ t , is a positive t-supermartin-
gale when M (t) > 0 and ξ < 1⇑B.
Proof: We are dealing with an imprecise probability tree with a finite number of
situations, and so we will use Equation (2.25) to prove this lemma. We have to prove
for any non-terminal node s ⊒ t that varch(s)M −M (s) ∈−𝒜s . Let c ∈ ch(s), then we
infer from the definition of M that
M (c)−M (s) = M (t) ∏
t⊑v⊏c (1−ξhv(c))−M (t) ∏t⊑v⊏s (1−ξhv(c))
= M (t)( ∏
t⊑v⊏s (1−ξhv(c)))(︀1−ξhs(c)−1⌋︀
=−M (t)( ∏
t⊑v⊏s (1−ξhv(c)))ξhs(c),
whence
varch(s)M −M (s) =− M (t)⧹︀>0 ξ⟩︀>0
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ ∏t⊑v⊏s
(1−ξhv(c)))︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂>0?
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
hs∈⃒𝒜s
.
From A332 we infer that M is indeed a supermartingale if 1−ξhv(c) > 0, for all t ⊑ v ⊑ s
and all s ⊒ t , so for all v ⊒ t . This follows from ξ < 1⇑B and 1−ξhv ≥ 1−ξB . This, together
with Equation (2.26), also proves that M > 0. ◻
We will also define a particular supermartingale that is going to be useful
when proving a generalisation of Hoeffding’s inequality. The proof is an
adaptation of the proof given by Vovk [58].
Lemma 104: The t-process M defined by:
M (s) = M (mo(s))e−ξhmo(s)(s)− ξ2⋃︁hmo(s)⋃︁v8 , for all s ⊐ t (2.27)
where M (t) = 1 , ξ ∈ R, hs ∈𝒜s , maxhs ≥ 0 and minhs ≤ 0 for all s ⊒ t , is a
t-supermartingale.
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Proof: Without loss of generality, we can assume that ∏︁hs∏︁v ≠ 0 as the opposite case
represents a trivial supermartingale. To prove the lemma we start from the first -order
Taylor expansion ofα(ξ) := ln(maxhs e−ξ inf hs−minhs e−ξmax hs ) around zero which
is given by
α(ξ) = ln( :=∏︁hs∏︁v(︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂[︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂(︂maxhs −minhs)+0ξ
+∫ ξ
0
x
∂2
∂x2
ln(maxhs e−x min hs −minhs e−x max hs )dx.
Working out the second derivative, we get
∏︁hs∏︁2v (maxhs e−x min hs )(−minhs e−x max hs )(maxhs e−x min hs −minhs e−x max hs )2 ,
so the integrand of the Lagrange remainder becomes of the form x∏︁hs∏︁2v p(1− p)
with p ∈ (︀0,1⌋︀. Therefore, the second derivative is smaller or equal than x∏︁hs∏︁2v⇑4.
Substituting this upper bound in the integrand yields the inequality
ln(maxhs e−ξmin hs −minhs e−ξmax hs ) ≤ ln(∏︁hs∏︁v)+ ξ2∏︁hs∏︁2v8 ,
and therefore also
ln(maxhs e−ξmin hs −minhs e−ξmax hs∏︁hs∏︁v ) ≤ ξ
2∏︁hs∏︁2v
8
.
By taking the exponential of both sides, we get
maxhs∏︁hs∏︁v e−ξmin hs + −minhs∏︁hs∏︁v e−ξmax hs ≤ e
ξ2∏︁hs∏︁2v
8 .
and adding hs∏︁hs∏︁v e−ξmax hs − hs∏︁hs∏︁v e−ξmin hs on both sides, we find:(1−η)(︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂[︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂(︂
maxhs −hs∏︁hs∏︁v e−ξmin hs +
η(︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂[︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂(︂
hs −minhs∏︁hs∏︁v e−ξmax hs
≤ e ξ28 ∏︁hs∏︁v + hs∏︁hs∏︁v (e−ξmax hs − e−ξmin hs ))︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂
e−ξmin hs (e−ξ∏︁hs∏︁v−1)
.
If we define η := hs−min hs∏︁hs∏︁v , then we see that η ∈ (︀0,1⌋︀, and the left-hand side of the
inequality above is a convex mixture. As the exponential is a convex function, and
because (1−η)minhs +ηmaxhs = hs , we get
e−ξhs ≤ e ξ2∏︁hs∏︁2v8 + hs∏︁hs∏︁v e−ξmin hs (e−ξ∏︁hs∏︁v −1),
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which can be rewritten as
cs hs :=
>0(︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂[︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂(︂
e−ξmin hs− ξ2∏︁hs∏︁2v8 (1−
∈(0,1)(︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂[︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂(︂
e−ξ∏︁hs∏︁v)∏︁hs∏︁v⧹︀>0)︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂>0
hs ≤ 1− e−ξhs− ξ2∏︁hs∏︁2v8 .
As cs > 0 the gamble cs hs belongs, by A332, to the set of acceptable gambles 𝒜s .
Consequently, if we multiply both sides with M (s) we get
M (s)−varch(s)M ∈𝒜s .
It then follows from Equation (2.25) that −M is a submartingale, and consequently M
is a supermartingale. ◻
Given the strong relation between selections and submartingales, it can-
not come as a surprise that we can express the predictive lower prevision in
terms of submartingales, and upper previsions in terms of supermartingales.
Proposition 105: For all situations t , all U ∈ Ut and any U -measurable t-
gamble f U , it holds that
P( f U ⋃︀t) = sup{M (t)∶M is a t-submartingale and f U ≥ varU M} (2.28)
P( f U ⋃︀t) = inf{M (t)∶M is a t-supermartingale and f U ≤ varU M} (2.29)
Proof: From Proposition 94104 we know that the lower prevision P( f U ⋃︀t) of the
U -measurable t-variable f U is given by
P( f U ⋃︀t) = sup{α∶ f U −α = varU ∑t𝒮 +p where 𝒮 ∈ Selst (𝒜⋅) and p ∈ℒ≥0(U)} ,= sup{α∶ f U ≥α+varU ∑t𝒮 where 𝒮 ∈ Selst (𝒜⋅)} ,= sup{M (t)∶ f U ≥ varU M where M is a t-submartingale} ,
where the last step follows from Definition 102114 with α = M (t).
Equation (2.29) follows immediately from P( f ) =−P(− f ). ◻
2.4.1 Imprecise concentration inequalities
In what follows we call Forecaster the agent, who, in ◻, has certain beliefs
about the moves that Reality will make. In this section we will prove a
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generalised version of the weak law of large numbers and of the Hoeffding -
Azuma inequality. Classically, the first is proved using the Chebyshev
inequality which in its turn is based on the Markov inequality. These two
inequalities generalise fairly easily to imprecise probabilities. Assume that
² > 0, then it follows from the monotonicity of P that
²I⋃︀h⋃︀≥² ≤ ⋃︀h⋃︀⇒ P(⋃︀h⋃︀ ≥ ²) ≤ P(⋃︀h⋃︀)
²
,
which is the generalisation of the Markov inequality. This inequality implies
in its turn the generalised Chebyshev inequality:
P(⋃︀h⋃︀ ≥ ²) ≤ P(h2)
²2
.
In going from the Chebyshev inequality to the (weak) Law of Large Numbers,
the gamble h is typically assumed to be h = 1n ∑ni=1 ( fi −P( fi )), where fi ∈ℒ(Xi ) with 𝒳i =: 𝒳 , and fi (x) =: f (x). It is moreover assumed that all Xi
are independent and identically distributed. In the imprecise probabilistic
framework, assuming that P Xi ( fi ) = P( f ) and denoting 1n ∑ni=1 fi by f n , this
results in
P (⋂︀ f n −P( f )⋂︀ ≥ ²) ≤ P (( f n −P( f ))2)²2 .
It is now left to prove that P (( f n −P( f ))2)→ 0 as n →∞. This should be
done—assuming epistemic independence—using the independent natural
extension, which is by no means a trivial affair.
Instead of following the i.i.d. path, we choose to follow the martingale
approach. Consider therefore an imprecise probability tree with finite depth,
with non-terminal situation t and a cut U of t . Define the t-variable nU such
that nU(ω) is the distance d(t ,u) := ⋃︀{s ∈S∶ t ⊑ s ⊏ u}⋃︀, measured in moves
along the tree, from t to the unique situation u in U that ↓ω goes through.
nU is clearly U -measurable, and nU(u) is simply the distance d(t ,u) from t
to u. We assume that nU(u) > 0 for all u ∈U , or in other words that U ≠ {t}.
Of course, nU is bounded because the tree has finite depth, and we denote
its minimum by n.
Now consider for each s between t and U a bounded gamble hs and a real
number ms such that hs −ms ∈𝒜s , meaning that Forecaster in situation ◻
accepts to buy hs for ms , contingent on Reality getting to situation s. Let B > 0
be any common upper bound for maxhs −minhs , for all t ⊑ s ⊏U . It follows
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from the coherence of𝒜s that ms ≤maxhs . To make things interesting, we
also assume that minhs ≤ms , because otherwise hs −ms ≥ 0 and accepting
this gamble represents no real commitment on Forecaster’s part. As a result,
we see that ⋃︀hs −ms ⋃︀ ≤maxhs −minhs ≤B .
We are interested in the following t-gamble GU , given by
GU = 1
nU
∑
t⊑s⊏U IE(s)(︀hs −ms⌋︀,
which provides a measure for how much, on average, the gambles hs yield an
outcome above Forecaster’s accepted buying prices ms , along segments of
the tree starting in t and ending right before U . In other words, GU measures
the average gain for Forecaster along segments from t to U , associated with
commitments Forecaster has made and is taken up on, because Reality has
to move along these segments.
We would like to study Forecaster’s beliefs (in the initial situation ◻ and
contingent on Reality getting to t ) in the occurrence of the event
∆² := {GU ≤−²} ∶= {ω ∈ E(t)∶GU(ω) ≤−²} ,
where ² > 0. In other words, we want to know P({GU ≤−²}⋃︀t), which is
Forecaster’s infimum rate for selling the bet on the event that his average
gain from t to U will be at most −², contingent on Reality’s getting to t . We
will generalise two concentration inequalities that are known in classical
literature, to wit, the weak Law of Large Numbers and the Hoeffding - Azuma
inequality.
Theorem 106 (Weak law of large numbers): For all 0 < ² < B and any cut
U ⊐ t ,
P({GU ≤−²}⋃︀t) ≤ exp(− n²2
4B 2
) ,
where n :=minu∈U nU(u) and B > 0 any common upper bound for ⋃︀hs −ms ⋃︀.
Proof: From the definition of upper previsions in terms of martingales (Proposi-
tion 105117), we know that the proof is done if we can find a t-supermartingale
M such that M (u) ≥ I∆²(u) for all u ∈U and M (t) ≤ e− n²24B2 . In Lemma 103114 we
defined a positive supermartingale M that can be rescaled with M (t).
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Because M > 0, we only have to concentrate on these values u in U for which
GU (u) ≤−². For these u, we have that
M (u) ≥ 1⇔M (t) ∏
t⊑v⊏u(1−ξ(hv(u)−mv)) ≥ 1⇔ ∑
t⊑v⊏u ln(1−ξ(hv(u)−mv)) ≥− ln M (t).
If we assume that ξ < 12B (remember that ξ should be strictly smaller than 1B ), then−ξ(hv(u)−mv) > −ξB > −1⇑2. Since ln(1+ x) ≥ x − x2 for x > − 12 , we then infer for
any u ∈U such that GU (u) ≤−²
M (u) ≥ 1⇐ ∑
t⊑v⊏u−ξ(hv(u)−mv)−ξ2(hv(u)−mv)2 ≥− ln M (t)⇔−ξnU (u)GU (u)−ξ2 ∑
t⊑v⊏u(hv(u)−mv)2 ≥− ln M (t)⇐ ξnU (u)²−ξ2nU (u)B2 ≥− ln M (t)
⇔ e−ξnU (u)(²−ξB 2) ≤ M (t)
⇐ e−ξn(²−ξB 2) ≤ M (t).
In the last transition we assumed that ²−ξB2 > 0.
We thus see that
P({GU ≤−²}⋃︀t) ≤ min
0<ξ< 12B e
−ξn(²−ξB 2) = e− n²24B2 .
The minimum is attained for ξ = ²
2B 2
< 12B and in this case ² − ξB2 = ²2 > 0 as
assumed. ◻
Theorem 107 (Hoeffding’s inequality): For all ² > 0 and any cut U ⊐ t ,
P({GU ≤−²}⋃︀t) ≤ exp(−2n2²2
VU
) ,
where VU :=maxu∈U vU(u) with vU(u) :=∑t⊑s⊏u ∏︁hs∏︁2v .
Proof: From the expression of upper previsions in terms of supermartingales (Equa-
tion 2.29117), we infer that the theorem is proved if we can find a supermartingale M ,
such that M (t) ≤ exp(− 2n²2VU ) and such that varU M ≥ IGU≥−², or in other words
(∀u ∈U))︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
M (u) ≥ 1 if GU (u) ≤−²,
M (u) ≥ 0 otherwise.
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2.4. Martingales
From Lemma 104115 we know one supermartingale M which starts at M (t) = 1 and
obtains
M (u) = exp(−ξnU (u)GU (u)− ξ2vU (u)
8
) ,
for all u ∈U . Consequently—as M ≥ 0—we only have to examine the values of this
supermartingale on the event ∆². On this event we have G
U ≤ −² and therefore for
every ξ > 0:
M (u) ≥ exp(ξnU (u)²− ξ2vU (u)
8
) ,
hence, for every u ∈U such that GU ≤−²,
M (u) ≥ exp
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ξ²minnU)︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂=n −
ξ2
=V U(︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂[︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂(︂
max vU
8
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
So,
exp(−ξ²n+ ξ2V U
8
)M (u) ≥ 1.
Now, exp(−ξ²n+ ξ2V U8 )M (u) is again a supermartingale, with value e−ξ²n+ ξ2V U8 in
t and therefore,
P({GU ≤−²}⋃︀t) ≤min
ξ>0 exp(−ξ²n+ ξ2VU8 ) = exp(−2n2²2VU ) . ◻
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CHAPTER 3
Imprecise Markov chains
One convenient way to model uncertain dynamical systems mathematically
is to describe them as Markov chains. Such systems have been studied
in great detail, and their properties are very well known. However, in
many practical situations, it remains a challenge to accurately identify the
transition probabilities in the chain, mainly because the information we may
obtain about physical systems is often imprecise and uncertain. As a result,
describing a real-life dynamical system as a Markov chain will often lead to
unwarranted precision, and the model may therefore jump to conclusions
that are not supported by the available information.
For this reason, it seems quite useful to perform probabilistic robustness
studies, or sensitivity analyses, for Markov chains. This is especially relevant
in decision-making applications. It should come as no surprise, then, that
many researchers [27, 31, 43, 65] in Markov Chain Decision Making—inspired
by Satia & Lave [49]’s original work [49]—have paid attention to this issue of
“imprecision” in Markov chains.
Early work on the more mathematical aspects of modelling such “im-
precision” in Markov chains was done by Hartfiel [28] and Kozine & Utkin
[36]. Armed with linear programming techniques, Kozine & Utkin [36] also
performed an experimental study of the limit behaviour of Markov chains
with uncertain transition probabilities. More recently, Škulj [59] has begun a
formal study of the time evolution and limit behaviour of such systems.
All these approaches have at least one thing in common: they use sets
of probabilities to deal with the imprecision in the transition probabilities.
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When these probabilities are not well known, they are assumed to belong
to certain sets, and robustness analyses are performed by allowing the
transition probabilities to vary over such sets. However, this approach leads
to a number of computational as well as technical mathematical difficulties.
These difficulties can be overcome by tackling the same problem from
another angle, one that we know already. Rather than working with sets
of transition probabilities, or equivalently, sets of Markov chains, we can
consider an imprecise Markov chain, which is a special type of imprecise
probability tree.
A large part of this Chapter studies the limit behaviour of stationary
imprecise Markov chains, or alternatively, studies the limit behaviour of
the upper transition operator (see Section 3.2129) that corresponds to
an imprecise Markov chain. This upper transition operator inherits the
properties of upper previsions and consequently, it is a non-expansive
map. A very useful result for non-expansive maps by Sine [56, Theo. 1] and
Nussbaum [45, 46]1 states that for every element f of the finite-dimensional
domain of a non-expansive transformation T, there is some natural number
p such that the sequence Tnp f converges. More importantly, Sine proves
that we can find a finite ‘period’ p common to all maps f on the domain𝒳 . This means that, for any f , the set ωT( f ) of limit points of the set of
iterates {Tn f ∶n ∈N≥0} has a number of elements ⋂︀ωT( f )⋂︀ that divides this p.
T is cyclic on ωT( f ), with period ⋂︀ωT( f )⋂︀ (and therefore also with period p).
Lemmens and Scheutzow [37, Theo. 5.2] managed to prove that an upper
bound for the common periods of all topical functions (i.e. monotone and
constant additive functions) T∶Rn →Rn is ( n⟨︀n⇑2⧹︀). This upper bound is tight in
the sense that there is always at least one topical function that has this bound
as its smallest common period. However, Akian and Gaubert [1, Cor. 5.6]
have shown that for convex maps that are monotone and non-expansive, this
bound is equal to the maximal order of the permutation group. This is given
by Landau’s function g for which ln g(n) ∼ c1⌋︂n lnn, whereas ln( nn⇑2) ∼ c2n,
for some constants c1,c2 > 0, as n→∞.
In Section 3.6143 we use these ideas to introduce ergodicity for upper
transition operators, and to explain its link with so-called Perron-Frobenius
conditions. That there is such a link has already been established by Akian and
Gaubert [1, Theo. 1.1] for a more general class of operators. The goal of Akian
1Nussbaum found and closed a gap in Sine’s argument.
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and Gaubert was to determine combinatorial bounds for the orbit lengths of
order preserving, convex and sup-norm non-expansive maps. These upper
bounds involve the notion of a critical graph. It is shown in [1, Theo. 6.6],
that these bounds are tight when the map is piecewise affine. Moreover, in
this case, Akian and Gaubert give an algorithm to compute the critical graph.
In this paper, we assume in addition to the general assumptions made by
Akian and Gaubert, that the map is non-negatively homogeneous and we
address the case where all periodic orbits have length one. For this class of
maps, we show that the piecewise affine condition can be dispensed with
for the critical graph bound to be tight. In Section 3.10154 we compare our
approach to the critical graph method used by Akian and Gaubert.
3.0.1 A short analysis of classical Markov chains
Consider a finite Markov chain in discrete time, where at consecutive times
n = 1,2,3, . . . , N , N ∈N>0 the state Xn of a system can assume any value in a
finite set𝒳 . Here, N is the time horizon. The time evolution of such a system
can be modelled as if it traverses a path in an event tree. An example of such
a tree for𝒳 = {a,b} and N = 3 is given in Figure 3.1.
The situations, or nodes, of the tree have the form x1∶k := (x1, . . . , xk) ∈𝒳 k ,
k = 0,1, . . . , N . For k = 0 there is some abuse of notation as we let 𝒳 0 := {◻},
where ◻ is the so-called initial situation, or root of the tree. In the cuts 𝒳 n
of ◻, the value of the state Xn at time n is revealed.
a
(a, a)
(a, a, a) (a, a, b)
(a, b)
(a, b, a) (a, b, b)
b
(b, a)
(b, a, a) (b, a, b)
(b, b)
(b, b, a) (b, b, b)
𝒳 1
𝒳 2
Figure 3.1: The event tree for the time evolution of system that can be in two states,
a and b, and can change state at time instants n = 1,2. Also depicted are the respective
cuts𝒳 1 and𝒳 2 of ◻ where the states at times 1 and 2 are revealed.
In a classical analysis, it is generally assumed that we have: (i) a probability
distribution over the initial state X1, in the form of a probability mass function
m1 on𝒳 ; and (ii) for each situation x1∶n that the system can be in at time n,
a probability distribution over the next state Xn+1, in the form of a probability
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mass function q(⋅⋃︀x1∶n) on 𝒳 . This means that the event tree’s immediate
prediction model in each non-terminal situation x1∶n of the event tree is a
local probability model telling us about the probabilities of each of its child
nodes. This turns the event tree into a so-called probability tree; see Shafer
[53, Chapter 3] and Kemeny & Snell [35, § 1.9].
The probability tree for a Markov chain is special, because the Markov
Condition states that when the system jumps from state Xn = xn to a new
state Xn+1, the belief model for where the system goes to will only depend on
the state Xn = xn the system was in at time n, and not on its states Xk = xk at
previous times k = 1,2, . . . ,n−1. In other words:
q(⋅⋃︀x1∶n) = qn+1(⋅⋃︀xn), x1∶n ∈𝒳 n , n = 1, . . . , N −1, (3.1)
where qn+1(⋅⋃︀xn) is some probability mass function on𝒳 . The Markov chain
may be non-stationary, as the transition probabilities on the right-hand side
in Equation (3.1) are allowed to depend explicitly on the time n. Figure 3.2
gives an example of a probability tree for a Markov chain with𝒳 = {a,b} and
N = 3.
a
(a, a)
(a, a, a) (a, a, b)
(a, b)
(a, b, a) (a, b, b)
b
(b, a)
(b, a, a) (b, a, b)
(b, b)
(b, b, a) (b, b, b)
m1
q2(⋅⋃︀a) q2(⋅⋃︀b)
q3(⋅⋃︀a) q3(⋅⋃︀b)q3(⋅⋃︀a)q3(⋅⋃︀b)
Figure 3.2: The probability tree for the time evolution of a Markov chain that can be in
two states, a and b, and can change state at each time instant n = 1,2.
With the local probability mass functions m1 and qn+1(⋅⋃︀xn) we associate
the linear real-valued prevision functionals Q 1 and Q n+1(⋅⋃︀xn), given, for
all real-valued maps h on𝒳 , by
Q 1(h) :=∑
x1∈𝒳h(x1)m1(x1) (3.2)
Q n+1(h⋃︀xn) :=∑
xn+1∈𝒳h(xn+1)qn+1(xn+1⋃︀xn) (3.3)
Throughout, we will formulate our results using previsions, rather than
probabilities.
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In any probability tree, probabilities and expectations can be calculated
very efficiently using backwards recursion. Suppose that in situation x1∶n , we
want to calculate the conditional expectation P( f ⋃︀x1∶n) of some real-valued
map f on𝒳 N that may depend on the values of the states X1, . . . , XN . Let us
indicate briefly how this is done, also taking into account the simplifications
due to the Markov Condition (3.1).
To express these simplifications, a prominent part will be played by the
so-called transition operators2 Tn and Tn . Consider the linear spaceℒ(𝒳 )
of all real-valued maps on 𝒳 . Then the linear operator (transformation)
Tn ∶ℒ(𝒳 )→ℒ(𝒳 ) is defined by
Tnh(xn) :=Q n+1(h⋃︀xn) =∑
xn+1∈𝒳h(xn+1)qn+1(xn+1⋃︀xn) (3.4)
for all real-valued maps h on𝒳 . In other words, Tnh is the real-valued map
on 𝒳 whose value Tnh(xn) in xn ∈𝒳 is the conditional expectation of the
random variable h(Xn+1), given that the system is in state xn at time n. More
generally, we also consider the linear maps Tn from ℒ(𝒳 n+1) to ℒ(𝒳 n),
defined by
Tn f (x1∶n) := Tn( f (x1∶n , ⋅))(xn)= Q n+1( f (x1∶n , ⋅)⋃︀xn) =∑
xn+1∈𝒳f (x1∶n , xn+1)qn+1(xn+1⋃︀xn) (3.5)
for all x1∶n ∈𝒳 n and all real-valued maps f on𝒳 n+1.
We begin our illustration of backwards recursion by calculating P( f ⋃︀x1∶n)
for the case n = N −1. Here
P( f ⋃︀x1∶N−1) = P( f (x1∶N−1, ⋅)⋃︀x1∶N−1)=∑
xN ∈𝒳f (x1∶N−1, xN)q(xN ⋃︀x1∶N−1)=∑
xN ∈𝒳f (x1∶N−1, xN)qN(xN ⋃︀xN−1) =TN−1 f (x1∶N−1), (3.6)
where the third inequality follows from the Markov Condition (3.1), and the
fourth from Equation (3.5). Using similar arguments for n = N −2, we derive
2The operators Tn are also called the generators of the Markov process; see Whittle [66].
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from the Law of Iterated Expectations3 that
P( f ⋃︀x1∶N−2) = P(P( f (x1∶N−2, ⋅, ⋅)⋃︀x1∶N−2, ⋅)⋃︀x1∶N−2) =TN−2TN−1 f (x1∶N−2).
(3.7)
Repeating this argument leads to the backwards recursion formulae
P( f ⋃︀x1∶n) =TnTn+1 . . .TN−1 f (x1∶n) (3.8)
for n = 1, . . . , N −1, while for n = 0, we get
P( f ) := P( f ⋃︀◻) =Q 1(T1T2 . . .TN−1 f ). (3.9)
In these formulae, f is any real-valued map on𝒳 N .
For instance, if we let f be the indicator functions I{x1∶N} of the singletons{x1∶N}, Formulae (3.8) and (3.9) allow us to calculate the joint probability
mass function p defined by p(x1∶N) = P(I{x1∶N}) for all the variables X1, . . . ,
XN . We can also use them to find the conditional mass functions pn+1(⋅⋃︀xn)
and p(⋅⋃︀x1∶n) defined by pn+1(xn+1∶N ⋃︀xn) = p(xn+1∶N ⋃︀x1∶n) = P(I{x1∶N}⋃︀x1∶n).
3.1 Towards imprecise Markov chains
The treatment above shows that a classical Markov chain can be seen as a
special type of event tree with precise probability models attached to the
non-terminal nodes. From the previous chapter we already know how to
implement this type of model, where local prediction models are used that are
more general than linear previsions. This special type of imprecise probability
tree is exactly what we define to be an imprecise Markov chain. In this chapter
we will make one concession to the generality of this type of Markov chain in
that we will assume that the models are given as coherent upper previsions
(and not as coherent sets of acceptable gambles). The reason we focus on
upper- rather than lower previsions will become clear in Section 3.5135, but
the main reason is that there is always a positive upper transition probability
to go to a next state, which is not true for lower probabilities.
Definition 108: An imprecise Markov chain of length N with state space𝒳
and local conditional models Q i+1(⋅⋃︀Xi ) on ℒ(Xi+1) with i ∈ {1, . . . , N −1}
and initial model Q 1 on ℒ(X1)is an imprecise probability tree with set of
situations S =𝒳1∶N where
3Also known as the Rule of Total Expectation, or the Rule of Total Probability, or the
Conglomerative Property; see, e.g., Whittle [66, § 5.3] or de Finetti [24].
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1. in every non-terminal situation there is a choice amongst one of the
elements of𝒳
ch(s) =𝒳 for all s ∈S∖Ω,
2. the local conditional models satisfy the Markov Condition
Q i+1(⋅⋃︀x1∶i ) =Q i+1(⋅⋃︀xi ) for all x1∶i ∈𝒳 i and i = 1,2, . . . , N −1.
(3.10)
The second condition demands that every variable Xi+1 should be epi-
stemically irrelevant to its non-parents non-descendants given its parent
Xi . This type of irrelevance structure will also provide the interpretational
basis for the more general Markov trees discussed in the next chapter. The
Markov Condition also justifies the name “state space” as the current state
summarises everything there is to know about possible trajectories of the
system under study. A classical, or precise, Markov chain is an imprecise one
with local upper previsions that are linear.
a
(a, a)
(a, a, a) (a, a, b)
(a, b)
(a, b, a) (a, b, b)
b
(b, a)
(b, a, a) (b, a, b)
(b, b)
(b, b, a) (b, b, b)
Q 1(⋅)
Q 2(⋅⋃︀a) Q 2(⋅⋃︀b)
Q 3(⋅⋃︀a) Q 3(⋅⋃︀b)Q 3(⋅⋃︀a)Q 3(⋅⋃︀b)
▷ Example 109: An imprecise Markov chain of length three, interpreted as an
imprecise probability tree. At each step, a transition of an element of the state space𝒳 = {a,b} to the same state space𝒳 is possible. An important property of a Markov
chain is that the local prediction model depends only on the last state. For example,
the local prediction models in (b,b) and in (a,b) are both equal to Q 3(⋅⋃︀b). If the
imprecise Markov chain is stationary, then Q 2(⋅⋃︀b) =Q 3(⋅⋃︀b).
If the local conditional models do not depend on the actual index:
Q i+1(⋅⋃︀⋅) =Q(⋅⋃︀⋅), then we say that the imprecise Markov chain is stationary
and we can summarise it by the tuple (𝒳 ,Q 1,Q, N).
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3.2 Upper transition operators
Theorem 96106 allows us to comfortably calculate upper previsions of
arbitrary gambles on𝒳 n . To streamline notation and provide more insight,
we introduce upper transition operators in analogy with transition operators
in the precise case.
Definition 110: The upper transition operator Ti of an imprecise Markov
chain with local conditional upper previsions Q i+1 is given by
Ti ∶ℒ(Xi+1)→ℒ(Xi )∶Ti f (x) =Q i+1( f ⋃︀Xi = x)
So the transition operator Ti is a map, a transformation from ℒ(𝒳 ) toℒ(𝒳 ): it takes a gamble f ∈ ℒ(Xi+1) and turns it into a gamble on Xi . By
definition, Ti I{y}(x) is equal to Q i+1(I{y}⋃︀x) = Q i+1({y}⋃︀x) which is the
upper probability to go from the state x at “time point” i to state y at the next
time point. What is important to notice, is that for two different states x, y ∈𝒳 ,
there is no interaction between Ti f (x) and Ti f (y), i.e. if for example Ti f (x)
takes a certain value, then this tells you nothing about Ti f (y). We say that Ti
is rectangular.4 More generally, we also consider the maps Ti fromℒ(𝒳 i+1)
to ℒ(𝒳 i ), defined by
Tn f (x1∶n) := (Tn f (x1∶n , ⋅))(xn) =Q n+1( f (x1∶n , ⋅)⋃︀xn) (3.11)
for all x1∶n in𝒳 n and all real-valued maps f on𝒳 n+1. Of course, we can also
consider lower expectations and lower transition operators, which are related
to the upper expectations and upper transition operators by conjugacy.
As is the case for coherent upper previsions, it is possible to introduce
the notion of an upper transition operator directly, by basing it on a number
of defining properties, rather than by referring to an underlying imprecise
Markov chain.
Definition 111 (Upper transition operator): Consider a non-empty finite
set of states𝒳 , and the set ℒ(𝒳 ) of all real-valued maps on𝒳 . A transforma-
tion T ofℒ(𝒳 ) is called an upper transition operator if and only if it satisfies
the following properties:
4This is inspired by the following analogy: a set is said to be rectangular if it is the Cartesian
product of subsets of a set 𝒮 .
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T1. I𝒳 minh ≤ Th ≤ I𝒳 maxh [boundedness]
T2. T(h1+h2) ≤ Th1+Th2 [sub-additivity]
T3. T(λh) =λTh [non-negative homogeneity]
for arbitrary h, h1, h2 inℒ(𝒳 ) and real λ ≥ 0. The transformation T ofℒ(𝒳 ),
defined by T f :=−T(− f ) for all f ∈ℒ(𝒳 ), is then called its conjugate lower
transition operator.
Any upper transition operator T automatically also satisfies the following
interesting properties:
T4. T(h+µI𝒳 ) = Th+µI𝒳 [constant additivity]
T5. if h1 ≤ h2 then Th1 ≤ Th2 [monotonicity]
T6. if hn → h (point-wise) then Thn → Th [continuity]
T7. Th ≥−T(−h) = Th [upper–lower consistency]
for arbitrary h, h1, h2, hn in ℒ(𝒳 ) and real µ. Clearly, for any n ∈N≥0, Tn is
an upper transition operator as well. As usual T0 corresponds to the identity
map.
3.3 Recursive nature of imprecise Markov chains
The upper previsions P(⋅⋃︀x1∶n) and P on ℒ(𝒳 N) can be calculated easily
using the Law of Iterated Expectation (Theorem 112), by backwards recursion,
cf. (3.8) and (3.9).
Theorem 112 (Concatenation Formula): For any x1∶n in 𝒳 n , n = 1,2, . . . ,
N −1, and for any real-valued map f on𝒳 N :
P( f ⋃︀x1∶n) =TnTn+1 . . .TN−1 f (x1∶n) (3.12)
P( f ) =Q 1(T1T2 . . .TN−1 f ). (3.13)
If we apply the joint upper prevision P to maps h that depend only on
the state Xn at time n, we get the marginal upper previsions Pn(h) := P(h),
and Pn is a model for the uncertainty about the state Xn at time n. More
generally, taking the Markov condition into account, we use the notation
Pn⋃︀`(h⋃︀x`) := P⋃︀`(h⋃︀x`) for the upper prevision of h(Xn), conditional on
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X` = x` with 1 ≤ ` < n and we see that Pn+1⋃︀n(h⋃︀xn) = Q n+1(h⋃︀xn) =
Tnh(xn). Such previsions can be found using simpler recursion formulae
than Equations (3.12) and (3.13), as they are based on the simpler upper
transition operators Tk .
Proposition 113: For any real-valued map h on𝒳 , and for any 1 ≤ ` < n ≤ N
and all x` in𝒳 :
Pn⋃︀`(h⋃︀x`) = T`T`+1 . . .Tn−1h(x`), (3.14)
Pn(h) =Q 1(T1T2 . . .Tn−1h). (3.15)
This offers a reason for formulating our theory in terms of real-valued maps
rather than events: suppose we want to calculate the upper probability Pn(A)
that the state Xn at time n belongs to the set A. According to Equation (3.15),
Pn(A) = Q 1(T1 . . .Tn−1I A), and even if Tn−1I A can still be calculated using
upper probabilities only, it will generally assume values other than 0 and 1,
and therefore will generally not be the indicator of some event. Already after
one step, i.e., in order to calculate Tn−2Tn−1I A , we need to leave the ambit of
events, and turn to the more general real-valued maps; even if we only want
to calculate upper probabilities after n steps.
From here onwards, we assume that the imprecise Markov chain is
stationary: T1 = T2 = . . . = T. For stationary imprecise Markov chains,
Proposition 113 simplifies.
Proposition 114: For any real-valued map h on𝒳 , and for any 1 ≤ ` < n ≤ N
and all x` in𝒳 :
Pn⋃︀`(h⋃︀x`) = Tn−`h(x`), (3.16)
Pn(h) =Q 1(Tn−1h). (3.17)
3.4 Sensitivity interpretation
The classical treatment of Markov chains rests on the assumption that the
initial and transition probabilities are precisely known. If this is not the case,
then it seems necessary to perform some kind of sensitivity analysis, in
order to find out to what extent any conclusion we might reach using such a
treatment, depends on the actual values of these probabilities.
To see what is the link between upper transition operators and sets of
precise finite-state and discrete-time Markov chains, consider the coherent
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upper prevision Th(x) := Q(h⋃︀x). Because Q(⋅⋃︀x) is monotone (T5130),
constant additive (T4130), convex (T2130+T3130) and non-negatively homo-
geneous (T3130), it follows from Legendre-Fenchel duality (and the Lower
Envelope Theorem [62, §2.6.3] and to a lesser extent Theorem 1841), that
Q(h⋃︀x) can be written as (see [1])5
Q(h⋃︀x) =max{p ⋅h∶p ∈𝒫x} ,
where𝒫x is a compact convex set of probability mass functions, also known
as a credal set. The upper transition operator Th can now be seen as the
Cartesian product (or a vector) of the upper previsions over all states. If given
a prior upper prevision Q 1 corresponding to a credal set𝒫1:
Q 1(h) =max{p1 ⋅h∶p1 ∈𝒫1} , (3.18)
then it follows almost immediately that
Q 1(Th) =max{p1 ⋅M ⋅h∶p1 ∈𝒫1 and M ∈ 𝒯 } ,
where 𝒯 := {M ∈R⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀×⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀∶(∀x ∈𝒳 )(Mx,⋅ ∈𝒫x)} . (3.19)
Here, any M ∈ 𝒯 is a stochastic matrix where the x-th row, Mx,⋅, is a probability
distribution over the states at a time k +1, conditional on the chain being in
state x at time k. Therefore, we can interpret M as a transition matrix of a
finite-state and discrete-time Markov chain. When considering iterations of
the map, then we see that
Q 1(Tk h) =max{p1 ⋅M(1) ⋅ . . . ⋅M(k) ⋅h∶p1 ∈𝒫1 and M( j) ∈ 𝒯 } . (3.20)
Generally speaking, therefore, an upper transition operator effects robust
inference for a set of not necessarily stationary Markov chains whenever
we are investigating marginal gambles. In general, however, the sensitivity
interpretation and our definition of a Markov chain are not the same. The
difference lies in the type of independence that is assumed in the Markov
Condition. Whereas we assume epistemic irrelevance, strong independence
is assumed when using the sensitivity interpretation [8].
5Here we use the inner product notation p ⋅h :=∑x∈𝒳 p(x)h(x).
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3.4.1 When interpretation does not matter
The question arises whether the interpretation of the Markov Condition really
matters. The next example shows that in general, it actually does.
▷ Example 115: Let𝒳1 =𝒳2 =𝒳3 = {a,b} and Q 1(h) =Q 1( f h) = h(a)+h(b)2 . Then
we know from Equation (3.18) that𝒫1 = {( 12 12)}. The upper transition operator is
given by a vacuous model, independent of the state: T := I𝒳 max. Therefore
𝒯 := {M ∈R2×2∶Ma,⋅ ∈𝒫a and Mb,⋅ ∈𝒫b} .
with 𝒫a = 𝒫b = {(p 1−p) ∶0 ≤ p ≤ 1}. The gamble f ∈ ℒ(𝒳1∶3) of interest is f =
I(a,a,a)+ I(b,a,b).
Under the strong independence interpretation, the joint credal set𝒫1∶3 is given
by 𝒫1∶3 :=𝒫1𝒯 2 = {p1 ⋅M(1) ⋅M(2) ⋅h∶p1 ∈𝒫1 and M( j) ∈ 𝒯 }
and we get that
P( f ) =max)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀ ∑x∈𝒳1∶3 p(x) f (x)∶p ∈𝒫1∶3
[︀⌉︀⌉︀⌈︀⌉︀⌉︀⌊︀ ,=max{p(a, a, a)+p(b, a,b)∶p ∈𝒫1∶3} ,=max{q1(a)q2(a⋃︀a)q3(a⋃︀a)+q1(b)q2(a⋃︀b)q3(b⋃︀a) ∶
q1 ∈𝒫1, q2(⋅⋃︀a) ∈𝒫a , q2(⋅⋃︀b) ∈𝒫b , q3(⋅⋃︀a) ∈𝒫a , q3(⋅⋃︀b) ∈𝒫b}=max{1
2
q2(a⋃︀a)q3(a⋃︀a)+ 12 q2(a⋃︀b)(︀1−q3(a⋃︀a)⌋︀ ∶
q2(a⋃︀a) ∈ (︀0,1⌋︀, q2(a⋃︀b) ∈ (︀0,1⌋︀, q3(a⋃︀a) ∈ (︀0,1⌋︀ 
= 1
2
.
Under the epistemic irrelevance interpretation, we get from Theorem 112130 that
P( f ) =Q 1⎛⎝ ∑x1∈𝒳 I{x1}Q 2⎛⎝ ∑x2∈𝒳 I{x2}Q 3 ( f (x1, x2, ⋅)⋃︀x2)
∫︀∫︀∫︀∫︀∫︀∫︀∫︀∫︀∫︀∫︀∫︀x1⎞⎠⎞⎠= 1
2
Q 2 (I{a}Q 3( f (a, a, ⋅)⋃︀a)+ I{b}Q 3( f (a,b, ⋅)⋃︀b)⨄︀a)
+ 1
2
Q 2 (I{a}Q 3( f (b, a, ⋅)⋃︀a)+ I{b}Q 3( f (b,b, ⋅)⋃︀b)⨄︀b)
= 1
2
Q 2 (I{a}Q 3(I{a}⋃︀a)⨄︀a)+ 12 Q 2 (I{a}Q 3(I{b}⋃︀a)⨄︀b) (3.21)= 1
2
⋅1+ 1
2
⋅1 = 1.
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Rewriting Equation (3.21) gives more insight about where the difference comes from
P( f ) =max{q1(a)q2(a⋃︀a)q3(a⋃︀a)+q1(b)q′2(a⋃︀b)q′3(b⋃︀a) ∶
q1 ∈𝒫1, q2(⋅⋃︀a) ∈𝒫a , q′2(⋅⋃︀b) ∈𝒫b , q3(⋅⋃︀a) ∈𝒫a , q′3(⋅⋃︀a) ∈𝒫a , 
=max{1
2
q2(a⋃︀a)q3(a⋃︀a)+ 12 q′2(a⋃︀b)q′3(b⋃︀a) ∶
q2(a⋃︀a) ∈ (︀0,1⌋︀, q′2(a⋃︀b) ∈ (︀0,1⌋︀, q3(a⋃︀a) ∈ (︀0,1⌋︀, q′3(b⋃︀a) ∈ (︀0,1⌋︀ 
= 1
2
⋅1 ⋅1+ 1
2
⋅1 ⋅1 = 1.
The inequality still holds if the transition operator is assumed to be a linear-vacuous
mixture (not purely linear).
The example shows that the interpretation is relevant. It also shows that the
sensitivity interpretation result can be obtained from the epistemically irrel-
evant one by adding extra constraints. The extra constraints are that, at any
given time point, the optimisation is allowed to choose only one transition
matrix. Hence, the imprecise Markov chain is a set of (non-stationary) precise
Markov models under the strong independence interpretation. This is not the
case in the epistemic irrelevance case where the choice of transition matrices
may depend on the complete history.
The discrepancy between the two interpretations is most unfortunate.
However, if the gamble depends only on one state, then it follows immediately
from Equation (3.20) that the interpretation is irrelevant. This is so, because
the local optimisation done in the epistemic irrelevance case takes the same
transition matrix, which will of course be the one that was used in the strong
independence case.
Theorem 116: Let {Xn ∶n ∈N>0} be a stationary imprecise Markov chain and
let the upper prevision functional Q 1 represent the beliefs about the initial
state X1 and T be the upper transition operator. Then the upper prevision of
a gamble h depending only on one state Xn is given by
Pn(h) =Q 1(Tn−1h), (3.22)
independent of the assumed Markov Condition.
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3.5 Graph-theoretic analysis of upper transition operators
Let us introduce the notation [14]:
P nx y := Tn I{y}(x) for n ∈N≥0. (3.23)
P nx y can be interpreted as an upper probability of going from state x to
state y in n steps. For n = 0, P 0x y = I{y}(x), and for n = 1 we also use the
simpler notation Px y instead of P
1
x y . The following inequality is of crucial
importance for what follows. It is an immediate generalisation of a similar
equality (Chapman–Kolmogorov) involving (precise) probabilities in (precise)
Markov chains.
Proposition 117: For all x, y and z in𝒳 , and for all m and n in N≥0,
P n+mx y ≥ P nxz P mz y . (3.24)
Proof: Since P muy = Tm I{y}(u) ≥ 0 for all u ∈𝒳 , we have that
Tm I{y} =∑
u∈𝒳Tm I{y}(u)I{u} ≥ Tm I{y}(z)I{z} (3.25)
for all z ∈𝒳 . If we now apply the upper transition operator T n times to both sides
of this inequality, and repeatedly invoke its monotonicity [T5130] and non-negative
homogeneity [T3130], we find that T
n+m I{y} ≥ Tm I{y}(z)Tn I{z} and hence indeed
Tn+m I{y}(x) ≥ Tn I{z}(x)Tm I{y}(z). ◻
Using the P nx y , we can define a ternary relation ⋅ ⋅→ ⋅ on 𝒳 ×𝒳 ×N≥0 as
follows: for any x and y in 𝒳 and any n ∈ N≥0, we say that y is accessible
from x in n steps, and we write x
n→ y , if P nx y > 0:
x
n→ y⇔ P nx y > 0⇔ Tn I{y}(x) > 0. (3.26)
Proposition 118: The ternary relation ⋅ ⋅→ ⋅ is an accessibility relation, mean-
ing that:
(∀x, y ∈𝒳 )(x 0→ y⇔ x = y); (C1)(∀x, y ∈𝒳 )(∀m,n ∈N≥0)(x n+m→ y⇔ (∃z ∈𝒳 )(x n→ z and z m→ y)) ; (C2)(∀x ∈𝒳 )(∀n ∈N≥0)(∃y ∈𝒳 )x n→ y . (C3)
Proof:
C1 This property follows at once from Equation (3.23).
135
3. IMPRECISE MARKOV CHAINS
C2 The implication (∃z ∈𝒳 )(x n→ z and z m→ y)⇒ x n+m→ y follows immediately from
Equation (3.24).
Assume that x
n+m→ y , then we know that
0 <Tn+m I{y}(x) = Tn (Tm I{y})(x) = Tn (∑
z∈𝒳 I{z}Tm I{y}(z))(x)
and using the sub-additivity property T2130 we get that
0 < ∑
z∈𝒳 Tn I{z}(x)Tm I{y}(z)
which can—knowing that both Tn I{z}(x) and Tm I{y}(z) are nonnegative by
property T1130— only be true if there is some z ∈𝒳 such that Tn I{z}(x) > 0 and
Tm I{y}(z) > 0 and therefore x n+m→ y⇒ x n→ z ∧ z m→ y .
C3 Consider any x ∈ 𝒳 and n ∈ N≥0. Assume ex absurdo that Tn I{y}(x) = 0 for all
y ∈𝒳 . Since Tn is an upper transition operator, it follows from T1130 and T2130
that 1 ≤ Tn I𝒳 ≤∑y∈𝒳 Tn I{y}, whence 1 ≤ 0, a contradiction. ◻
The last condition C3 was assumed implicitly by Kemeny and Snell [35,
§ 1.4]. We have made it explicit here as it is exactly this requirement that
forces us to work with upper instead of lower transition operators. If we take
the lower transition operator T := I𝒳 min, then TI{x} = 0 and C3 does not
hold.
Kemeny and Snell did not assume an equivalence in condition C2, they
only required that
(∀x, y ∈𝒳 )(∀m,n ∈N≥0)((∃z ∈𝒳 )(x n→ z and z m→ y)⇒ x n+m→ y) . (C2’)
All qualitative statements that can be made for the accessibility relation can
also be made with the alternative requirement C2’. However, the computation
of accessibility properties—like periodicity, regularity, ergodicity—becomes
very hard because the link with the accessibility graph will be lost. This is
why we assume the stronger condition C2 as it will allow us to deduce all
interesting results from this simple graph: the accessibility graph.6
Definition 119: The accessibility graph 𝒢(T) of an accessibility relation⋅ ⋅→ ⋅∶𝒳 ×𝒳 ×N≥0→ {0,1} is the directed graph with vertices𝒳 and an edge
from x ∈𝒳 to y ∈𝒳 if and only if x 1→ y .
6For more information about the accessibility graph and the graph terminology used
in this chapter (e.g. reachability relation, strongly connected component, . . . ), we refer to
Appendix A192.
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It is clear that a state y is accessible from x in n steps if and only if there is
an (x, y)-path of length n in the accessibility graph 𝒢(T). This means that all
results that can be deduced from the accessibility relation, can also be found
by studying the accessibility graph.
3.5.1 State classification
We call any ternary relation ⋅ ⋅→ ⋅ that satisfies C1135–C3135 an accessibility
relation on the finite set 𝒳 . For any such (abstract) accessibility relation,
we can draw all the following conclusions. The present discussion is a
formalisation of the more intuitive discussion by Kemeny and Snell [35,
§ 1.4], under slightly more restrictive conditions. We refer to Figure 3.3 for a
graphical representation of many of the notions discussed below.
𝒳
C1
D1 D2
D3
D4
D5 D6
C2
D7
D8
C3
D9
Figure 3.3: Three increasingly finer partitions of the state set 𝒳 for a particular
stationary (im)precise Markov chain, or more generally, for an accessibility relation⋅ ⋅→ ⋅. No transition between states in different closed atoms Ck is possible, and closed
atoms can be seen as separate (im)precise Markov chains. The equivalence classes
Dk for the communication relation are partially ordered by the relation→, whose
(Hasse) diagram is represented by the upward arrows. Maximal classes are D5, D6,
D8 and D9, the other classes are non-maximal. Each communication class Dk is
further subdivided in dDk cyclic classes, through which the system can move in a
cyclic fashion, e.g., dD2 = 4. For a non-maximal class, it is also possible to move to
descendant classes, until finally a maximal class is reached. There are 3 aperiodic
classes: D6, D7 and D9 =C3. The (im)precise Markov sub-chain C3 is also irreducible,
and therefore regular.
Consider any two states x and y in𝒳 . Then y is accessible from x, which
we denote as x→ y , if there is some n ∈N≥0 such that x n→ y . If x and y are
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accessible from one another, then we say that x and y communicate, which
we denote as x↔ y .
It follows at once from C1135 and C2135 that the binary relation→ on𝒳 is
a preorder, i.e., is reflexive and transitive. The binary relation↔ on𝒳 is the
associated equivalence relation. This communication relation↔ partitions
the state set 𝒳 into equivalence classes D of states that are accessible
from one another, called communication classes. The preorder→ induces a
partial order on this partition, also denoted by→.
Maximal (or undominated) states with respect to the preorder → are
states x such that (∀y ∈𝒳 )(x→ y⇒ y → x). This means that a maximal state
only has access to other maximal states in the same communication class,
and to no other states. They, and the communication classes they belong to,
are called maximal. The other states, and the communication classes they
belong to, are called non-maximal or dominated.
In terms of the accessibility graph 𝒢(T), the reachability relation (see
Appendix A192 for concepts and related terminology) is the counterpart of
the accessibility relation: If x has access to y , then either x = y , or there is a(x, y)-path in 𝒢(T).
Proposition 120: The communication classes of an upper transition op-
erator T, correspond exactly to the strongly connected components of𝒢(T) and the maximal communication classes are the undominated strong
components of 𝒢(T).
3.5.2 Periodicity
Consider, for any x and y in𝒳 , the set
Nx y := {n ∈N≥0∶x n→ y} (3.27)
of those numbers of steps after which y is accessible from x. Observe that
Nx y is non-empty if and only if x→ y .
Nxx always contains at least 0. If Nxx contains no other elements, then x
constitutes a communication class by itself. In terms of an upper transition
operator T this requires that Tn I{x}(x) = 0 for all n > 0. If a system enters
such a state x, it must immediately leave it and can never come back to it. We
call any such state, and the communication class it constitutes, volatile. We
infer from condition C3135 that no maximal state can be volatile.
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Definition 121: We call the period dx of a state x the greatest common
divisor of the non-empty set Nxx , i.e.,
dx := gcd{n ∈N≥0∶x n→ x} .
This means that the lengths of all (x, x)-paths in 𝒢(T) must be multiples
of dx . It is not necessary though, that there is some (x, x)-path for every
multiple of dx .
▷ Example 122: For the accessibility graph given in the figure, returns to state a can
only occur for
Naa = {α6+β8∶α ∈N≥0,β ∈N≥0} .
a b c d
efgh
Therefore, the period da = gcd Naa = 2. Only paths from a to a exist that have a length
that is a multiple of 2. There is no (a, a)-path of length 2 or 4.
The complete state space is a communication class as the accessibility graph is
strongly connected. The period for every state is 2 (see also Proposition 124).
A state is volatile if and only if its period is infinite. If dx < +∞, then
because, by C2135, the set Nxx is closed under addition, the basic number-
theoretic result of Theorem 123 tells us that Nxx is, up to perhaps a finite
number of elements, equal to the set of all multiples of dx :
(∃n ∈N≥0)(∀k ≥ n)kdx ∈ Nxx . (3.28)
Theorem 123 ([35, Theorem 1.4.1]): A non-empty set of natural numbers
that is closed under addition contains all but a finite number of multiples of
its greatest common divisor.
Now consider a communication class D, and any two states x and y in
that class. Then it is not difficult to show that they have the same period.
Proposition 124: For any two elements x and y of𝒳 : x↔ y⇒ dx = dy .
Proof: We assume without loss of generality that x ≠ y . Suppose x↔ y . Then Nx y ≠∅ and Ny x ≠ ∅. Fix nx y ∈ Nx y and ny x ∈ Ny x . Then nx y +ny x ∈ Nxx ∩Ny y . Since
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nx y +ny x > 0 this implies that both dx and dy are finite. Hence there are rx and ry in
N≥0 such that
rx dx = nx y +ny x = ry dy . (3.29)
On the other hand, we infer from (3.28) that for sufficiently large k ∈N≥0 both nx y +
ny x +kdy and nx y +ny x +(k +1)dy are elements of Nxx . Using (3.29), this implies
that dx divides both (ry +k)dy and (ry +k+1)dy . Hence dx divides dy . A completely
similar argument shows that dy divides dx . ◻
We denote by dD the common period of all elements of the communication
class D . If dD = 1, then we call the class D , and all its states, aperiodic.
The analysis can still be taken further in interesting ways.
Proposition 125: Consider arbitrary x and y in some non-volatile com-
munication class D. Then there is some 0 ≤ tx y < dD such that n ∈ Nx y
implies n ≡ tx y (mod dD), i.e., n and tx y are equal up to some multiple of
dD . Moreover, (∃n ∈N≥0)(∀k ≥ n)tx y +kdD ∈ Nx y , (3.30)
and therefore Nx y equals {tx y +kdD ∶k ∈N≥0} up to perhaps a finite number
of elements. Finally,
(∀x, y, z ∈D)(tx y + ty z ≡ txz (mod dD)). (3.31)
Proof: Since Nx y ≠ ∅ and Ny x ≠ ∅ we can consider arbitrary nx y and mx y in Nx y
and arbitrary ny x in Ny x . Since both nx y +ny x and mx y +ny x belong to Nxx , we see
that nx y ≡ mx y (mod dD), so all elements of Nx y have the same remainder after
division by dD . If we call this common remainder tx y , then obviously 0 ≤ tx y < dD
and nx y ≡ tx y (mod dD) for all nx y ∈ Nx y .
To prove (3.30), consider any nx y ∈ tx y . We have just proved that there is some
n′ ∈ N≥0 such that nx y = tx y +n′dD . And we know from (3.28) that there is some
n′′ ∈N≥0 such that for all k ≥ n′′, kdD ∈ Nxx and therefore tx y +(n′+k)dD ∈ Nx y .
To prove (3.31), consider nx y ∈ Nx y and ny z ∈ Ny z , then on the one hand
nx y + ny z ∈ Nxz and therefore nx y + ny z ≡ txz (mod dC ). On the other hand, if
follows from nx y ≡ tx y (mod dC ) and ny z ≡ ty z (mod dC ) that nx y +ny z ≡ tx y +ty z(mod dC ). ◻
It follows that for any x, y and z in a non-volatile communication class D ,
txx = 0 and tx y + ty z ≡ txz (mod dD), and therefore ty z = 0 if and only if
tx y = txz for some x ∈D . This implies that ‘ty z = 0’ determines an equivalence
relation on this communication class D , which further partitions it into dD
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subsets, called cyclic classes. In such a cyclic class, all states y give the same
value to tx y , for any given x in D . Within D , the system moves from cyclic class
to cyclic class, in a definite ordered cycle of length dD . If D is non-maximal,
then in each of its cyclic classes it is possible that, rather than moving to the
next cyclic class, the system moves on to (a state in) another communication
class D′, that is a successor to D for the partial order→.
Definition 126: A maximal aperiodic communication class is called regular.
If there is only one communication class, then𝒳 is called irreducible. If𝒳 is
irreducible and aperiodic,𝒳 itself is also called regular.
The following characterisations of regularity are now immediate (observe
that dD = 1 and tx y = 0 for an aperiodic class).
Proposition 127: A maximal communication class D is regular if and only if
(∃n ∈N≥0)(∀k ≥ n)(∀x, y ∈D)(x k→ y).
𝒳 is regular if and only if
(∃n ∈N≥0)(∀k ≥ n)(∀x, y ∈𝒳 )(x k→ y).
Let us define the set of all (simple) cycles 𝒞x from a state x to itself.𝒞x := {x 1→ x1 1→ x2 1→ . . . 1→ x∶(xi ≠ x) and (i ≠ j ⇒ xi ≠ x j )} .
The length of a path c := x0 1→ x1 1→ x2 1→ . . . 1→ xn−1 1→ xn is by definition
length(c) = n.
Proposition 128: The period dD of a communication class D is equal to
dD = gcd{length(c)∶c ∈ 𝒞x} ,
where x is any element of D .
Proof: Remark that any “path”7 from x to x has to be a concatenation of elements of𝒞x . We infer then from Definition 121139 and from Proposition 124139 that
dC = gcd)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀∑c∈𝒞c ac length(c)∶ac ∈N≥0
[︀⌉︀⌉︀⌈︀⌉︀⌉︀⌊︀ = gcd{length(c)∶c ∈ 𝒞x} . ◻
7Here we mean with “path” a sequence of states where consecutive states in the sequence
are accessible in one step. Remark that states can be repeated in this “path” whence it is not a
path in the graph-theoretic sense of Appendix A192
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Remark that x
1→ y if and only if there is an arc (x, y) in 𝒢(T). All this means
that the search for the period of a communication class C can be reduced
to finding the period of the corresponding strongly connected component𝒢(T)⋂︀
C
.8 This problem is closely related to a breadth-first search in 𝒢(T)⋂︀
C
as explained in [25].
3.5.3 Adding more detail to this picture
We now return from this abstract discussion to the specific accessibility
relation→ associated with an upper transition operator T. Using T, we will
be able to add some detail to the sketch made using the relation→ only.
We begin by looking at closed sets of states. A set of states C is called
closed if no state outside C is accessible from any state within the set of states
C ∶ (∀x ∈ C)(∀y ∈ C c)(x ⇑→y). In particular, any maximal communication
class is a closed set of states. Of course,𝒳 itself is also closed. And so is any
union of closed sets.
Proposition 129: Consider a stationary imprecise Markov chain with upper
transition operator T. Let 𝒞 be a partition of the state set𝒳 into closed sets
and let C ∈ 𝒞.9 Then
1. T(hIB)(x) = 0 for all h ∈ℒ(𝒳 ), all x ∈C and all B ⊆C c ;
2. Th(x) = T(hIC)(x) for all h ∈ℒ(𝒳 ) and all x ∈C ;
3. Th =∑C∈𝒞 T(IC h) =∑C∈𝒞 IC T(IC h) for all h ∈ℒ(𝒳 ).
Proof: First, fix x in C and B ⊆ C c . Since the set C is closed, it follows that for any
y in B , TI{y}(x) = Px y = 0. Using T2130 and T5130, we see that therefore TIB(x) = 0.
But since −IB max ⋃︀h⋃︀ ≤ hIB ≤ IB max ⋃︀h⋃︀, we find that on the one hand, using T5130
and T3130, T(hIB) ≤ (max ⋃︀h⋃︀)TIB . On the other hand, using T5130, T7130 and T3130,
we get −(max ⋃︀h⋃︀)TIB ≤ T(hIB). Since TIB(x) = 0, we see that T(hIB)(x) = 0, which
proves the first statement.
We infer from the first statement that both T(hIC c )(x) = 0 and T(−hIC c )(x) = 0.
Since h = hIC +hIC c , it follows from T2130 that T(hIC )−T(−hIC c ) ≤ Th ≤ T(hIC )+
T(hIC c ) and therefore Th(x) = T(hIC )(x), which proves the second statement.
8Remember that 𝒢(T)⋂︀
C
is the subgraph of 𝒢(T) induced by C , see Appendix A192.
9Remark that a partition of closed sets must always be a coarsening of the partition of
communication classes. The set of all states 𝒳 is always a closed set and forms the coarsest
partition.
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Consider any C ∈ 𝒞 and any y ∈C c . Then y belongs to some closed set C ′ ∈ 𝒞∖{C},
so we infer from the first statement that T(hIC )(y) = 0. This, together with the second
statement, leads at once to the third statement. ◻
If we consider a closed set of states C , then we can define an operator
TC ∶ℒ(C)→ℒ(C) as follows. Consider any real-valued map g on C , and any
extension h of g to𝒳 . Then it follows from Proposition 129.2 that Th = T(hIC)
only depends on g , and not on how g is extended to h outside C . It therefore
makes sense to define TC g as the restriction Th⋂︀C of Th to C . It is very easy to
see that TC satisfies T1130–T3130, and is therefore an upper transition operator
onℒ(C).
It also follows from Proposition 129.3, that if 𝒞 is a collection of mutually
disjoint closed subsets of the state set 𝒳 , then Tn⋃𝒞 =∑C∈𝒞 IC TnC ○ ⋃︀C for all
n ≥ 0: the dynamics associated with T⋃𝒞 on the closed subset⋃𝒞 of𝒳 can be
seen as being subdivided into isolated and independent dynamics associated
with TC on state sets C ∈ 𝒞.
3.6 Ergodicity and a non-linear Perron-Frobenius theorem
In this section we introduce the notion of ergodicity for upper transition
operators and lay bare the link with the Perron-Frobenius theorem. We allow
ourselves to be inspired by corresponding notions for non-stationary Markov
chains [52, p. 136] and Markov set chains [28] to lead us to the following
definition of ergodicity.
Definition 130 (Ergodicity): An upper transition operator T on𝒳 is called
ergodic if for all h ∈ ℒ, the sequence of gambles {Tk h}
k∈N≥0 converges
pointwise to a constant gamble.
This definition of ergodicity is not exactly the one more commonly en-
countered in probability or dynamical systems theory, where ergodicity
usually refers to the special properties of an invariant measure. Here,
ergodicity corresponds to what is usually called “ergodic + aperiodic” in
the Markov chain setting.
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Consider any gamble h ∈𝒳 . Ergodicity of an upper transition operator
T not only means that the sequence Tnh converges, so the ω-limit set10
ωT(h) is a singleton {ξh}, but also that this limit ξh is a constant function.
Observe that by T6130, ξh is a fixed point for all T
k : Tkξh = ξh and therefore
ξTk h = ξh for all k ∈ N≥0. If we denote the constant value of ξh by PT(h),
then this defines a real functional Q T onℒ(𝒳 ). This functional is an upper
prevision: it is bounded, sub-additive and non-negatively homogeneous
[compare with T1130–T3130]. It is T-invariant in the sense that PT ○T = PT,
and it is the only such upper prevision. This shows that our definition of
ergodicity is nevertheless in line with the concept more commonly used in
systems theory.
Definition 131: An upper transition operator T on ℒ(𝒳 ) is called Perron
Frobenius-like if there is some real functional Q∞ onℒ(𝒳 ) such that
lim
n→∞Q 1(Tnh) =Q∞(h)
for all upper previsions Q 1 on ℒ(𝒳 ) and all h ∈𝒳 , or in other words, if the
sequence of upper previsions Q 1 ○Tn converges pointwise to some limit that
does not depend on the initial value Q 1.
As an immediate result, conditions for ergodicity of upper transition operat-
ors are conditions for a Perron–Frobenius-like theorem for such transforma-
tions to hold.
Theorem 132 (Perron–Frobenius): An upper transition operator T is Per-
ron-Frobenius-like if and only if it is ergodic, and in that case Q∞ =Q T.
Proof: Sufficiency. Suppose T is ergodic. Then using the notations established
above, Tn h → ξh and therefore Q(Tn h) → Q(ξh) because any upper prevision
Q is continuous [compare with T6130]. Observe that, since any upper prevision
Q is constant-additive [compare with T4130 and T1130], Q(ξh) = Q T(h). Hence
Q ○Tn →Q T, and therefore T is Perron–Frobenius-like, with Q∞ =Q T.
Necessity. Suppose that T is Perron–Frobenius-like, with limit upper prevision
Q∞. Fix any x ∈𝒳 , and consider the upper prevision Q x defined by Q x(h) := h(x)
for all h ∈ℒ(𝒳 ). Then by assumption Tn h(x) =Q x(Tn h)→Q∞(h). Since this holds
for all x ∈𝒳 , we see that T is ergodic with Q T =Q∞. ◻
10Here, ω
T
(h) stands for the ω-limit set of h, which is the set of cluster points of the orbit{Tn h}
n∈N≥0 . In other words, g ∈ωT(h) if and only if there exists a strictly increasing sequence
of natural numbers {nk}k∈N≥0 such that g = limk→∞Tnk h.
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It follows from the discussion in Section 3.2129 that⋃h∈ℒ(𝒳)ωT(h) is the
set of all periodic points of T—a periodic point being an element h ∈ℒ(𝒳 )
for which there is some n ∈ N≥0 for which Tnh = h. Because of T4130, this
set contains all constant maps. We now see that for T to be ergodic, this set
cannot contain any other maps.
Proposition 133: An upper transition operator T is ergodic if and only if all
of its periodic points are constant maps.
3.7 Characterisation of ergodicity
We now turn to the issue of determining in practice whether an upper
transition operator is ergodic. In the case of finite-state, discrete-time Markov
chains, a nice approach to deciding upon ergodicity, based on the the
accessibility relation, was given by Kemeny and Snell [35, § 1.4].
In the case of finite-state, discrete-time precise Markov chains, the
accessibility of states, gives us clues about the ergodicity of the Markov chain.
For such a Markov chain to be ergodic, it is necessary and sufficient that
it is top class regular [14], meaning that: (i) there is only one maximal or
undominated communication class—elements of a maximal communica-
tion class have no access to states not in that class—, in which case we call
this unique maximal classℛ the top class; and (ii) the top classℛ should be
regular, meaning that after some time k, all elements of this class become
accessible to each other in any number of steps: for all x and y inℛ and for
all n ≥ k, x n→ y .
For upper transition operators, it turns out that top class regularity is a
necessary condition for ergodicity. However, top class regularity is by itself
not a sufficient condition: we need some guarantee that the top class will
eventually be reached—a requirement that is automatically fulfilled in finite-
state discrete-time precise Markov chains.
Proposition 134: An upper transition operator T is ergodic if and only if it is
regularly absorbing, meaning that it satisfies the following properties:
(TCR) it is top class regular:
ℛ := {x ∈𝒳 ∶(∃n ∈N≥0)(∀k ≥ n)minTk I{x} > 0} ≠∅,
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(TCA) it is top class absorbing: withℛc :=𝒳 ∖ℛ,
(∀y ∈ℛc)(∃n ∈N≥0)Tn Iℛc (y) < 1.
For a proof that (TCR) is equivalent toℛ ≠∅, we refer to [14, Prop. 4.3]. (TCA)
means that for every element y not in the top class, there is some finite
number of steps n after which the top class can be reached with a strictly
positive lower probability 1−Tn Iℛc (y).
Proof: (TCR)∧ (TCA)⇒ (ER). Consider any fixed point ξ of Tk , where k ∈ N≥0 and
observe, by T5130 and T4130, that minξ ≤ minTξ ≤ minT2ξ ≤ . . . ≤ minTkξ = minξ
whence for any p ∈N≥0,
minξ =minTpξ and similarly maxξ =maxTpξ. (3.32)
We infer from Proposition 133 that we have to show that ξ is constant. Using
T5130, T4130, T3130 and Eq. 3.32 we construct from T
pξ ≥ minTpξ + (︀Tpξ(x) −
minTpξ⌋︀I{x} = minξ+ (︀Tpξ(x)−minξ⌋︀I{x} the following inequality, which holds
for all n, p ∈N≥0 and all x ∈𝒳 :
Tn+pξ ≥minξ+ )︀Tpξ(x)−minξ⌈︀Tn I{x}.
Hence, by taking the minimum on both sides of this inequality and using Equa-
tion (3.32), we find that
0 ≥ )︀Tpξ(x)−minξ⌈︀minTn I{x}.
We infer from (TCR) that by taking n large enough, we can ensure that minTn I{x} > 0
whence for any p ∈N≥0 and x ∈ℛ
0 = )︀Tpξ(x)−minξ⌈︀ ,
so we already find that Tpξ(x) =minξ for all p ∈N≥0 and x ∈ℛ.
If there is some p ∈N≥0 such that Tpξ reaches its maximum onℛ, then we infer
from Eq. (3.32) that maxTpξ = maxξ which has to be equal to minξ to satisfy the
inequality, so ξ is indeed constant. Let us therefore assume that the maximum of
Tpξ is not reached inℛ. Using T5130, T4130, T3130 and Equation (3.32), we construct
from ξ ≤maxξ−(︀maxξ−maxx∈ℛ ξ(x)⌋︀Iℛ and−Iℛ = Iℛc −1 the following inequality,
which holds for all n ∈N≥0:
Tnξ ≤maxξ+]︀maxξ−max
x∈ℛξ(x){︀(Tn Iℛc −1).
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By taking the maximum overℛc on both sides of this inequality and under the made
assumption that the maximum is never reached onℛ, we get
0 = max
y∈ℛc Tnξ(y)−maxξ ≤ ]︀maxξ−maxx∈ℛξ(x){︀( maxy∈ℛc Tn Iℛc (y)−1).
For each y ∈ ℛc , consider some ny ∈ N≥0 such that Tny Iℛc (y) < 1, and let n :=
maxy∈ℛc ny . Then we see that for every y ∈ℛc :
Tn Iℛc (y) = Tny (︀(Iℛ+ Iℛc )Tn−ny Iℛc ⌋︀(y)= Tny (︀Iℛc Tn−ny Iℛc ⌋︀(y)≤ Tny Iℛc (y) < 1.
The second equality follows from the fact that IℛTn−ny Iℛc = 0: an element in the top
classℛ has no access to any element outside of it; and the first inequality follows from
Iℛc ≤ 1 and T5130. But this means that maxy∈ℛc Tn Iℛc (y)−1 < 0 and consequently
maxξ =maxx∈ℛ ξ(x) =minξ.
(ER)⇒ (TCR)∧ (TCA). We will use contraposition and show first that ¬(TCR)⇒¬(ER). Then we will show that ¬(TCA)∧ (TCR)⇒¬(ER).¬(TCR) ⇒ ¬(ER). Not being top class regular means that ℛ = ∅, which is
equivalent to
(∀x ∈𝒳 )(∀n ∈N≥0)(∃k ≥ n)(∃z ∈𝒳 )Tk I{x}(z) = 0.
Since we infer from I{x} ≥ 0 and T1130 that Tk I{x} ≥ 0, this leads us to conclude that
liminfn→∞minTn I{x} = 0. But for any n ∈N≥0, Tn+1I{x} = T(Tn I{x}) ≥minTn I{x}
by T1130, and therefore also minT
n+1I{x} ≥ minTn I{x}. This implies that the
sequence minTn I{x} is non-decreasing, and bounded above [by 1], and therefore
convergent. This shows that
(∀x ∈𝒳 ) lim
n→∞minTn I{x} = 0. (3.33)
We also infer from T1130 and T2130 that 1 = Tk I𝒳 ≤ ∑x∈𝒳 Tk I{x}. Since the
cardinality ⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀ of the state space is finite, this means that for all z ∈𝒳 and all n ∈N≥0
there is some x ∈𝒳 such that Tn I{x}(z) ≥ 1⇑⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀. This tells us that maxTn I{x} ≥ 1⇑⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀.
Since we can infer from a similar argument as before that the sequence maxTn I{x}
converges, this tells us that
(∀x ∈𝒳 ) lim
n→∞maxTn I{x} ≥ 1⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀ . (3.34)
Combining Equations (3.33) and (3.34) tells us that
lim
n→∞(maxTn I{x}−minTn I{x}) > 0,
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so T cannot be ergodic.¬(TCA)∧ (TCR)⇒¬(ER). Since T is not top class absorbing, we know that there is
some y ∈ℛc such that Tn Iℛc (y) = 1 for all n ∈N≥0. As the top classℛ is non-empty,
we know that there is some x ∈ℛ, and this x has no access to any state outside the
maximal communication classℛ: Tn Iℛc (x) = 0 for all n ∈N≥0. Consequently
lim
n→∞(maxTn Iℛc −minTn Iℛc ) = 1−0 > 0,
so T cannot be ergodic. ◻
3.8 Ergodicity checking in practice
3.8.1 Checking for top class regularity
Checking for top class regularity directly using the definition would involve
calculating for every state x the maps TI{x}, T2I{x}, . . . , Tn I{x} until a first
number n = nx is found for which minTnx I{x} > 0. Unfortunately, it is not
clear whether this procedure is guaranteed to terminate, or whether we can
stop checking after a fixed number of iterations. However, it is clear from
Proposition 120138 that the accessibility relation
⋅→ of the accessibility graph𝒢(T) corresponding to T, is exactly the accessibility relation→ belonging to
the upper transition operator T. This means that checking for the existence
of a single top class of T, corresponds to asserting whether there is only one
final classℛ in 𝒢(T). Once we have found the top classℛ, we focus on the
subgraph 𝒢(T)⋂︀ℛ which is the upper accessibility graph 𝒢(T) restricted toℛ. Property 128141 tells us that checking for regularity of the top class means
that we have to check whether the cyclicity of 𝒢(T) is equal to 1.
The relation between T and its graph 𝒢(T) is a purely qualitative one: the
exact quantitative value of the upper transition probabilities between two
states x and y is not important at all. What is important is whether there
is a possible transition between two states. This means that appropriately
replacing the upper transition operator T with a classical, linear transition
operator, or its associated transition matrix M , will still lead to the same
results.
Definition 135: A stochastic matrix M ∈ R𝒳×𝒳 represents an upper trans-
ition operator T on𝒳 if Mx,y > 0⇔ TI{y}(x) > 0 for all x and y in𝒳 .
148
3.8. Ergodicity checking in practice
It is clear that any stochastic matrix M that represents T will result into
the same graph 𝒢(T) and will therefore lead to the same conclusions with
respect to top class regularity. For stochastic matrices however, a final
class corresponds to an irreducible stochastic submatrix, and aperiodicity
corresponds to the absence of eigenvalues with modulus 1 apart from 1 (with
multiplicity 1) itself.
Proposition 136 (Top class regularity): Consider an upper transition oper-
ator T. Then the following statements are equivalent: (i) T is top class regular;
(ii) M represents T and is regular; (iii) M represents T and M has exactly one
eigenvalue with modulus 1; and (iv) 𝒢(T) has exactly one final classℛ and𝒢(T)⋂︀ℛ has cyclicity 1.▷ Example 137: Let 𝒳 := {x, y} and T f := f (x)I{x} +max{ f (x), f (y)}I{y} for all
f ∈ 𝒳 . Then TI{x} = I𝒳 whence x 1→ x and y 1→ x and TI{y} = I{y} whence y 1→ y .
The graph 𝒢(T) is then given by
x y
Clearly {x} is the unique final strongly connected component of 𝒢(T) and as it is
a singleton, it has cyclicity one. We conclude that T is top class regular.
In the next example we focus on a simple upper transition operator that
is not piecewise affine. It does not therefore fall within the scope of Akian
and Gaubert’s algorithm, which we will discuss in Section 3.10154.▷ Example 138: Consider the map
T∶R3→R3∶ f → f + ∏︁ f − f ∏︁2⌋︂
3
⎛⎜⎜⎝
αx
αy
αz
⎞⎟⎟⎠
where f := ( fx + fy + fz)⇑3 for f = ( fx fy fz)T and the parameters αx , αy and αz
are any real numbers in (︀0, 1⇑⌋︂2⌋︀. It is not difficult to check that this T is indeed an
upper transition operator, but it is obviously not piecewise affine. Independently of
the value of αx , αy and αz , the upper accessibility graph of this map is given by:
x
y
z
The entire graph is strongly connected, and it has cyclicity one. This implies that T is
not only top class regular, but also ergodic, according to Proposition 134145.
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3.8.2 Checking for top class absorption
We now present a computationally efficient procedure to check for top class
absorption.
Proposition 139 (Top class absorption): Let T be an upper transition oper-
ator with regular top classℛ. Consider the nested sequence of subsets ofℛc
defined by the iterative scheme:
A0 :=ℛc
An+1 := {a ∈ An ∶TI An(a) = 1} , n ≥ 0.
After k ≤ ⋃︀ℛc ⋃︀ iterations, we reach Ak = Ak+1. Then T is top class absorbing if
and only if Ak =∅.
Proof: We start by showing inductively that under the given assumptions, the
statement
Hn ∶ (︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂[︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂(︂I An Tn Iℛc = I An(α) and(∀a ∈ Acn+1)TI An (a) < 1)︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂(β) and (∀a ∈ A
c
n)Tn Iℛc (a) < 1)︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂(γ)
holds for all n ≥ 0. We first prove that the statement Hn holds for n = 0. The first and
third statements of H0 hold trivially. For the second statement, we have to prove that
TI A0(a) < 1 for all a ∈ Ac1 = Ac0∪(A0∖ A1). On A0∖ A1, the desired inequality holds
by definition. On Ac0 =ℛ it holds because there TI A0 is zero: no state in the top classℛ has access to any state outside it.
Next, we prove that Hn ⇒Hn+1. First of all (α),
Tn+1I A0 = T(Tn I A0) = T(︀I An Tn I A0 + I Acn Tn I A0⌋︀ = T(︀I An + I Acn Tn I A0⌋︀, (3.35)
where the last equality follows from the induction hypothesis Hn . It follows from the
definition of An+1 that I An+1 TI An = I An+1 , and therefore
I An+1 = I An+1 T(︀I An + I Acn Tn I A0 − I Acn Tn I A0⌋︀≤ I An+1 T(︀I An + I Acn Tn I A0⌋︀+ I An+1 T(︀−I Acn Tn I A0⌋︀= I An+1 Tn+1I A0 + I An+1 T(︀−I Acn Tn I A0⌋︀≤ I An+1 Tn+1I A0 ≤ I An+1 ,
where the first inequality follows from T2130, the second inequality follows from the
fact that −I Acn Tn I A0 ≤ 0 and therefore I An+1 T(︀−I Acn Tn I A0⌋︀ ≤ 0 [use T1130 and T5130],
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and the third from Tn+1I A0 ≤ 1 [use T5130]. The second equality follows from
Equation (3.35). Hence indeed I An+1 = I An+1 Tn+1I A0 .
(β) Next, observe that Acn+2 = Acn+1∪(An+1∖An+2). By definition, TI An+1(a) < 1
for all a ∈ An+1 ∖ An+2. It also follows from the induction hypothesis Hn that
TI An (a) < 1 for all a ∈ Acn+1. But since An+1 ⊆ An , it follows from T5130 that
TI An+1 ≤ TI An , and therefore also TI An+1(a) < 1 for all a ∈ Acn+1. Hence indeed
TI An+1(a) < 1 for all a ∈ Acn+2.
(γ) To finish the induction proof, let β := maxa∈Acn Tn Iℛc (a), then β < 1 by the
induction hypothesis Hn . We then infer from Equation (3.35) that
Tn+1I A0 = T(︀I An + I Acn Tn I A0⌋︀ ≤ T(︀I An +βI Acn ⌋︀ = T(︀β+(1−β)I An ⌋︀ =β+(1−β)TI An .
Consider any a ∈ Acn+1, then TI An (a) < 1 by the induction hypothesis Hn , and
therefore Tn+1I A0(a) ≤ β+ (1−β)TI An (a) < 1 since also β < 1. We conclude that
Hn+1 holds too.
To continue the proof, we observe that A0, A1, . . . , An , . . . is a non-increasing
sequence, and that A0 is finite. This implies that there must be some first k ∈N≥0 such
that Ak+1 = Ak . Clearly, k ≤ ⋃︀A0⋃︀. We now prove by induction that Gn ∶ I Ak Tn+k I A0 =
I Ak for all n ≥ 0. The statement Gn clearly holds for n = 0: it follows directly from Hk .
We show that Gn ⇒Gn+1. First of all,
Tn+k+1I A0 = T(Tn+k I A0) = T(︀I Ak Tn+k I A0 + I Ack Tn+k I A0⌋︀ = T(︀I Ak + I Ack Tn+k I A0⌋︀,
where the last equality follows from the induction hypothesis Gn . As before, it follows
from the definition of Ak+1 that I Ak+1 TI Ak = I Ak+1 , and therefore I Ak TI Ak = I Ak
(remember that Ak+1 = Ak ), so
I Ak = I Ak T(︀I Ak + I Ack Tn+k I A0 − I Ack Tn+k I A0⌋︀≤ I Ak T(︀I An k + I Ack Tn+k I A0⌋︀+ I Ak T(︀−I Ack Tn+k I A0⌋︀= I Ak Tn+k+1I A0 + I Ak T(︀−I Ack Tn+k I A0⌋︀ ≤ I Ak Tn+k+1I A0 ≤ I Ak ,
where the first inequality follows from T2130 and the second inequality follows from
the fact that −I Ac
k
Tn+k I A0 ≤ 0 and therefore I Ak T(︀−I Ack Tn+k I A0⌋︀ ≤ 0 [use T1130
and T5130], and the third from T
n+k+1I A0 ≤ 1 [use T5130]. Hence indeed I Ak =
I Ak T
n+k+1I A0 .
There are now two possibilities. The first is that Ak ≠ ∅. It follows from the
arguments above that for any element a of Ak , T
`Iℛc (a) = 1 for all ` ∈N≥0, which
implies that T cannot be top class absorbing. The second possibility is that Ak =∅. It
follows from the argument above that Tk Iℛc (a) < 1 for all a ∈ Ack =𝒳 which implies
that T is top class absorbing. ◻
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▷ Example 140: Define T f = max{M f ∶L ≤ M ≤U and M stochastic} where L and
U are given by
L =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 0
0 1⇑4 1⇑4 0 0
1⇑2 1⇑4 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 1⇑2 0 0 1⇑4
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
and U =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 0
1⇑2 3⇑4 1⇑2 0 0
3⇑4 1⇑2 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1
1⇑4 3⇑4 0 0 1⇑4
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
The corresponding upper accessibility graph 𝒢(T) is given by
1
2
3
4
5
where {1} is corresponds to the unique strongly connected component that is final.
As it is a singleton, it has cyclicity one, so there is a regular top classℛ = {1}.
To check for top class absorption, we start iterating:
step 1: TIℛc = (0 1 1⇑2 1 1)T whence I A1 = (0 1 0 1 1)T ,
step 2: TI A1 = (0 3⇑4 1⇑2 1 1)T whence I A2 = (0 0 0 1 1)T ,
step 3: TI A2 = (0 0 0 1 1⇑4)T whence I A3 = (0 0 0 1 0)T ,
step 4: TI A3 = (0 0 0 1 0)T whence I A4 = (0 0 0 1 0)T .
Because A4 = A3 ≠∅ we conclude that T is not top class absorbing and therefore not
ergodic.
3.9 Coefficient of ergodicity
It is clear that ergodicity would follow immediately from Banach’s fixed
point theorem if T were contractive instead of non-expansive. With this
in mind, one might think that conditions for ergodicity might coincide
with contractiveness of T. This is not true. Take, for example, the particular
upper transition operator T = I𝒳 max, which is not contractive, but, by
Proposition 133145, clearly ergodic.
In addition to requiring the sequence {Tk h}k∈N≥0 to converge pointwise,
ergodicity also requires that the sequence converges to a constant gamble.
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Therefore, maxTn f −minTn f → 0 when n→∞. It seems therefore to be more
natural to focus on the so-called variation pseudo-norm defined by:
∏︁ f ∏︁v :=max f −min f .
Under this pseudo-norm, upper transition operators will again be non-
expansive. The extra condition that makes the map T contractive is expressed
by Škulj and Hable [61] in terms of the coefficient of ergodicity. It is a standard
trick, see Nussbaum’s monograph [44], to use Hilbert’s projective metric to
show contraction. The variation norm we define can now be seen as an
additive version of Hilbert’s projective metric.
Proposition 141: If we define the coefficient of ergodicity of an upper
transition operator T as
ρ(T) :=max{∫︁Th∫︁
v
∶0 ≤ h ≤ 1} , (3.36)
then T is ergodic if ρ(Tm) < 1 for some m ∈N≥0.
Proof: Consider any f ∈𝒳 . It follows by repeatedly applying T5130, T3130 and T4130
that for all k ∈N≥0:
min f ≤minTk f ≤minTk+1 f ≤maxTk+1 f ≤maxTk f ≤max f . (3.37)
This tells us that the sequence minTk f is non-decreasing and bounded above. It
therefore converges to some real number m. Similarly, the sequence maxTk f is non-
increasing and bounded below, and therefore converges to some real number M . It is
also clear from Equation (3.37) that m ≤ M . Suppose that there is some p ∈N≥0 such
that ρ(Tp) < 1. Then we have to prove that m = M , which is what we now set out to
do.
Since 0 ≤ ( f −min f )⇑∏︁ f ∏︁v ≤ 1, we infer from Equation (3.36), (T3) and (T4) that
∫︁T f ∫︁
v∏︁ f ∏︁v = ⨄︁T f −min f∏︁ f ∏︁v ⨄︁v ≤ ρ(T),
and therefore also ⋃︁Tk f ⋃︁
v
≤ ρ(Tk)∏︁ f ∏︁v for all k ∈N≥0. (3.38)
Then applying Equation (3.38) repeatedly tells us that for the upper transition operator
Λ := Tp : ∫︁Λn f ∫︁
v
≤ ρ(Tp)n∏︁ f ∏︁v for all n ∈N≥0.
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But this implies that maxΛn f −minΛn f = ∏︁Λn f ∏︁v → 0. Since we know from the
arguments above that maxΛn f → M and minΛn f → m, this implies that indeed
m = M . ◻
Not only does the coefficient of ergodicity allow us to decide in favour of
ergodicity, but by Equation (3.38) it also gives a numerical bound on the speed
of convergence. The main problem however is that, in the worst case, in order
to check for ergodicity in this manner, we need to calculate the coefficient
of ergodicity of Tk for powers k up to g(⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀), where g is Landau’s function.
This renders this approach, as described in Section 3.8148, impractical from a
computational point of view, making our approach preferable.
The following section describes yet another alternate approach for
checking ergodicity.
3.10 The critical graph versus the upper accessibility graph
The aim of Akian and Gaubert’s paper [1] is to determine, for convex,
monotone and non-expansive maps Φ, combinatorial bounds on orbit
lengths of the described maps. Although the scope of Akian and Gaubert’s
paper is different, it overlaps to some extent with our work on the limit
behaviour of upper transition operators. Akian and Gaubert try to describe
the entire (additive) eigenspace of the mapΦ. Their tool of choice for doing
that is what they call the critical graph 𝒢c(Φ) of the map Φ. It is defined
as the final graph 𝒢 f (∂Φ(v)) of the subdifferential ∂Φ ofΦ evaluated in an
(additive) eigenvector v . Akian and Gaubert define the subdifferential of the
operatorΦ evaluated in any vector v as
∂Φ(v) := {M ∈R⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀×⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀∶(∀ f ∈R⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀)Φ f −Φv ≥ M( f − v)} .
They show that the matrices M that belong to ∂Φ(v) are necessarily
stochastic matrices.
Let us now consider what happens in the special case thatΦ is an upper
transition operator T, in order to better understand the relationship between
their approach and ours. Given the constant additivity of T we can choose
any constant gamble as an (additive) eigenvector to calculate the critical
graph. To make things as simple as possible, we opt for the zero gamble. The
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subdifferential of T evaluated in this additive eigen vector then becomes
∂T(0) = {M ∈R⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀×⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀∶(∀ f ∈R⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀)T f ≥ M( f )} = 𝒯 ,
which is the closed convex set of transition matrices that corresponds with
the upper transition operator T, as defined by Equation (3.19). The critical
graph 𝒢c(T) = 𝒢 f (∂T(0)) = 𝒢 f (𝒯 ) is then (defined as) the union of all the
final graphs of the stochastic matrices belonging to 𝒯 . A final graph of a
stochastic matrix can be found by interpreting this stochastic matrix as an
adjacency matrix and restricting the corresponding graph to its final classes
(see also the discussion in Section 3.8.1148).
By comparing the definitions of the upper accessibility graph 𝒢(T) and
the critical graph 𝒢c(T) for an upper transition operator T, we see that
the strongly connected components of 𝒢(T) have to be unions of strongly
connected components of𝒢c(T). It is also not too difficult to see that the final
classes of 𝒢(T) and the final classes of 𝒢c(T) are the same. This is exactly
what allows us to check for top class regularity using the (usually much)
cruder upper accessibility graph.
If the convex closed set of transition matrices 𝒯 corresponding with
T is given explicitly in terms of a finite set of extreme points, then the
calculation of the critical graph might be preferred over the calculation of
the accessibility graph. However, if no finite set of extreme points is given, a
vertex enumeration step is required (assuming that, unlike in Example 138149,𝒯 has a finite number of extreme points). As it is provable that any algorithm
based on vertex enumeration cannot have polynomial time complexity, the
algorithm given by Akian and Gaubert becomes computationally intractable
in this case. This is where our algorithm stands out. The reason it does, is
because it works directly with the upper transition operator, and drops extra
eigen space information that is not needed when checking for ergodicity.
3.11 The eigenvector approach to imprecise Markov chains
In the classical analysis of precise Markov chains, convergence results
are usually reported in terms of eigenvalues of eigenvectors. A stationary
distribution is, for example, a left eigenvector belonging to eigenvalue 1
of the transition matrix. For imprecise Markov chains, this approach will
not be very fruitful in general. This is mainly because the linearity of the
operator is lost. For imprecise Markov chains with a two-dimensional state
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space 𝒳 = {x, y}, a gamble can always be written as constant gamble plus
a non-constant gamble and this sum can be pulled apart using constant
additivity as will become clearer later on. In this section, we focus on such
two-dimensional imprecise Markov chains.
In the binary case, the eigenequation is:
Tξ =λξ⇔)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
P(ξ⋃︀x) =λξ(x),
P(ξ⋃︀y) =λξ(y).
which can be written, using P465, as)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
ξ(x)+P ((︀ξ(y)−ξ(x)⌋︀I{y}⋃︀x) =λξ(x),
ξ(y)+P ((︀ξ(x)−ξ(y)⌋︀I{x}⋃︀y) =λξ(y).
We can continue from here using non-negative homogeneity. However then
we need to know the sign of ξ(x)−ξ(y). Therefore, the problem splits in two;
first we assume that ξ(x) ≥ ξ(y), and we call the corresponding solution ξx .
Afterwards we will find the solution for ξ(x) ≤ ξ(y) and denote this solution
by ξy .
If ξ(x) ≥ ξ(y), then we infer using P365 and the conjugacy relation
P(− f ) =−P( f ) that)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
ξ(x)+ (︀ξ(y)−ξ(x)⌋︀P (I{y}⋃︀x) =λξ(x)
ξ(y)+ (︀ξ(x)−ξ(y)⌋︀P (I{x}⋃︀y) =λξ(y).
In matrix form, this equation looks like11
(λ−1+P (I{y}⋃︀x) −P (I{y}⋃︀x)−P (I{x}⋃︀y) λ−1+P (I{x}⋃︀y)))︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂=:(λ12−M x y)
(ξ(x)
ξ(y)))︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂
ξ
= (0
0
) .⧸︀
0
This means that the non-linear eigenvalue problem, has been transformed to
a linear one, with the extra constraint that the eigenfunctions ξ must satisfy
ξ(x) ≥ ξ(y). The eigenvalues of M x y are given by the zeros of its characteristic
equation:
0 =(λ−1)2+ )︀P (I{x}⋃︀y)+P (I{y}⋃︀x)⌈︀(λ−1)+P (I{x}⋃︀y)P (I{y}⋃︀x)−P (I{x}⋃︀y)P (I{y}⋃︀x) ,
11here 12 stands for the two dimensional identity matrix.
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or,
0 =(λ− )︀1−P (I{y}⋃︀x)−P (I{x}⋃︀y)⌈︀)(λ−1)
0 =(λ− )︀P (I{x}⋃︀x)−P (I{x}⋃︀y)⌈︀)(λ−1).
This means that there are two solutions for ξ(x) ≥ ξ(y). The first solution,
which we denote by ξ1, is the eigenfunction belonging to the eigenvalue λ = 1.
Solving M x y(1) = 0 shows us that ξ1 must be a constant gamble. The first
eigenvalue/eigenfunction pair is thus given by
TI𝒳 = I𝒳 . (3.39)
This equation is fairly trivial as it can be derived from constant additivity.
The second solution ξx , is the eigenfunction belonging to the eigenvalue
λx := P (Ix ⋃︀x)−P (Ix ⋃︀y). Besides satisfying ξx(x) ≥ ξx(y), this solution has to
satisfy
0 = P (I{x}⋃︀y)ξx(x)+P (I{y}⋃︀x)ξx(y).
Any non-negative multiple of I{x}P (I{y}⋃︀x)− I{y}P (I{x}⋃︀y) satisfies both
constraints. The eigenequation therefore becomes
T(I{x}P (I{y}⋃︀x)− I{y}P (I{x}⋃︀y)))︁⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂]︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂⌊︂)︂
ξx
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λx
ξx . (3.40)
In a similar manner, we can derive the eigenvalues and functions in the
case that ξ(x) ≤ ξ(y). If we do so, then we see that I𝒳 is again the eigen
gamble belonging to eigenvalue 1. The other eigenvalue λy is then equal to
λy := P (I{y}⋃︀y)−P (I{y}⋃︀x) and the corresponding eigenfunction ξy is given
by ξy :=−I{x}P (I{y}⋃︀x)+ I{y}P (I{x}⋃︀y) and the eigenequation becomes
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ξy
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λy
ξx . (3.41)
Unlike the linear case, where the number of eigenvalues corresponds to
the dimension of the problem, we now have three different eigenvalues and
corresponding eigenfunctions.
If we apply the upper transition operator T repeatedly to ξx , and we
assume that neither ξx = 0 nor ξy = 0, then we can prove, using complete
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induction, that
Tnξx =
)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
λnx ξx λx ≥ 0,
νx ( 1−(λxλy)⟩︀ n2 (︁1−λxλy (1−λx)−1)+(λxλy)⟩︀ n2 (︁+1 (νx +λn mod 2x ξx)
λx < 0 and λy < 0 and 1 < n,−νxλx(1−λn−1y )+λxλn−1y ξx otherwise.
Here we have used that
−ξx = νx + 1−λx
1−λy ξy , with νx := P(I{y}⋃︀x)P(I{x}⋃︀y)−P(I{y}⋃︀x)P(I{x}⋃︀y),−ξy = νy + 1−λy
1−λx ξx , with νy := νx 1−λy1−λx .
What makes the two dimensional case especially attractive is that it is
possible, whenever ξx and ξy are nonzero, to express every gamble f as
the sum of a constant gamble and a non-negative multiple of one of the
eigenvectors ξx or ξy :
f =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
aI𝒳 +bξx f (x) ≥ f (y)
aI𝒳 +bξy f (x) < f (y)
where a ∈ R and b ∈ R≥0. This means that we can calculate any power of T,
applied to f as
Tn f =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
a+bTnξx f (x) ≥ f (y)
a+bTnξy f (x) < f (y)
We know that ⋃︀λ⋃︀ ≤ 1 (otherwise, the transition operator would be
expansive), so there is only one fixed point (up to a nonnegative multiple)
if both ⋃︀λx ⋃︀ < 1 and ⋃︀λy ⋃︀ < 1. This fixed point will be a multiple of ξ1 :=
I𝒳 , confirming Proposition 133145 and Theorem 132144. Observe that it is
extremely easy to find the limit value of Tn f : assuming for example that
f (x) ≥ f (y), we get that
lim
n→∞Tn f =
)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
a λx ≥ 0,
a−bνxλx λx < 0 and λy ≥ 0,
a−bνxλx 1−λy1−λxλy λx < 0 and λy < 0.
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CHAPTER 4
Imprecise Markov trees
The last twenty years have witnessed a rapid growth of graphical models in
the fields of artificial intelligence and statistics. These models combine graphs
and probability to address complex multivariate problems in a variety of
domains, such as medicine, finance, risk analysis, defence, and environment,
to name just a few.
Much has been done also on the front of imprecise probability. In
particular, credal nets [8] have been and still are the subject of intense
research. A credal net creates a global model of a domain by combining
local uncertainty models using some notion of independence, and then uses
this to do inference. The local models represent uncertainty by closed convex
sets of probabilities, also called credal sets, and the notion of independence
used with credal nets in the vast majority of cases has been that of strong
independence (with some exceptions in [5]).
An alternative and attractive approach to expressing independence that
is not committed to the sensitivity analysis interpretation is offered by
epistemic irrelevance (Section 1.5.168).
The question we address in this chapter should be clear: can we
define credal nets based on epistemic irrelevance, and moreover create
an exact algorithm to perform efficient inferences with them? We give a
fully positive answer to this question in the special case that (i) the graph
under consideration is a directed tree, and (ii) the related variables assume
finitely many values. The intuitions that showed us the way towards this
result originated in previous work on imprecise probability trees (see [12]
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and Chapter 280) and imprecise Markov chains (see [14] and Chapter 3122)
and lead to our paper on imprecise Markov trees [13], of which this chapter
is a reflection.
In Section 4.1, we discuss preliminary graph-theoretic notions, and define
the local uncertainty models that will be used at each node of a tree. These
models are formalised through the language of coherent lower previsions
(see Section 1.4.360). We discuss how such local models will give rise to
a global uncertainty model, which plays the same role as the joint mass
function built by the chain rule in a Bayesian net. Based on the global
model, we state the Markov Condition that defines the imprecise-probability
interpretation of our credal trees. As was the case in the previous chapter,
this Markov Condition involves epistemic irrelevance rather than strong
independence.
In Section 4.3168, we turn to the problem of constructing the most
conservative global model based only on the local models in the tree and
our Markov Condition. We show that this task can be achieved by a recursive
construction that proceeds from the leaves to the root of the tree using two
operations: the independent natural extension discussed in Section 1.5.168
and studied at length in [18, 19], and the marginal extension, defined in
Theorem 3051, and studied in great detail in [41, 62]. We also show that all
uncertainty models we consider, the local ones as well as the global ones that
we create, satisfy a consistency criterion that generalises (and is based on
the same ideas as) the usual consistency criterion in Bayesian nets: they are
(separately and jointly) coherent as in Lemma 2951 [39, 40, 62, 69]. This is an
important rationality requirement.
We briefly comment on some of the graphical separation criteria induced
by epistemic irrelevance in Section 4.4173. We then go on to develop and
justify an algorithm for making inferences on credal trees under epistemic
irrelevance in Section 4.5174. The algorithm is used to update the tree: it
computes posterior beliefs about a target variable in the tree conditional on
the observation of other variables, which are called instantiated, meaning
that their value is determined. It can in particular be used for treating the
model as an expert system.
Our algorithm is based on message passing, as are the traditional
algorithms that have been developed for precise graphical models. It has
some remarkable properties: (i) it works in time essentially linear in the size
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of the tree; (ii) it natively computes posterior lower and upper previsions
(or expectations) rather than probabilities; (iii) it is the first algorithm
developed for credal nets that exclusively uses the formalism of coherent
lower previsions; and (iv) we show that, under very mild conditions, using
the tree for updating beliefs cannot lead to inferences that are inconsistent
with the local models we have started from, nor with one another.
We give a step-by-step example of the way inferences can be drawn using
our algorithm in Section 4.6182. We also comment there on the intriguing
relationship between the failure of certain classical separation properties in
our framework, and the phenomenon of dilation [30, 50].
4.1 Credal trees under epistemic irrelevance
4.1.1 Basic notions and notation
We consider a rooted and directed discrete tree with finite width and depth. As
the graphical structure is a tree, like in Chapter 280, a lot of the notation can be
reused in the chapter. We call S the set of its nodes s, and we denote the root,
or initial node, by◻. As will become clearer later on, the nodes in an imprecise
Markov chain contain random variables, which is in contradistinction with
imprecise probability trees, where the nodes contain situations. For any node
s, we denote the set of its parents by pa(s). Of course, pa(◻) = ∅, and for
s ≠ ◻ we have that pa(s) = {mo(s)} where mo(s) is the mother node of s.
Also, for each node s, we denote the set of its children by ch(s), and the
set of its siblings by sib(s). Clearly, sib(◻) = ∅, and if s ≠ ◻ then sib(s) =
ch(mo(s))∖ {s}. If ch(s) = ∅, then we call s a leaf, or terminal node. We
denote by S◊ := {s ∈S∶ch(s) ≠∅} the set of all non-terminal nodes.
For nodes s and t , we write s ⊑ t if s precedes t , i.e., if there is a directed
segment in the tree from s to t . The relation ⊑ is a special partial order
on the set S. ancest(s) := {t ∈S∶ t ⊏ s} denotes the chain of ancestors of s,
and desc(s) := {t ∈S∶ s ⊏ t} its set of descendants. Here s ⊏ t means that
s ⊑ t and s ≠ t . We also use the notation ↓s := ancest(s)∪{s} for the chain
(segment) connecting ◻ and s, and ↑s := desc(s)∪{s} for the subtree with
root s. Similarly, we let ↓S :=⋃{↓s∶ s ∈ S} and ↑S :=⋃{↑s∶ s ∈ S} for any subset
S ⊆S.
With each node s of the tree, there is associated a variable Xs assuming
values in a non-empty finite set 𝒳s . We extend this notation to more
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complicated situations as follows. If S is any subset ofS, then we denote by XS
the tuple of variables whose components are the Xs for all s ∈ S. This new joint
variable assumes values in the finite set𝒳S =×s∈S𝒳s , and the corresponding
set of gambles is denoted byℒ(𝒳S).1 Generic elements of𝒳s are denoted by
xs or zs . Similarly for xS and zS in𝒳S . Also, if we mention a tuple zS , then for
any t ∈ S, the corresponding element in the tuple will be denoted by zt . We
assume all variables in the tree to be logically independent, meaning that
the variable XS may assume all values in𝒳S , for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆S. We also find it
convenient to identify a gamble on𝒳S with its cylindrical extension to𝒳U ,
where S ⊆U ⊆S.
Throughout this chapter, we consider (conditional) lower previsions as
models for a subject’s beliefs about the values that certain variables in the
tree may assume (see Section 1.4.360). We use a systematic notation for such
(conditional) lower previsions. Let I ,O ⊆S be disjoint sets of nodes with O ≠∅, then we generically2 denote by VO(⋅⋃︀X I ) a conditional lower prevision
(see Definition 5166), defined on the set of gambles ℒ(𝒳I∪O).3 For every
gamble f on𝒳I∪O and every xI ∈𝒳I , VO( f ⋃︀xI ) is the lower prevision (or lower
expectation, or our subject’s supremum buying price) for/of the gamble f ,
conditional on the event that X I = xI . We interpret VO( f ⋃︀X I ) as a real-valued
map (gamble) on 𝒳I that assumes the value VO( f ⋃︀xI ) in the element xI
of 𝒳I . The conjugate conditional upper prevision VO(⋅⋃︀X I ) is defined onℒ(𝒳I∪O) by VO( f ⋃︀X I ) := −VO(− f ⋃︀X I ) for all gambles f on 𝒳I∪O . We will
always implicitly assume that all conditional models VO(⋅⋃︀X I ) we use are
separately coherent, meaning that they satisfy properties P165, P265 and
P365 of Proposition 4864 and that VO( f ⋃︀xI ) = VO( f (xI , ⋅)⋃︀xI ). Hereafter, we
will frequently introduce conditional lower previsions of the type VO(⋅⋃︀X I ) as
if they are defined onℒ(𝒳O), simply because that is a very natural thing to
do: such a conditional lower prevision is usually interpreted as representing
1 For any subset S ofS,𝒳S is defined formally as the set of all maps xS of S to⋃s∈S𝒳s , such
that xS(s) = xs ∈𝒳s for all s ∈ S. So when S =∅, the empty product𝒳∅ is defined as the set of all
maps from∅ to∅, which is a singleton. The corresponding variable X∅ can then only assume
this single value, so there is no uncertainty about it.ℒ(𝒳∅) can be identified with the set R of
real numbers.
2Besides the letter V, we will also use the letters P, Q and R.
3In keeping with the observation in footnote 1, we also allow I = ∅, which means
conditioning on the variable X I = X∅, which can only assume one single value. This means that
VO(⋅⋃︀X∅) =: VO effectively becomes an unconditional lower prevision onℒ(𝒳O∪∅) =ℒ(𝒳O).
This is a very useful device that allows us to use the same generic notation for both conditional
and unconditional lower previsions.
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beliefs about the variable XO , conditional on values of the variable X I .
As soon as we consider a number of such conditional lower previsions
VOk (⋅⋃︀X Ik ), k = 1, . . . ,n, they should satisfy more stringent consistency criteria
than that each of them should be separately coherent: they should also be
consistent with one another in the sense of Walley’s (joint) coherence. For
more details about this much more involved type of coherence, we refer to
[39, 40, 62] and Definition 2951.
4.1.2 Local uncertainty models
We now add a local uncertainty model to each of the nodes s. If s is
not the root node, i.e. has a mother mo(s), then this local model is a
(separately coherent) conditional lower prevision Qs(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)) onℒ(𝒳s): for
each possible value zmo(s) of the variable Xmo(s) associated with its mother
mo(s), we have a coherent lower prevision Qs(⋅⋃︀zmo(s)) for the value of Xs ,
conditional on Xmo(s) = zmo(s). In the root, we have an unconditional local
uncertainty model Q◻ for the value of X◻; Q◻ is a (separately) coherent lower
prevision onℒ(𝒳◻). We use the common generic notation Qs(⋅⋃︀Xpa(s)) for
all these local models.
4.1.3 Global uncertainty models
We intend to show in Section 4.3168 how all these local models Qs(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s))
can be combined into global uncertainty models. We generically denote
such global models using the letter P. More specifically, we want to end up
with an unconditional joint lower prevision P := P↑◻ = PS on ℒ(𝒳S) for all
variables in the tree, as well as conditional lower previsions P↑s(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s))
on ℒ(𝒳↑s) for all non-initial nodes s, and P↑ch(t)(⋅⋃︀X t) on ℒ(𝒳↑ch(t)) for all
non-terminal nodes t .
Ideally, we want these global (conditional) lower previsions (i) to be
compatible with the local assessments Qs(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)), s ∈S, (ii) to be coher-
ent with one another, and (iii) to reflect the conditional irrelevancies (or
Markov-type conditions) that we want the graphical structure of the tree
to encode. In addition, we want them (iv) to be as conservative (small) as
possible.
In this list, the only item that needs more explanation concerns the
Markov-type conditions that the tree structure encodes. This is what we
turn to now.
164
4.1. Credal trees under epistemic irrelevance
4.1.4 The interpretation of the graphical model
In classical Bayesian nets, the graphical structure is taken to represent the
following assessments: for any node s, conditional on its parent variables, its
non-parent non-descendant variables are epistemically irrelevant to it (and
therefore also independent).
In the present context, we assume that the tree structure embodies
the following conditional irrelevance assessment, which turns out to be
equivalent with the conditional independence assessment above in the
special case of a Bayesian tree.
CI. Consider any node s in the tree, any subset S of its set of children
ch(s), and the set4 ⊥(S) :=⋂c∈S ⊥(c) of their common non-parent non-
descendants. Then conditional on the mother variable Xs , the non-
parent non-descendant variables X⊥(S) are assumed to be epistemic-
ally irrelevant to the variables X↑S associated with the children in S
and their descendants:
X⊥(S) EI X↑S ⋃︀Xs .
This interpretation turns the tree into a credal tree under epistemic irrelev-
ance, and we also introduce the term imprecise Markov tree (IMT) for it. For
the global models we are considering here, CI has the following consequences.
It implies that for all s ∈S◊, all non-empty S ⊆ ch(s) and all I ⊆⊥(S), we can
infer from P↑S(⋅⋃︀Xs) a model P↑S(⋅⋃︀X{s}∪I ), where for all z{s}∪I ∈𝒳{s}∪I , with
obvious notations:5
P↑S( f ⋃︀z{s}∪I ) := P↑S( f (⋅, zI )⋃︀zs) for all gambles f inℒ(𝒳↑S∪I ), (4.1)
where f (⋅, zI ) denotes a partial map of f , defined on𝒳↑S .
We discuss some of the separation properties that accompany this
interpretation in Section 4.4173. For now, we focus on two immediate con-
sequences that will help us go from local to global models in Section 4.3168.
First, consider some node s. Then CI tells us that for any two children
c1,c2 ∈ ch(s) of s, the variable X↑c1 is epistemically irrelevant to the variable
X↑c2 , conditional on Xs .
4Here the set ⊥(c) of non-parents non-descendants of the node c is defined by ⊥(c) :=
S∖(pa(c)∪desc(c)).
5For leaves s, the corresponding irrelevance condition is trivial, as the set ch(s) of children
of s is empty.
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Xs
X↑c1 . . . X↑c2
It even tells us that for any two disjoint non-empty sets S1 ⊆ ch(s) and S2 ⊆
ch(s) of children of s, the variable X↑S1 is epistemically irrelevant to X↑S2 ,
conditional on Xs . We conclude that, conditional on a node, all its children
c (and the variables associated with their sub-trees ↑c) are epistemically
independent (see Section 1.5.168), in the specific sense to be discussed in the
next section.
Next, consider some non-terminal node s different from ◻, and its
mother variable Xmo s . We infer from CI that this mother variable Xmo s is
epistemically irrelevant to the variable X↑ch(s) conditional on Xs :
Xmo(s)
Xs
X↑c1 . . . X↑cn
or equivalently,
Xmo(s)
Xs
X↑ch(s)
4.2 Factorising lower previsions
The following notion of factorisation is intimately linked with that of an
independent product (see [17, Theorem 24] and Section 1.5.168). It will also
play a crucial part in our development of an algorithm for updating an
imprecise Markov tree in Section 4.5174.
Definition 142: We call a (separately) coherent lower prevision P N onℒ(𝒳N) strongly factorising if for all disjoint proper subsets O and I of N , all
g ∈ℒ(𝒳O) and all non-negative f ∈ℒ(𝒳I ), P N( f g) = P N( f P N(g)).
As an important example, the so-called strong product ⊠n∈N P n [8] of the
marginal lower previsions P n is factorising [19].
6
6This type of independent product comes to the fore in a study of credal nets under strong
independence.
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As a consequence of the separate coherence of the joint lower prevision
P N , the right-hand side of the equality in this definition can be rewritten as:
P N( f P N(g)) =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
P N( f )P N(g) if P N(g) ≥ 0
P N( f )P N(g) if P N(g) ≤ 0 .
If fi ∈ℒ≥0(𝒳i ) for i ∈ I then this equation implies that
P N(P N(g∏
i∈I ) fi ) =
)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
P o(g)∏i∈I P i ( fi ) if P o(g) ≥ 0
P o(g)∏i∈I P i ( fi ) if P o(g) ≤ 0,
which explains where the term ‘factorising’ comes from. In particular, for any
(separately) coherent factorising joint lower prevision P N , we see that for any
non-empty subset I of N :
P N(×i∈I Ai ) =∏
i∈I P N(Ai ) and P N(×i∈I Ai ) =∏i∈I P N(Ai ), (4.2)
where Ai ⊆𝒳i for all i ∈ I .
The independent natural extension has very interesting and non-trivial
marginalisation and associativity properties (Proposition 6072). Consider
any non-empty subset R of N , then the independent natural extension
satisfies
⊗n∈N𝒜Xn = (⊗r∈R𝒜Xr )⊗ (⊗n∈N∖R𝒜Xn) and
margR (⊗n∈N𝒜Xn) =⊗r∈R𝒜Xr .
The corresponding lower prevision for any gamble f ∈ℒ(𝒳N) will be given
by (⊗n∈N P n)( f ) := {α ∈R∶ f −α ∈⊗n∈N𝒜Xn} (4.3)
and they satisfy (see also [19] and Proposition 6273)
(⊗r∈R P r )(g) = (⊗n∈N P n)(g) for all gambles g on𝒳R . (4.4)
Moreover, for any partition N1 and N2 of N , we have that
⊗n∈N P n = (⊗n1∈N1 P n1)⊗ (⊗n2∈N2 P n2) , (4.5)
so⊗n∈N P n is the independent natural extension of its𝒳N1 -marginal⊗n1∈N1 P n1
and its𝒳N2 -marginal ⊗n2∈N2 P n2 .
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If confronted with a finite set of marginal lower previsions, P n on𝒳n with
n ∈ N , then De Cooman, Miranda and Zaffalon proved [19, Theorem 24], that
the independent natural extension ⊗n∈N P n is factorising.
Theorem 143: Consider coherent lower previsions P n on ℒ(𝒳n), n ∈ N .
Then their independent natural extension ⊗n∈N P n is factorising.
4.3 Constructing the most conservative joint
Let us show how to construct specific global models for the variables in
the tree, and argue that these are the most conservative coherent models
that extend the local models and express all conditional irrelevancies (4.1),
encoded in the imprecise Markov tree. In Section 4.5174, we will use these
global models to construct and justify an algorithm for updating the
imprecise Markov tree.
The crucial step lies in the recognition that any tree can be constructed
recursively from the leaves up to the root, by using basic building blocks of
the following type:
Xmo(s)
Xs
X↑c1 X↑c2 . . . X↑cn
Qs(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s))
P↑ck (⋅⋃︀Xs)
The global models are then also constructed recursively, following the same
pattern. In what follows, we first derive the recursion equations for these
global models in a heuristic manner. The real justification for using the global
models thus derived is then given in Theorem 146172.
Consider a node s and suppose that, in each of its children c ∈ ch(s), we
already have a global conditional lower prevision P↑c(⋅⋃︀Xs) on ℒ(𝒳↑c) [or
equivalently, onℒ(𝒳{s}∪↑c)].
Given that, conditional on Xs , the variables X↑c , c ∈ ch(s) are epistem-
ically independent [see Section 4.1.4165, condition CI], the discussion in
Section 4.2166 leads us to combine the ‘marginals’ P↑c(⋅⋃︀Xs), c ∈ ch(s) into
their point-wise smallest conditionally independent product (conditionally
independent natural extension) ⊗c∈ch(s)P↑c(⋅⋃︀Xs), which is a conditional
lower prevision P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀Xs) onℒ(𝒳↑ch(s)) [or equivalently, onℒ(𝒳↑s)]:
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Xmo(s)
Xs
X↑ch(s)
Qs(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s))
⊗c∈ch(s)P↑c(⋅⋃︀Xs) =: P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀Xs)
Next, we need to combine the conditional models Qs(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)) and
P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀Xs) into a global conditional model about X↑s . Given that, con-
ditional on Xs , the variable Xmo s is epistemically irrelevant to the variable
X↑ch(s) [see Section 4.1.4165, condition CI], we expect P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀X{mo s,s})
and P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀Xs) to coincide [this is a special instance of Equation (4.1)].
The most conservative (point-wise smallest) coherent way of combining
the conditional lower previsions P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀X{mo s,s}) and Qs(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)) con-
sists in taking their marginal extension Qs(P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀X{mo s,s})⋃︀Xmo(s)) =
Qs(P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀Xs)⋃︀Xmo(s)); see [41, 62] and Theorem 3051 for more details.
Graphically:
Xmo(s)
X↑s Qs(P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀Xs)⋃︀Xmo(s)) =: P↑s(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s))
Summarising, and also accounting for the case s =◻, we can construct
a global conditional lower prevision P↑s(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)) on ℒ(𝒳↑s) by backwards
recursion:
P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀Xs) :=⊗c∈ch(s)P↑c(⋅⋃︀Xs) (4.6)
P↑s(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)) :=Qs(P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀Xs)⋃︀Xmo(s)) =Qs(⊗c∈ch(s)P↑c(⋅⋃︀Xs)⋃︀Xmo(s)),
(4.7)
for all s ∈S◊. If we start with the ‘boundary conditions’
P↑t(⋅⋃︀Xmo(t)) :=Qt(⋅⋃︀Xmo(t)) for all leaves t , (4.8)
then the recursion relations (4.6) and (4.7) eventually lead to the global
joint model P◻ = P↑◻(⋅⋃︀Xmo(◻)), and to the global conditional models
P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀Xs) for all non-terminal nodes s. For any subset S ⊆ ch(s), the global
conditional model P↑S(⋅⋃︀Xs) can then be defined simply as the restriction of
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the model P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀Xs) onℒ(𝒳↑ch(s)) to the setℒ(𝒳↑S):
P↑S(g ⋃︀Xs) := P↑ch(s)(g ⋃︀Xs) for all gambles g on𝒳↑S . (4.9)
It follows from the discussion leading to Equation (4.6) that, more directly
[see Equation (4.4)],
P↑S(⋅⋃︀Xs) =⊗c∈S P↑c(⋅⋃︀Xs). (4.10)
For easy reference, we will in what follows refer to this collection of global
models as the family of global models 𝒯 (P), so
𝒯 (P) := {P}∪{P↑S(⋅⋃︀Xs)∶ s ∈S◊ and non-empty S ⊆ ch(s)} .
We end this section by discussing a number of interesting properties for
the family of global models 𝒯 (P) we can derive in this way. Let us call any
real functionalΦ on ℒ strictly positive ifΦ(I{x}) > 0 for all x ∈𝒳. The proofs
of the following two propositions can be found in [13].
Proposition 144: If all the local models Qs(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)), s ∈ S are strictly
positive, then so are all the global models in 𝒯 (P).
Proposition 145: Consider any non-empty subset E of S and any xE ∈𝒳E . If
P({xE}) > 0 then also P↑c({xE∩↑c}⋃︀xe) > 0 for all e ∈ E and all c ∈ ch(e).7
Before we formulate the most important result in this section (and
arguably, in this chapter), we provide some motivation. Suppose we have
some family of global models
𝒯 (V ) := {V}∪{V↑S(⋅⋃︀Xs)∶ s ∈S◊ and non-empty S ⊆ ch(s)}
associated with the tree. How do we express that such a family is compatible
with the assessments encoded in the tree?
First of all, we require that our global models should extend the local
models:
V1. For each s ∈S, Qs(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)) is the restriction of V↑s(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)) toℒ(𝒳s).
The second requirement is that our models should satisfy the rationality
requirement of coherence:
7Observe that this holds trivially also if E ∩↑c =∅, because then𝒳E∩↑c =𝒳∅ is a singleton
[see footnote 1163] whose upper probability is 1 by separate coherence.
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V2. The (conditional) lower previsions in 𝒯 (V ) are jointly coherent.
The third requirement needs some preparatory explanation: the global
models should reflect all epistemic irrelevancies encoded in the graphical
structure of the tree. Naively, we would want condition (4.1) to be satisfied.
The problem is that only the right-hand side in Equation (4.1), involving
the model V↑S(⋅⋃︀Xs) is directly available to us. To get to the left-hand
side involving the model V↑S(⋅⋃︀X{s}∪I ), one naive approach would be to
‘condition the joint model V = VT on the variable X{s}∪I ’. But we have
seen in Proposition 5367 that given a joint model, coherence in general
only determines the conditional models uniquely, provided that the lower
probability of the conditioning event is non-zero. This is a fairly strong
condition, and in what follows we would generally prefer to work with the
much weaker condition that the upper probability of the conditioning event
is non-zero.
Nevertheless, as soon as we realise that all we can reasonably require
from our models is that they should be coherent, the right approach
readily suggests itself: we should require that if we use the available
models V↑S(⋅⋃︀Xs) to define the models V↑S(⋅⋃︀X{s}∪I ) through the epistemic
irrelevance condition (4.1), then the result should still be coherent:
V3. If we define the conditional lower previsions V↑S(⋅⋃︀X{s}∪R), s ∈S◊, S ⊆
ch(s) and R ⊆⊥(S) through the epistemic irrelevance requirements
V↑S( f ⋃︀z{s}∪R) :=V↑S( f (⋅, zR)⋃︀zs) for all gambles f inℒ(𝒳↑S∪R),
then all these models together should be (jointly) coherent with all the
available models in the family 𝒯 (V ).
And there is a final requirement, which guarantees that all inferences we
make on the basis of our global models are as conservative as possible, and
are therefore based on no other considerations than what is encoded in the
tree:
V4. The models in the family 𝒯 (V ) are dominated (point-wise) by the
corresponding models in all other families satisfying requirements TV1–
TV3.
It turns out that the family of models 𝒯 (P) we have been constructing
above satisfy all four requirements.
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Theorem 146: If all local models Qs(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)) on ℒ(𝒳s), s ∈ S are strictly
positive, then the family of global models 𝒯 (P), obtained through Equa-
tions (4.6)–(4.9), constitutes the point-wise smallest family of (conditional)
lower previsions that satisfy TV1170–TV3. It is therefore the unique family
to also satisfy TV4. Finally, consider any non-empty set of nodes E ⊆S and
the corresponding conditional lower prevision derived by applying regular
extension:
R( f ⋃︀xE) :=max{µ ∈R∶P↑T (I{xE}(︀ f −µ⌋︀) ≥ 0}
for all f ∈ ℒ(𝒳T ) and all xE ∈ 𝒳E . Then the conditional lower prevision
R(⋅⋃︀XE) is (jointly) coherent with the global models in the family 𝒯 (P).
The last statement of this theorem guarantees that if we use regular extension
to update the tree given evidence XE = xE , i.e., derive conditional models
R(⋅⋃︀xE) from the joint model P = P↑T , such inferences will always be coherent.
This is of particular relevance for the discussion in Section 4.5174, where we
derive an efficient algorithm for updating the tree using regular extension. It
implies in particular that our algorithm produces coherent inferences.
Proof: We will prove this theorem using the machinery of sets of acceptable gambles
developed in the first chapter. We start by picking, for every node s, any tuple (one
for every z in 𝒳mo(s)) of coherent sets of acceptable gambles 𝒜s)︁Xmo(s) that is
compatible with the local coherent conditional upper prevision Q s(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)).
The proper combination of these sets of acceptable gambles is done as explained,
by applying marginal extension and independent natural extension in an iterative
fashion:
𝒜↓s)︁Xmo(s) =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
𝒜s)︁Xmo(s)+∑xs∈𝒳s I{z} (⊗c∈ch(s)𝒜↓c(︁z) when s ∈S◊,𝒜s)︁Xmo(s) when s is terminal.
(4.11)
It follows immediately from the finite character of the tree, Properties 2749 and 2548,
Theorem 3051 and Lemma 5971, that𝒜↓s)︁Xmo(s) is the smallest (jointly) coherent
set of acceptable gambles that, by construction, encodes all necessary epistemic
irrelevancies.
We moreover know from Propositions 144170 and 145170 that the joint set of
almost acceptable gambles,𝒜↓◻, will not contain a practically impossible event. This
means that𝒜↓s)︁Xmo(s) is the result of properly updating and marginalising𝒜↓◻.
Clearly, the resulting joint set of acceptable gambles𝒜↓◻ does depend on the local
sets of acceptable gambles we have chosen initially. However, by ‘translating’ (use
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Theorem 112130 for Marginal Extension and the Proposition 6273 for the independent
naturals extension ) Equation (4.12) to lower previsions, we infer that
P↑s(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)) =)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
Qs(⊗c∈ch(s)P↑c(⋅⋃︀Xs)⋃︀Xpa(s)) when s ∈S◊,
Qs(⋅⋃︀Xpa(s)) when s is terminal. (4.12)
which are exactly Equations (4.7) and (4.8). More importantly, these equations do
no longer depend on the local sets of acceptable gambles that were chosen initially.
Hence, we may conclude that the global models P↑s(⋅⋃︀Xmo(s)) satisfy V1170–V3171
and V4171.
In the beginning of the proof, we were allowed to select any local set of acceptable
gambles𝒜s , compatible with the local lower prevision Qs(⋅⋃︀Xpa(s)). If we take not
just any set, but the (unique) set of almost desirable gamblesℛs , then we infer from
Proposition 5367 that R(⋅⋃︀xE) is the lower prevision that is compatible with the joint
set of almost desirable gambles, updated on xE ,ℛ↓◻(︁xE , whence R(⋅⋃︀xE) has to be
coherent with the global models P↑s(⋅⋃︀Xpa(s)), s ∈S and P↑ch(s)(⋅⋃︀Xs). ◻
4.4 Some separation properties
Without going into too much detail, we would like to point out some of the
more striking differences between the separation properties in imprecise
Markov trees under epistemic irrelevance, and the more usual ones that are
valid for Bayesian nets [47], which are also inherited from Bayesian nets by
credal nets under strong independence [8].
It is clear from the interpretation of the graphical model described in
Section 4.1.4165 that we have the following simple separation results:
Xi1 Xi2 Xt Xi2Xi1 Xt
where in both cases, Xi2 separates X t from Xi1 : when the value of Xi2 is
known, additional information about the value of Xi1 does not affect beliefs
about the value of X t . In this figure, between i1 and i2, and between i2 and t ,
there may be other nodes, but the arrows along the path segment through
these nodes should all point in the indicated directions. The underlying idea
is that t is a (descendant of some) child c of i2, and conditional on the mother
i2 of c , the non-parent non-descendant i1 of c is epistemically irrelevant to c
and all of its descendants.
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On the other hand, and in contradistinction with what we are used to
in Bayesian nets, we will not generally have separation in the following
configuration:
Xi1 Xi2 Xt
where Xi2 does not necessarily separate X t from Xi1 . We will come across a
simple counterexample in Section 4.6182. Where does this difference with the
case of Bayesian nets originate? It is clear from the reasoning above that Xi2
separates Xi1 from X t : conditional on Xi2 , X t is epistemically irrelevant to
Xi1 . For precise probability models, irrelevance always implies symmetrical
independence, and therefore this will imply that conditional on Xi2 , Xi1 is
epistemically irrelevant to X t as well. But for imprecise probability models
no such symmetry is guaranteed [7], and we therefore cannot infer that,
generally speaking, Xi2 will separate Xi1 from X t . As a general rule, we can
only infer separation if the arrows point from the ‘separating’ variable Xi2
towards the ‘target’ variable X t .
4.5 An efficient algorithm for updating in an imprecise Markov
tree
We now consider the case where we are interested in drawing inferences
about the value of the variable X t in some target node t , when we know the
values xE of the variables XE in a set E ⊆S∖{t} of evidence nodes; see for
instance Fig 4.1179 on page 179.
4.5.1 The formulation of the problem
If we assume that the values of the remaining variables are missing at
random, then we can do this by conditioning the joint P obtained above
on the available evidence ‘XE = xE ’; see for instance [22, 70].
We will address this problem by updating the lower prevision P to the
lower prevision Rt(⋅⋃︀xE) on ℒ(𝒳t) using regular extension (see Proposi-
tion 5367 and [62, Appendix J]):
Rt(g ⋃︀xE) =max{µ ∈R∶P(I{xE}(︀g −µ⌋︀) ≥ 0} (4.13)
for all gambles g on 𝒳t , assuming that P({xE}) > 0. Theorem 146172
guarantees that such inferences are coherent. The conditions that the local
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models should satisfy for this positivity assumption to hold are given in
Proposition 145170.
Consider the map
ρg ∶R→R∶µ↦ P(I{xE}(︀g −µ⌋︀).
We know from Lemma 5468, that ρg is continuous, concave and non-
increasing. Hence {µ ∈R∶ρg (µ) ≥ 0} = (−∞,Rt(g ⋃︀xE)⌋︀, which shows that the
supremum that we should have a priori used in (4.13) is indeed a maximum.
Rt(g ⋃︀xE) is the right-most zero of ρg , and it is, again by separate coherence
of P, guaranteed to lie between the smallest value min g and the largest
value max g of g . If moreover P({xE}) > 0, then Theorem 5367 implies that
Rt(g ⋃︀xE) is the unique zero of ρg . If on the other hand P({xE}) = 0, then(−∞,Rt(g ⋃︀xE)⌋︀ is the set of all zeros of ρg . It appears that any algorithm for
calculating Rt(g ⋃︀xE) will benefit from being able to calculate the values of
ρg , or even more simply, to check their signs, efficiently.
4.5.2 Calculating the values of ρg recursively
We now recall from Section 4.3168 that the joint P can be constructed
recursively from leaves to root. The idea we now use is that calculating
ρg (µ) = P(I{xE}(︀g −µ⌋︀) becomes easier if we graft the structure of the tree
onto the argument gµ := I{xE}(︀g −µ⌋︀ as follows. Define
gµs :=
)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
I{xs} if s ∈ E
g −µ if s = t
1 if s ∈S∖(E ∪{t}),
then gµs ∈ℒ(𝒳s) and gµ =∏s∈S gµs . Also define, for any s ∈S, the gamble φµs
on𝒳↑s by φµs :=∏u∈↑s gµu . Then
φ
µ◻ = gµ and φµs ≥ 0 if s ⇑⊑ t ,
and
φ
µ
s = gµs ∏
c∈ch(s)φ
µ
c for all s ∈S, (4.14)
where we use the convention that any product over an empty set of indices
equals one. Equation (4.14) is the argument counterpart of Equation (4.7).
Also, if s ⇑⊑ t then gµs and φµs do not depend on µ, nor on g . Indeed, in that
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case
φ
µ
s = I{xE∩↑s}. (4.15)
First, let us consider the nodes s ⇑⊑ t .
We define the messages pis and pis recursively by
pis :=Qs(gµs ∏
c∈ch(s)pic ⨄︀Xmo(s)) and pis :=Qs(gµs ∏c∈ch(s)pic ⨄︀Xmo(s)). (4.16)
We summarise such a pair by the notation: pis :=Qs(gµs ∏c∈ch(s)pic ⋃︀Xmo(s)) :=(pis ,pis). Then there are two possibilities:
pis =
)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
Qs({xs}⋃︀Xmo(s))∏
c∈ch(s)pic(xs) if s ∈ E ,
Qs( ∏
c∈ch(s)pic ⨄︀Xmo(s)) if s ∉ E ,
pis =
)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
Qs({xs}⋃︀Xmo(s))∏
c∈ch(s)pic(xs) if s ∈ E ,
Qs( ∏
c∈ch(s)pic ⨄︀Xmo(s)) if s ∉ E .
The messages pis and pis are gambles on𝒳mo(s), and can therefore be seen
as tuples of real numbers, with as many components pis(xmo(s)) as there
are elements xmo(s) in𝒳mo(s). They are all non-negative. As their notation
suggests, they do not depend on the choice of g or µ, but only (at most) on
which nodes are instantiated, i.e., belong to E , and on which value xE the
variable XE for these instantiated nodes assumes.
It then follows from Equations (4.7) and (4.14) and the strong factorisation
property8 that
P↑s(φµs ⋃︀Xmo(s)) =pis and P↑s(φµs ⋃︀Xmo(s)) =pis . (4.17)
8This, together with the course of reasoning leading to Equation (4.21), shows that the results
of updating the tree (and the algorithm we are deriving) in this way will be exactly the same for
any way of forming a product of the local models for the children of s, provided only that this
product is strongly factorising. For instance, replacing the conditionally independent natural
extension with the strong product in Equation (4.6) will lead to exactly the same inferences. Of
course, this should not be taken to mean that our algorithm also works for updating credal trees
under strong independence.
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Next, we turn to nodes s ⊑ t .
Define the messages piµs by
pi
µ
s :=Qs(ψµs ⋃︀Xmo(s)), (4.18)
where the gambles ψµs on𝒳s are given by the recursion relations:9
ψ
µ
t :=max{g −µ,0}∏
c∈ch(t)pic +min{g −µ,0}∏c∈ch(t)pic , (4.19)
and for each ◻ ≠ s ⊑ t , so mo s exists,
ψ
µ
mo(s) := ]︀max{piµs ,0}∏
c∈sib(s)pic +min{piµs ,0}∏c∈sib(s)pic{︀gµmo s . (4.20)
The messages piµs are again tuples of real numbers, with one component
pi
µ
s (xmo(s)) for each of the possible values xmo(s) of Xmo(s).10 They do
depend on the choice of g or µ, as well as on which nodes are instantiated
and on which value xE the variable XE for these instantiated nodes assumes.
It then follows from Equations (4.7) and (4.14) and the strong factorisation
property of the local independent products that
P↑s(φµs ⋃︀Xmo(s)) =piµs and of course ρg (µ) =piµ◻. (4.21)
We conclude that we can find the value of ρg (µ) by a backwards recursion
method consisting in passing messages up to the root of the tree, and in
transforming them in each node using the local uncertainty models; see
Equations (4.16) and (4.18)–(4.20).
There is a further simplification, because we are not necessarily interested
in the actual value of ρg (µ), but rather in its sign. It arises whenever there are
instantiated nodes above the target node: E ∩ancest(t) ≠∅. Let in that case
et be the greatest element of the chain E ∩ancest(t), i.e., the instantiated
node closest to and preceding the target node t , and let st be its successor in
the chain ↓t ; see for instance Figure 4.1179. If we let
λg (µ) :=max{piµst (xet ),0}∏
c∈sib(st)pic(xet )+min{piµst (xet ),0}∏c∈sib(st)pic(xet ),
9The maximum or minimum of two gambles (the zero gamble is also a gamble) should be
interpreted as a pointwise maximum, minimum respectively.
10If s is the root node, then mo(s) = ∅ and piµs is a single real number, which by
Equation (4.21) is equal to ρg (µ). See also footnote 1163.
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then it follows from Equation (4.20) [with s = st and mo(s) = et ] that ψµet =
I{xet }λg (µ). We easily derive that
ρg (µ) = a max{λg (µ),0}+b min{λg (µ),0}, (4.22)
where a and b are real constants that do not depend on g and µ. Letting
g := µ±1 then allows us to identify the constants a and b. It is easy to see,
however, that b > 0 and a ≥ 0 because we assumed from the outset that
P({xE}) > 0. We gather from this observation that
Rt(g ⋃︀xE) =max{µ ∈R∶λg (µ) ≥ 0} .
Moreover, by combining Equations (4.15) and (4.17) with Proposition
145170, we find that pic(xet ) = P↑c({xE∩↑c}⋃︀xet ) > 0 for all c ∈ sib(st), and
therefore λg (µ) ≥ 0⇔piµst (xet ) ≥ 0. Hence
Rt(g ⋃︀xE) =max{µ ∈R∶piµst (xet ) ≥ 0} .
We conclude that in order to update the tree in the situation described
above, we can perform all calculations on the sub-tree ↑st , where the new
root st has local model Qst (⋅⋃︀xet ). This is also borne out by the discussion of
the separation properties in Section 4.4173.
4.5.3 The algorithm
We now convert these observations into a workable algorithm.
Using regular extension and message passing, we are able to compute
Rt(g ⋃︀xE): we (i) choose any µ ∈ (︀min g ,max g ⌋︀; (ii) calculate the value of
λg (µ) by sending messages from the terminal nodes towards the root; and
(iii) repeat this in some clever way to find the maximal µ that will make
this λg (µ) zero. But we have seen above that this naive approach can be
sped up by exploiting (a) the separation properties of the tree, and (b) the
independence ofµ (and g ) for some of the messages, namely those associated
with nodes that do not precede the target node t .
For a start, as we are only interested in the sign of ρg (µ) [or equivalently,
that of λg (µ)], which we have seen is determined by the sign of piµst (xet ), we
only have to take into consideration nodes that strictly follow et .
The next thing a smarter implementation of the algorithm can do, is
determine the trunk S˜ of the tree: those nodes that precede the queried
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: observed node
: queried or target node t
: unobserved node
◻
X1
X2
et
X3
st
X4
X5
X15
X6
X7
X8
X9
X16
X10
t
X11
X12
X14
X13
Figure 4.1: Example imprecise Markov tree. The target node is t = 10, et = 2 is the
‘greatest’ observed ancestor of t and st = 3 is the child of et that precedes t . The bolder
arrows represent the trunk S˜ = {3,4,10} of the tree.
node t and strictly follow the greatest observed node et preceding t . We can
define the trunk more formally as follows: S˜ := ↓t ∩↑ch(et). For the tree in
Figure 4.1 for instance, where the darker X10 is the queried variable and the
lighter nodes {2,6,7,8,9,11,14,15} are instantiated, the trunk is given by
S˜ = {3,4,10}, and indicated by bolder arrows.
X4
Π4 = pi5pi14
X5
X15
X6
X7
X8
X9
X16
pi5 =Q5(pi6pi7⋃︀X4)
Q6({x6}⋃︀X5) = pi6
pi7 =Q7({x7}⋃︀X5)pi8pi9
pi8 =Q8({x8}⋃︀X7)
pi9 =Q9({x9}⋃︀X7)
pi15
1 = pi16
Figure 4.2: Calculation ofΠ4, which is a summary of the µ-independent messages in
the trunk node 4.
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We have a special interest in the nodes that constitute the trunk, because
only they will send messages to their mother nodes that actually depend on
µ. As a consequence, all other nodes (all descendants of the trunk that are
not in the trunk themselves) send messages that have to be calculated only
once. This implies that we can summarise all the µ-independent messages
by propagating all of them until they reach the trunk. The µ-independent
messages pis that arrive in a trunk node s can be represented more succinctly
by their point-wise products Πs :=∏c∈ch(s)∖S˜pic , because Equations (4.19)
and (4.20) only depend on them through these products.
This means that for every trunk node s ∈ S˜, we have to find the lower
(upper) messages of every child c of s that is not in the trunk itself. Bothpic and
pic can be calculated recursively using Equation (4.17), where the recursion
starts at the leaves and moves up to (but stops right before) the trunk. In the
leaves, the local lower and upper previsions of the indicator of the evidence
are sent upwards if the leaf is instantiated; if not the constant 1 is sent up,
which is equivalent to deleting the node from the tree. We could envisage
removing barren nodes (all of whose descendants are uninstantiated, such
as X1, X13, X16 in the example tree above) from the tree beforehand, but we
believe the computational overhead created by the search for them will void
the gain.
xet
Xst
X4
Xt
pi
µ
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ψ
µ
st
⋃︀xet )
pi
µ
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ψ
µ
4
⋃︀Xst )
pi
µ
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ψ
µ
t
⋃︀X4)
Figure 4.3: Calculation of pi
µ
st (xet ), whose sign is the same as that of the lower
prevision P(I{xE}(︀g −µ⌋︀).
The only recursion that is still left to do, is the calculation of the µ-
dependent messages piµs along the trunk. As demonstrated in Figure 4.3,
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we can calculate piµst (et) using the following recursion formula:
pi
µ
s :=
)︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌋︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀⌉︀]︀
Qs(max{g −µ,0}Πs +min{g −µ,0}Πs ⋃︀Xmo(s)) s = t ,
Qs(max{piµct ,0}Πs +min{piµct ,0}Πs ⋃︀Xmo(s)) s ∈ S˜∖{t} and
ch(s)∩ S˜ = {ct}.
These formulas are reformulations of Equations (4.18)–(4.20), where the
influence of theΠ has been made explicit.
Since we now know how to calculate piµst (et), we can tackle the final
problem: find the maximal µ for which piµst (et) = 0. In principle, a secant root-
finding method could be used, but using the concavity and non-increasing
character of piµst (et) as a function of µ, we can speed up the calculation of the
maximal root drastically as shown in Figure 4.4.
Let us briefly discuss the complexity of our algorithm. Consider for a
start that for a fixed µ each node makes a single local computation and then
propagates the result to its mother node: this implies that, with µ fixed, the
algorithm is linear in the number of nodes. Iterating on µ then amounts
to multiplying such a linear complexity with the number of iterations. This
µ
ρg (µ)
t
(a,ρg (a))
(b,ρg (b))
(c,ρg (c))
(d ,ρg (d))
p q r
p := ρg (c)b−ρg (b)c⇑ρg (c)−ρg (b);
m := c; t := p+m⇑2;
while m−p > tol and ρg (t) ≠ 0
if ρg (t) > 0
a := b; b := t ;
s := ρg (a)b−ρg (b)a⇑ρg (a)−ρg (b);
else
d := c; c := t ;
s := ρg (c)d−ρg (d)c⇑ρg (c)−ρg (d);
p := ρg (c)b−ρg (b)c⇑ρg (c)−ρg (b);
m :=min{m, s}; t := p+m⇑2;
Figure 4.4: The root of a concave and non-increasing function ρg whose values
ρg (a) > ρg (b) > 0 > ρg (c) > ρg (d) are known, will always be in the interval (︀p,m⌋︀
with m := min{q,r}. Here p, q and r are the intersections with the horizontal axis
of the straight lines through (b,ρg (b)) and (c,ρg (c)), (c,ρg (c)) and (d ,ρg (d)),
and (a,ρg (a)) and (b,ρg (b)), respectively. The next function evaluation of ρg will
be in t which bisects the error interval (︀p,m⌋︀. If ρg (t) > 0, then a becomes b and b
becomes t , otherwise d becomes c and c becomes t and a new interval (︀p,m⌋︀ and
matching t can be calculated. We stop iterating as soon as the error interval (︀p,m⌋︀ is
smaller than a given tolerance tol, or ρg (t) is exactly zero.
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number depends on the function g , as the iterations are made to compute the
root of a function that is known to belong to the real interval (︀min g ,max g ⌋︀.
If we assume that the bisection algorithm is employed to find the root—
for the sake of simplicity—and let r := max g −min g be the range of the
function, then the number of iterations is bounded by log2
r
tol + 1, where
tol is some fixed tolerance. In other words, the number of iterations is
linear in the number b of bits needed to represent r . This means that the
overall complexity of the algorithm is O(b ⋅ ⋃︀S⋃︀), taking into account that the
computational complexity of our root-finding algorithm must be lower than
for the bisection (and actually also for the secant) algorithm. Since b will be
a small number in most cases (e.g. when the focus is on probabilities), we
simply refer to the complexity of our algorithm as linear in the number of
nodes.
4.6 A simple example involving dilation
We present a very simple example that allows us to (i) follow the inference
method discussed above in a step-by-step fashion; (ii) see that there are
separation properties for credal nets under strong independence that fail for
credal trees under epistemic irrelevance; and (iii) see that in that case we will
typically observe dilation.
Consider the following imprecise Markov chain:
X1 X2 X3
? x2 x3
To make things as simple as possible, we suppose that𝒳1 = {a,b} and that Q1
is a linear (or precise, or expectation-like) model Q1 with mass function q . We
also assume that Q2(⋅⋃︀X1) is a linear model Q2(⋅⋃︀X1) with conditional mass
function q(⋅⋃︀X1). We make no such restrictions on the local model Q3(⋅⋃︀X2).
We also use the following simplifying notational device: if we have three real
numbers κ, κ and γ, we let
κ∐︀γ̃︀ := κmax{γ,0}+κmin{γ,0}.
We observe X2 = x2 and X3 = x3, and want to make inferences about the target
variable X1: for any g ∈ ℒ(𝒳1), we want to know R1(g ⋃︀x{2,3}). Letting r :=
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R1({a}⋃︀x{2,3}) and r :=R1({a}⋃︀x{2,3}), we infer from the separate coherence
of R1(⋅⋃︀x{2,3}) that it suffices to calculate r and r , because
R1(g ⋃︀x{2,3}) = g(b)+ r ∐︀g(a)− g(b)̃︀.
We let gµ = (︀I{a} −µ⌋︀I{x2}I{x3}, and apply the approach of the previous
section. We see that the trunk S˜ = {1}, and the instantiated leaf node 3
sends up the messages pi3 =Q3({x3}⋃︀X2) to the instantiated node 2, which
transforms them into the messages
pi2 =Q2({x2}⋃︀X1)pi3(x2) =: q(x2⋃︀X1)q ,
where we let q(x2⋃︀X1) := Q2({x2}⋃︀X1) and q := pi3(x2). These messages are
sent up to the (target) root node t = 1, which transforms them into the
message piµ1 = Q1(ψµ1) with ψµ1 = q(x2⋃︀X1)q∐︀I{a} −µ̃︀. If we also use that
0 ≤µ ≤ 1, this leads to
P 1(gµ) =piµ1 = q(a)q(x2⋃︀a)q(︀1−µ⌋︀+q(b)q(x2⋃︀b)q(︀−µ⌋︀,
so we find after applying regular extension that
r =R1({a}⋃︀x{2,3}) = q(a)q(x2⋃︀a)qq(a)q(x2⋃︀a)q +q(b)q(x2⋃︀b)q
r =R1({a}⋃︀x{2,3}) = q(a)q(x2⋃︀a)qq(a)q(x2⋃︀a)q +q(b)q(x2⋃︀b)q .
When q = q , which happens for instance if the local model for X3 is precise,
then we see that, with obvious notations,
r = r = q(a)q(x2⋃︀a)
q(a)q(x2⋃︀a)+q(b)q(x2⋃︀b) =: p(a⋃︀x2) (4.23)
and therefore X2 indeed separates X3 from X1. But in general, letting α :=
q(a)q(x2⋃︀a) and β := q(b)q(x2⋃︀b), we get
r −p(a⋃︀x2) = αβ
α+β q −qαq +βq and p(a⋃︀x2)− r = αβα+β q −qαq +βq .
As soon as q > q , X2 no longer separates X3 from X1, and we witness dilation
[30, 50]—the increase of uncertainty on extra observations, no matter what
they are—because of the additional observation of X3!
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
“Chapeau” and I thank you very much if you read yourself all the way
through this thesis. It is OK if you did not, I am still very happy that you
are about to read this conclusion. The hat might stay though. I wish you an
entertaining stroll through these conclusions which is a small summary with
some additional remarks about the modelling uncertainty chapter and the
chapter probability trees and the chapters: Markov chains and Markov trees
with the, admittedly, dull and uninspired predicate “imprecise”.
Modelling uncertainty
In Chapter 128, we introduced sets of acceptable gambles in an attempt to
define an uncertainty model that allows for indecision. The agent is offered
a number of gambles and he can either accept them or not accept them.
We assumed that the underlying utility is linear and that the agent meets a
minimal number of rationality requirements, like accepting sure gain and
avoiding Dutch book scenarios. A set of acceptable gambles that does not
show irrational behaviour is called a coherent set of gambles. Our approach
is strongly influenced by de Finetti [24], Ramsey [48], Williams [69] and
Walley [62, 64]. Besides the mathematical simplicity, we prefer to work with
sets of gambles because of their clear interpretation and operational nature.
In Section 1.342 we developed a multivariate framework that shows how
sets of acceptable gambles (modelling beliefs of the same agent) should
be combined. When we want to know what exactly are the agent’s beliefs
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about a subset of the modelled random variables, then it is explained in
Section 1.3.143 how beliefs can be marginalised and Section 1.3.245 explains
how to update beliefs on events. Apart from some pathological cases, both
marginalising and updating result in intersecting the cone of acceptable
gambles with a suitable subspace. This also explains why marginalising and
updating are commutative operations.
Coherent sets of fully resolved gambles can be seen as the acceptability
counterpart of linear previsions. We prove an acceptability version of Walley’s
lower envelope theorem [62, §2.6.3]. The set of all dominating resolved
coherent sets of acceptable gambles appearing in this lower envelope
theorem, can be seen as the acceptability analogue of credal sets. Usually
it is assumed that a credal set is closed. This closedness can be achieved
by restricting ourselves to sets of marginally acceptable gambles. Sets of
marginally acceptable gambles are one of the types of uncertainty models we
derived from sets of acceptable gambles. The other ones are sets of strictly
desirable gambles and lower (or upper) previsions. The three derived models
lack some of the expressiveness that comes with sets of acceptable gambles.
Therefore there is no bijective relation between lower previsions and sets of
acceptable gambles. In general this is not a problem. Only when updating,
this might cause problems and this is exactly where the sets of marginally
desirable and sets of strictly desirable gambles come in as they are special
extreme cases.
By asking an agent about his disposition towards a gamble f and its
negation − f , we are able to make the distinction between desirability and
irrelevance. By doing so, we show that we developed a theory that deals with
strong symmetry in a very natural way. Symmetry was not the focus of this
thesis, and this result is merely a by-product. However, we believe that this
elegant way of describing symmetry might be the strongest point in favour of
the framework of sets of acceptable gambles in future work.
Although finite possibility spaces are assumed, we do not expect major
difficulties when extending our theory to infinite possibility spaces. The
avoiding sure loss axiom will have to be adapted slightly (see Chapter 280),
and the Axiom of Choice will have to be used a number of times; sadly
this means that the constructive nature of some of the proofs will be lost.
Unfortunately, the results about the combination of models will not be that
easy to transfer when considering infinite possibility spaces. For example, it is
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known that (cut) conglomerability has to be assumed for marginal extension.
Imprecise probability trees
In Chapter 280, we have generalised probability trees—arguably the simplest
existing graphical model—in a way that is strongly connected to a special
case of Shafer and Vovk’s game-theoretic probability.
We haven’t paid much attention to the special case that the coherent
lower previsions and their conjugate upper previsions coincide, and are
therefore (precise) previsions or fair prices in de Finetti’s [24] sense. When
all the local predictive models P t (see Proposition 97107) happen to be precise,
meaning that P t( f ) = P t( f ) =−P t(− f ) for all gambles f on ch(t), then the
immediate prediction model we have described becomes very closely related,
and arguably identical to, the probability trees introduced and studied by
Shafer in [53]. Indeed, we then get predictive previsions P(⋅⋃︀s) that can be
obtained through concatenation of the local models P t , as guaranteed by
Theorem 96106.
We want to recall that Theorem 96106 and Proposition 97107 allow for a
calculation of the predictive models P(⋅⋃︀s) using only the local models and
backwards recursion, in a manner that is strongly reminiscent of dynamic
programming techniques. This should allow for a much more efficient
computation of such predictive models than, say, an approach that exploits
lower envelope theorems and sets of probabilities/previsions and forms the
basis for efficient algorithms when dealing with other types of graphical
models.
What makes this more efficient approach possible is, ultimately, the Mar-
ginal Extension Theorem (Theorem 3051), which leads to the Concatenation
Formula (Theorem 96106). Generally speaking (see for instance [62, § 6.7]
and [41]), such marginal extension results can be proved because of the
hierarchical and local nature of the assessments.
In Chapter 280, we also give some examples, like the Gambler’s ruin
which is a special instantiation of a counting process. General counting
processes are something that cannot be handled in our theory because we
do not allow for gambles that become infinite. Another example boils down
to the irrelevant forward product, which corresponds to the epistemically
independent product when permutation-invariant gambles are considered.
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This independent product is definitely something that deserves a bit more of
study as it forms the basis of every statistical theory.
In the last part of this chapter, sub- and supermartingales are considered.
Submartingales form a basic tool and concept in Shafer and Vovk’s game-
theoretic probability theory, There is a strong connection [12] between
the theory of imprecise event trees and Shafer and Vovk’s game-theoretic
probability. In the case of finite depth trees, the connection was proved [12],
but it remains still open whether the Matching Theorem in [12] holds in
general, for unbounded depth trees.
Imprecise Markov chains
In Chapter 3122, a special type of imprecise probability tree was studied: the
imprecise Markov chain. It can be viewed as a generalisation of classical
discrete time Markov chains with finite state space in which the Markov
condition is interpreted in terms of Walley’s epistemic irrelevance. This
interpretation does not entirely coincide with the sensitivity analysis in-
terpretation that was used in previous attempts to describe Markov chains
with parameter uncertainty. In the sensitivity analysis interpretation, the
Markov condition is interpreted as a strong independence assessment and
transition probabilities are replaced with credal sets, so these types of
generalised Markov chains are effectively special types of credal networks.
Nevertheless, both approaches yield the same results if we restrict ourselves
to calculating the marginal upper expectations for variables Xn . But in any
case, for the actual calculation of expectations, the set of transition matrices
approach suffers from a combinatorial explosion and the resulting high
computational complexity. This can be avoided using our upper transition
operator approach. We have proved that under the epistemic irrelevance
Markov assumption, lower or upper previsions of gambles can be calculated
in a recursive fashion. When calculating marginal gambles, the complexity of
this approach even becomes linear when the transition operator is considered
an oracle.
An important situation where the interpretation of the Markov condition
is not important is in the study of the limit behaviour—and closely linked
to that—ergodicity of upper transition operators. We have given different
equivalent conditions under which an upper transition operator is ergodic.
We have shown that ergodicity is completely determined by the eigenvalues
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and functions of the transition operator as is the case in classical Markov
chains. Unfortunately, it is at this point not known how to calculate these
eigenvalues in general. This is why we developed an alternative test for
ergodicity, which needs at most 2⋃︀𝒳 ⋃︀−1 evaluations of the upper transition
operator. Any algorithm that implements this test consists of two steps: the
first checks for top class regularity by building the upper accessibility graph
and checking for final strongly connected components and their cyclicity. In
some cases a second step is needed, to check for top class absorption.
Another approach that has been documented in the literature [61],
calculates the coefficient of ergodicity and checks whether there is some
iterate of the transition operator such that the corresponding coefficient
becomes strictly smaller than one. If this is the case, then the non-expansive
map that every upper transition operator is, becomes a contractive map
and ergodicity is a fact. Interesting about the coefficient of ergodicity is that
it moreover provides an upper bound on the speed of convergence. What
makes this approach difficult to use outside a theoretical context, is that there
is at present no efficient algorithm to calculate the coefficient of ergodicity.
It is moreover likely that very high powers of the upper transition operator
need to be calculated.
A paper with a different background is the very general work of Akian
and Gauber [1], who describe an algorithm for checking ergodicity of upper
transition operators that are piecewise affine. In practice, their algorithm
relies heavily on extreme points to calculate the subdifferential. If the set of
extreme points is given, then their critical graph approach is the shortest way
to get to all qualitative information available on the eigenspace of the upper
transition operator. If these extreme points are not given explicitly, then a
vertex enumeration step is involved which is computationally very hard as
any algorithm based on vertex enumeration cannot have polynomial time
complexity.
Our algorithm avoids the vertex enumeration step by using the upper
transition operator directly. It also allows checking for ergodicity for upper
transition operators whose ‘credal set’ has an infinite number of extreme
points. Of course, extra information about the eigenspace available through
the critical graph approach, not necessary for deciding upon ergodicity, may
be lost by using our simpler approach based on accessibility alone.
In a number of stochastic control applications that provide a motivation
188
for Akian and Gaubert’s work [1], the extreme points of the polytopes of
transition probability measures cannot be enumerated (only separation or
minimisation oracles are available), and hence, dealing with such situations
in the way we explain here, is also quite relevant in that application context.
Imprecise Markov trees
In Chapter 4160, we have defined imprecise-probability (or credal) trees using
Walley’s notion of epistemic irrelevance. Credal trees generalise tree-shaped
Bayesian nets in two ways: by allowing the parameters of the tree to be
imprecisely specified, and moreover by replacing the notion of stochastic
independence with that of epistemic irrelevance. Our focussing on epistemic
irrelevance is the most original aspect of this work, as this notion has received
limited attention so far in the context of credal nets.
We have focussed in particular on developing an efficient exact algorithm
for updating beliefs on the tree. Like the algorithms developed for precise
graphical models, our algorithm works in a distributed fashion by passing
messages along the tree. It computes lower and upper conditional previsions
(expectations) with a complexity that is essentially linear in the number
of nodes in the tree. This is remarkable because until now it was unclear
whether an algorithm with such features was at all feasible: in fact, epistemic
irrelevance is most easily formulated using coherent lower previsions or
sets of acceptable gambles, which have never before been used as such
in practical applications of credal nets, which tend to focus on a sets of
probabilities approach. Moreover, it is at this point not clear that epistemic
irrelevance is as “well-behaved” as strong independence is with respect to
the graphoid axioms for propagation of probability in graphical models [10,
42].1 Our results therefore appear very encouraging, and seem to have the
potential to open up new avenues of research in credal nets.
On a more theoretical side, we have also shown that our credal trees
satisfy the important rationality requirement of coherence. This has been
established under the assumption that the upper probability of any possible
observation in the tree is positive, which is a very mild requirement. The same
assumption also allowed us to show that all inferences made by updating
1Unlike credal nets based on strong independence, a credal net based on epistemic
irrelevance cannot generally be seen as equivalent with a set of Bayesian nets with the same
graphical structure: if it were, then all separation properties of Bayesian nets would simply be
inherited, and we have seen in Section 4.6182 that such is not the case.
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the tree will be coherent with each other as well as with the local uncertainty
models in the nodes of the tree.
Where to go from here? There are many possible avenues for future
research.
It would be very useful to be able to extend the algorithm at least to so-
called polytrees, which are substantially more expressive graphs than trees
are. This could be a difficult task to achieve. In fact, updating credal nets
based on strong independence is an NP-hard task when the graph is more
general than a tree [11]. Similar problems might affect the algorithms for
credal nets based on irrelevance.
For applications, it would be very important to develop statistical
methods specialised for credal nets under irrelevance that avoid introducing
excessive imprecision in the process of inferring probabilities from data. This
could be achieved, for instance, by using a single global IDM [63] over the
variables of the tree rather than many local ones.
Another research direction could be concerned with trying to strengthen
the conclusions that epistemic trees lead to. There might be cases where
our Markov condition based on epistemic irrelevance is too weak as a
structural assessment. We have discussed situations where this type of
Markov condition systematically leads to a dilation of uncertainty when
updating beliefs with observations, and indicated that this dilation is related
to (the lack of) certain separation properties induced by epistemic irrelevance
on a graph. Dilation might not be desirable in some applications, and we
could be called upon to strengthen the model in order to rule out such
behaviour. One way to address the issue of dilation—but not necessarily
the easiest—could consist in adding additional irrelevance statements to
the model, other than those derived from the Markov condition. An easier
avenue could be based on designing assumptions that together with the
Markov condition lead to some stronger separation properties, while not
necessarily requiring them to match the common ones used in Bayesian
nets.
190

APPENDIX A
The very basics of Graph Theory
In this appendix we will introduce the graph-theoretical notation that is used
in this work. We base ourselves on the work of Bang-Jensen & Gutin [3] and
Jarvis & Shier [33].
A directed graph 𝒢 consists of a non-empty finite set V (𝒢) of ele-
ments called vertices or sometimes called nodes, and a finite set A(𝒢)
of ordered pairs of vertices called arcs. In the figure we have a directed
graph with set of vertices V (𝒢) = {a,b,c,d ,e, f , g} and set of arcs A(𝒢) ={(a, a),(b, a),(c,b),(d , a),(b,d),(e,b),(c,e),(d ,e),( f ,d),( f ,e),(g ,e),(g , f ),( f , g),(g , g)}.
a
b c
d e
f g
Given an arc (x, y) of a graph 𝒢 we say that the vertex x is the head and y
is the tail of the arc. A path of length k in a graph 𝒢 is a sequence of vertices
x1x2 . . . xk−1xk such that (xi , xi+1) ∈ A(𝒢) for all i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,k −1} and such
that no vertex in the sequence x1x2 . . . xk−1 gets repeated. Any path in 𝒢 of
length k with k ∈N>0 from x to y is simply called a path in 𝒢 and is denoted
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an (x, y)-path. An (x, x)-path is also called a cycle. In the example above,
eba and f g eb are paths while f g f eb and f g g e are not; f g f , aa and debd
are cycles.
A subgraph ℋ of 𝒢 is a directed graph with V (ℋ) ⊆ V (𝒢) and A(ℋ) ⊆
A(𝒢). We say that the subgraph ℋ of 𝒢 is induced by S = V (ℋ) if A(ℋ) =
A(𝒢)∩V (ℋ)2. We denote the subgraph of 𝒢 induced by S as 𝒢⋃︀S .
A.0.1 Strongly connected components
A vertex y in a graph 𝒢 is reachable from x if x = y or if there is an(x, y)-path in 𝒢. The reachability relation on V (𝒢) is a preorder, i.e., it is
reflexive and transitive. The associated equivalence relation “x is reachable
from y and y is reachable from x” partitions the vertices V (𝒢) into
equivalence classes S1,S2, . . . ,Sn and the induced subgraphs 𝒢⋃︀Si are the
strongly connected components or strong components of 𝒢. Every vertex
in a strongly connected component is reachable by any other vertex. If there
is only one strongly connected component, then we say that the graph is
strongly connected or strong. In this case, every vertex is reachable from every
other vertex. In the example graph, the strongly connected components are
the subgraphs induced by S1 = {a}, S2 = {b,d ,e}, S3 = {c} and S4 = { f , g}.
a
b c
d e
f g
𝒢⋃︀S1
𝒢⋃︀S2
𝒢⋃︀S3
𝒢⋃︀S4
Tarjan [57] has developed an algorithm that is widely used to compute
strongly connected components of a graph 𝒢 and that has time complexity𝒪(⋃︀V (𝒢)⋃︀+ ⋃︀A(𝒢)⋃︀).
The period of a strongly connected network is the greatest common
divisor of the lengths of the cycles it contains.
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APPENDIX B
A short introduction to Order
Theory
We will try to give a short overview of the order theoretic concepts used in
this thesis.
B.1 Partial orders and their representation
Definition 147: A set P with a binary relation ≤ is partially ordered if it is
reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive, i.e. if for all x, y, z ∈ P
PO1. x ≤ x ≤ is reflexive on P ;
PO2. x ≤ y and y ≤ x implies x = y ≤ is antisymmetric on P ;
PO3. x ≤ y and y ≤ z implies x ≤ z ≤ is transitive on P .
A partially ordered set, or shortly poset, will be denoted as (P,≤). When either
x ≤ y or y ≤ x then we say that the pair (x, y) is comparable. If every possible
pair of elements of a partially ordered set (P,≤) is comparable then we say
that the set P is totally ordered by ≤.
A strict order relation < can be defined from the order relation ≤ by
demanding that x < y if and only if x ≤ y and x ≠ y . Both ≤ and < can be used
as fundaments for order theory. A new poset (P,≥) is induced from (P,≤) by
defining x ≥ y⇔ y ≤ x for all x, y ∈ P .
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B.1. Partial orders and their representation
A Hasse-diagram is a graphical representation of a finite partial order(P,≤). The graph is a directed graph, where the nodes are the elements of
P and a directed arc is drawn from the node x to the node y , if x < y and
there is no element z ∈ P such that x < z < y . So, a Hasse-diagram can be seen
as a minimal graphical representation of a finite poset. Usually, the Hasse-
diagram is defined as an undirected graph, where the direction of the order
relation can be understood from the fact that greater elements are put higher
in the graph. We will not follow this custom and define the Hasse-diagram
immediately as a directed graph.
∅
{a} {b} {c}
{a, b} {a, c} {b, c}
{a, b, c}
Figure B.1: The Hasse diagram of the partial order (2{a,b,c},⊆).
B.1.1 Chains and antichains
Definition 148: A chainC of a partially ordered set (P,≤) is a totally ordered
subset of P that is not empty:
C is a chain⇔ (∀x, y ∈C ≠∅)(x ≤ y or y ≤ x).
Definition 149: An antichainC of a partially ordered set (P,≤) is a subset of
P that is pairwise incomparable:
C is an antichain⇔ (∀x, y ∈C)(x ⇑≤ y and y ⇑≤ x).
An example of a chain in Figure B.1 is the set {∅,{b} ,{a,b,c}}. An example
of an antichain in Figure B.1 is the set {{a,b} ,{a,c} ,{b,c}}.
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B.2 Special elements in order relations
A (subset of a) poset (P,≤) has a greatest element or maximum g , if for every
element t ∈ P it holds that t ≤ g . The greatest element can be considered as an
upper bound of the set and is necessarily unique but does not need to exist.
An upper bound of a poset (P,≤) can be defined as any set S such that for any
s ∈ S and for any p ∈ P it holds that p ≤ s. The maximum of a set should not
be confused with the maximal elements of a partial order which are all the
elements of the set that are undominated: x ∈ P is maximal if and only if z ≥ x
for any z ∈ P implies that z = x.
The supremum or least upper bound of a subset S denoted supS of a
partial order (P,≤) is the smallest element of P that is greater or equal than
every element of S. The supremum does not need to exist. If it does and if it
is in S then it is necessarily the greatest element of S.
Given a poset (P,≤), the dual relation ≥ can always be defined as x ≤ y⇔
y ≥ x. It turns out that (P,≥) is again a partial order. Similar to the definitions
above smallest element, minimal elements and minimum, lower bound
and infimum can be defined.
𝒮∅
{a} {b} {c}
{a, b} {a, c} {b, c}
{a, b, c}
Figure B.2: The Hasse diagram of the partial order (2{a,b,c},⊆). The set 𝒮 does not
have a greatest element or maximum. It does have a least upper bound though:
sup𝒮 = {a,b,c}which is the maximum of 2{a,b,c}. The smallest element of 𝒮 is given
by min𝒮 =∅. Clearly, inf𝒮 =min𝒮 . The maximal elements of the partial order (𝒮 ,⊆)
are given by {{a,b} ,{a,c} ,{b,c}}.
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B.3 Some special orders
We already saw one special type of partial order, the total order. Other special
types of orders exist as well and we will here define some that are used in this
work.
Definition 150: A totally ordered set (P,≤) iswell-ordered if and only if every
nonempty subset 𝒮 of P has a least element in this ordering.
A well-ordered set is sometimes said to be a well-founded order. An example
of a well-ordered set is the set of natural numbers N≥0. The set of all non-
negative real numbers R≥0 on the other hand, is an example of a totally
ordered set that is not well-ordered.
Definition 151:
1. A set P with order relation ≤ is a lattice if every two-element subset of
P has a supremum and an infimum in P .
2. A poset (P,≤) is a complete lattice if every non-empty subset has a
supremum and an infimum in P .
The set of all positive real numbers R>0, is an example of a complete lattice
that is not well-ordered.
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Symbols
Number sets
R real numbers
R∗ extended real numbers
Q rational numbers
R>0 positive real numbers
R<0 negative real numbers
R≠0 real numbers without zero
R≥0 nonneggative real numbers
N≥0 natural numbers (with zero)
N>0 natural numbers without zero
Mathematical symbols
⇔ is equivalent to⇒ implies∧ (logical) and∨ (logical) or¬ (logical) not∈ is element of⇑∈ is not an element of⊆ is a subset of
⊂ is a strict subset of
:= is by definition equal to=: which is the definition of> greater than< less than≥ greater or equal than≤ less or equal than≻ pointwise strictly greater≺ pointwise strictly smaller
Ac complement of the set A𝒪 big O notation (complexity)⋃︀⋅⋃︀ absolute value or cardinality⟨︀⋅⧹︀ round to the largest integer
smaller or equal than ⋅[︂⋅⌉︂ round to the smallest integer
greater or equal to ⋅∏︁⋅∏︁ norm∏︁ f ∏︁∞ = ∑x∈𝒳 ⋃︀ f (x)⋃︀ supremum
norm of f∏︁ f ∏︁2 = ∑x∈𝒳 ( f (x))2 Euclidean
norm of f∏︁ f ∏︁v = sup f − inf f variation
208
seminorm
f ⋃︀A restriction of the function f to
the space A, 27
int interior
cl closure
1 identity matrix
ωT( f ) set of limit points of the
trajectory Tk f , 123
Graph and tree symbols
𝒢,ℋ any graph, 192𝒢(T) upper accessability graph
used to check top class
regularity,136𝒢(T)⋂︀ℛ graph used to check top
class regularity, 148𝒢c Akian and Gaubert’s critical
graph, 154𝒢 f Akian and Gaubert’s final graph,
154𝒢(T) upper accessibility graph
used to check top class regularity,
148⊑ precedes, 83⊏ strictly precedes, 83⊒ follows, 83⊐ strictly follows, 83∥ is not ordered with, 83↓S nodes preceding the nodes in
the set S, 83↑S nodes preceding the nodes in
the set S, 83
pa(s) parents of the node s, 162
mo(s) mother of the node s, 84
ch(s) children of the node s, 84
sib(s) siblings of the node s, 162
ancest(s) ancestors of the node s,
162
desc(s) descendants of the node s,
162⊥(s) nodes that are non-parents
non-descendants of s, 165
depth(s) depth of s in a forward
irrelevant process tree, 112
length(⋅) length of a path in a tree,
141𝒞x set of simple cycles from the
state x, 141
varU F make a variable from the
process F by evaluating in the cut
U , 89
StopU F stop (keep constant) the
process F in the cut U , 26
KillU F kill (make zero) the process
F in the cut U , 26◻ initial situation of a tree, 83
ω a generic terminal situation,
S set of all nodes/situations of a
tree, 83
S˜ trunk in a Markov tree, 178
P set of all paths, 85
UVs the set of all cuts following the
situation s and preceding the cut
V , 88
Ω set of terminal situations, 84
E(a) (exact) event, 86
ω a generic terminal situation
S set of all nodes/situations of a
tree, 83
S˜ trunk in a Markov tree, 178
P set of all paths, 85
UVs the set of all cuts following the
209
SYMBOLS
situation s and preceding the cut
V , 88
Ω set of terminal situations, 84
E(a) (exact) event corresponding
to the situation a, 86
IP specific symbols
f , g generic name for a gamble,
h generic name for a (local) gam-
ble,
I A indicator function, 26⊑ is less resolved than, 38⊒ is more resolved than, 38
posi convex hull, 31
span finite linear span, 31
cccl cut-conglomerabiliy closure,
98
ext natural extension, 35
regext regular extension, 55
EI is epistemic irrelevant to, 69⊗ epistemic independent product,
70⊠ strong product, 166
margA (⋅) marginalisation, 43𝒜⋃︀x condition on x, 47𝒜⧹︀x update on x, 47
projA f projection operator, 43
projTA f lifted projection operator,
43
cylextA f cylindrical extension, 45
cylextTA f lifted cylindrical exten-
sion, 45
cylext−1A f pre-image of lifted cyl-
indrical extension, 45𝒮 selection process, 92
∑t𝒮 summation of a selection pro-
cess, 92
M submartingale, 114
M supermartingale, 114
ρ,ρ’ coefficients of ergodicity, 153
Sets of gambles
ℒ(𝒳 ) Set of all gambles on 𝒳
(linear space), 26𝒩 Set of strictly desirable gambles,
56𝒟 Set of desirable gambles, 30𝒜 Set ofacceptable gambles, 29𝒰 Set of undesirable gambles, 29ℐ Set of indifferent gambles, 30𝒪 Set of unresolved gambles, 29ℛ Set of almost desirable gambles,
53
A Set of coherent sets of acceptable
gambles, 34
M Set of all resolved sets of accept-
able gambles, 39ℳ Set of resolved, acceptable gam-
bles, 39𝒫 Set of linear previsions (credal
set), 132𝒯 Set of linear transition operators,
132
Selst(𝒜⋅) Set of all t-selecions, 93
SumSelst(𝒜⋅) Set of all summed t-
selecions, 93𝒜E(◻) Set of of acceptable gambles
for event tree, 94
Previsions
p probability,
210
p lower probability,
p upper probability,
q local lower probability,
q local upper probability,
P linear prevision, 65
P lower prevision, 60
P upper prevision, 63
P lower-upper prevision
N lower prevision under natural
extension, 66
R lower prevision under regular
extension, 66
Q local linear prevision,
Q local lower prevision,
Q local upper prevision,
T linear transition operator, 126
T lower transition operator, 130
T upper transition operator, 129
T linear projection operator, 126
T upper projection operator, 129
P nx y upper transition probability to
go in n steps from x to y , 135
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